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The process of European integration (EUI) has long been the subject of limited 
public debate, and the domain was seen as dominated mainly by European 
political elites. The project generally presents itself as a continental-scaled, 
post-national political project, aiming to pool certain executive, legislative, and 
judicial responsibilities at the supra- or international level.1 It aims to achieve 
an “ever closer union of the European people” to constrain of past national 
rivalries and promote a sphere of peace and stability.2 The process can broadly 
be divided into three main periods: the first period spanning the early stages of 
the integration process in the 1950s until the late-1980s, the second period from 
the establishment of a union in the early-1990s until the late-2000s, and the third 
period lasting until the election of the European Parliament (EP) in 2019.3  
Especially during the first period of EUI, political rivalries and ideological 
conflicts were mostly absent from the process. The modi-operandi within the 
European institutions favored compromise over conflict.4 The process was 
dominated by pro-integrationists supporting the European project and a 
favorable attitude among the public. This favorable attitude among the 
European public during that time was generally labeled as “permissive 
consensus.”5 The presumed consensus enabled European elites to accelerate the 
process of integration without much interference of the broader public. For 
instance, it seems that the Schuman Plan from 1950 – as a fundamental political 
concept to amalgamate of German and French coal and steel production after 
                                               
1 Hix (2007); European Union (2012). 
2 Recital 1 of the preamble to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
See European Union (2012), also Cantat (2015). 
3 See also: Vasilopoulou (2013), who assumes a somewhat similar division of time periods 
within the process of EUI. 
4 About narratives, see also: Cantat (2015). 




the Second World War – was launched by a small political elite working in an 
almost conspiratorial fashion. They were able to maneuver quickly and 
effectively, partly due to the lack of public involvement.6  
In the second period of EUI, the presumed permissive consensus of the public 
seemingly eroded.7 This is particularly shown in Margaret Thatcher’s – Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990 – famous Bruges speech 
from 1988, in which she fundamentally challenges the European project and the 
direction it was taking. Her speech has often been seen as a turning point in the 
public debate surrounding the EUI process, stimulating divergent positions 
toward the European project. EUI became therefore increasingly subjected to a 
significant and controversial debate in the media and public. The more critical 
contributions towards EUI were characterized by resistance toward the process 
and the increasing support of re-nationalization efforts, showing disaffection 
with the European institutions themselves.8 
During the third period of EUI, these movements became increasingly visible 
in the European institutions, whereby euro-critical and anti-establishment 
parties represented the growing discontent with traditional parties and elites.9 
The manifestation of resistance to EUI became particularly apparent in the 2014 
and 2019 elections of the EP. For instance, in 2014, over twenty-five percent of 
the seats were taken by euro-critical parties, compared with around sixteen 
percent in 2009.10 Parties such as the Front National (FN) in France, the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) 
in Germany, the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) in Italy and Synaspismos 
                                               
6 Inglehart (1970). Scholars assume that this kind of consensus prevailed until the 1970s 
(Down and Wilson 2008: 46). 
7 Hooghe and Marks (2009); Risse (2017). 
8 These movements were often labeled “Euroscepticism” (Usherwood and Startin 2012). 
9 Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008); Mair (2011). 
10 See election results of the European Parliament in 2014 and 2019 (European Union 2014, 




Rizospastikis Aristeras (SYRIZA) in Greece achieved unprecedented electoral 
success and gained significant shares.11 Claims on the need for major reforms 
or even re-nationalization of the European Union (EU) became commonplace 
across the political spectrum.12 This development experienced another peak 
with the “Brexit” referendum in June 2016, which eventually led to the exit of 
the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU. 
The discourse on EUI has thus experienced a significant change over the past 
decades. It has transformed from a presumed permissive consensus towards a 
growing discontent and resistance within the general public, calling the very 
existence of the European institution into question.13 As a result, the EU finds 
itself faced with a substantial crisis, as Emmanuel Macron – French President 
since 2017 – formulated in 2019: 
“[Europe] is a historic success: the reconciliation of a devastated continent in 
an unprecedented project of peace, prosperity and freedom. […] Never, since 
World War II, has Europe been as essential. Yet never has Europe been in so 
much danger. Brexit stands as the symbol of that. It symbolizes the crisis of 
Europe.”14 
These developments were accompanied by the emergence of extensive and 
growing academic literature around the phenomenon.15 Earlier studies during 
the first period of EUI mostly showed a Europhile tenor, mainly focusing on the 
                                               
11 Brack and Startin (2015); Hobolt (2015); Hobolt and de Vries (2016a). 
12 Abbarno and Zapryanova (2013); Brack (2018). 
13 Scholars have identified challenges within the EU. This applies in particular to decision-
making and the legitimation of the EU among its members (Hix 2007). These challenges 
have also been taken as a sign that elite and public preferences on EUI are out of sync. As 
the European Council expressed concerns that citizens see the EU as “a threat to their 
identity” and “feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight” (European Council 
2002; see also: Hobolt 2012). Against this background, it is also important to analyze the 
process of EUI and understand how the discourse within the EU is shaped (Hobolt and 
Wratil 2015; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011). 
14 Macron (2019). 




support and legitimation of the process of EUI.16 In later periods of the EUI, 
scholarly attention has shifted more towards the study of resistance and euro-
critical parties. The phenomenon of resistance and the increasing questioning of 
the process was widely labeled as “Euroscepticism” both in the media as well 
as in the academic debate. The broad academic discourse assumed that 
Euroscepticism developed from a marginal political phenomenon to an 
established position even held by mainstream parties and parties in government. 
The phenomenon thus holds the potential to damage the EU’s quest for 
legitimacy and stability in the long run.17 Following these events, the study of 
Euroscepticism towards EUI became a well-established subfield in European 
integration studies (short: European studies, sometimes EU studies).18 Most 
research conducted within the field of Euroscepticism focuses on rational 
approaches.19 However, earlier in the 2000s, the field experienced a so-called 
“critical turn.” Since then, critical theorists have embraced the academic field, 
providing the main theoretical alternative to rational approaches within the 
discipline.20 Critical theorist in International Relations (IR) generally challenge 
the theoretical and political status quo in the discipline and, in particular, 
positivist and post-positivist positions. These critiques comprise Frankfurt-
school theoreticians, poststructuralists, neo-Gramscian, feminists, and others. 
                                               
16 See for instance: Inglehart (1970); Gabel (1998). 
17 Here, see for instance: Kopecký and Mudde (2002); Marks and Steenbergen (2002, 
2004a, 2004b); Szczerbiak and Taggart (2002, 2017: 11); Harmsen and Spiering (2004a); 
Hix (2005); Hooghe (2007); Hooghe and Marks (2007); Krouwel and Abts (2007); 
Usherwood and Startin (2012); Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia (2013); Leconte (2015); 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2016). 
18 Here, see for instance: Schmitt, H. and Thomassen (1999); Flood (2002); Kopecký and 
Mudde (2002); Leconte (2010); Mair and Thomassen (2010); Capuzzi (2016). 
19 These studies mainly focus on analyzing the “nature” of the term, as well as its underlying 
“drivers” (Brack and Startin 2015; Leruth, Startin, and Usherwood 2017a; Brack 2018). 
However, the study at hand takes a poststructuralist perspective and thus explicitly rejects 
these rational theoretical assumptions. From a poststructuralist perspective, there exists no 
“nature” or “driver” of a certain phenomenon; instead, the social is generally discursively 
constructed. 
20 Here, see for instance: Rengger and Thirkell-White (2007). Further, Robert Cox is one 




They all hold different epistemological and ontological premises from those of 
realism and liberalism. Regarding poststructuralism, it is often described as “a 
critical attitude”21 or “an ethos of critique”22, problematizing general claims and 
fundamental mainstream assumptions within the field of study. Influenced by 
theorists such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, it further explores 
possible ways to understand the social and political sphere beyond rational 
approaches based on essentialism.23 
The present study adopts a critical poststructuralist perspective to analyze the 
phenomenon of growing discontent and resistance regarding the process of EUI 
and gain a more comprehensive understanding of the existing debate. Chantal 
Mouffe’s Agonistic Model of Democracy (AMD) offers such critical 
perspective, providing a well-researched discourse-based poststructuralist 
theory of democracy.24 Mouffe’s AMD proposes that the absence of agonistic 
confrontation between differing parties and opinions allows for a growing 
apathy and disaffection in democratic systems to emerge.25 In opposition to the 
popular deliberative democratic approach based on the possibility of a rational 
consensus, Mouffe argues that the creation of democratic affection depends 
neither on “sophisticated rational arguments [nor] on making context-
transcendent truth claims.” Instead, identification within democratic systems 
takes place through complex articulatory practices and discourses.26 The 
affection with the democratic principles requires therefore a democratic ethos 
constituted by the mobilization of passion within the democratic design given 
                                               
21 Campbell and Shapiro (2007); Campbell (2013). 
22 Jabri (2007). 
23 Edkins (2007: 89); Çalkıvik (2017). Further, for critique of poststructuralism, see further: 
Rengger and Thirkell-White (2007); Khan and Wenman (2017). Essentialism is further 
understood as the idea that “every entity has a set of attributes that are necessary to its 
identity and function” (Cartwright 1968: 615-626). 
24 See also: Dahl (1961, 1982); Held (1995); Offe (2006: 34-35). For agonistic approaches 
in IR, see also: Mouffe (2013: xv, Ch. 2); Norval (2007: 4-5). 
25 Mouffe (2000c: 85, 105). 




the possibility for democratic subjects to identify with diverse political 
positions.27 Democratic politics thus always implies conflict and the dimension 
of antagonism. The aim of politics is therefore “the creation of unity in a context 
of conflict and diversity.”28 According to Mouffe’s approach, democratic 
systems that place excessive emphasis on political consensus tend to preclude 
opportunities for a vibrant dispute between legitimate and diverse positions, 
thus creating space for apathy and disaffection from the democratic system.29 
Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism combines the elements of conflict, 
consensus, democracy and politics in a way that allows for a substantial critique 
of the present conjunction of the European institutions. From the perspective of 
AMD, it may be suggested that the development of EUI – particularly during 
the earlier period – indicated a lack of real debate on the direction of the 
integration process within the institutions. Accordingly, this reflected a situation 
of dislocated identification enabling apathy and ultimately re-nationalization 
efforts to thrive.30 In this way, Mouffe’s model offers a potentially fruitful 
avenue to gain new insights and a deeper understanding of the process of EUI 
and the destructive phenomenon of resistance. It provides ways to re-think the 
constitution and practice of European institutions and eventually offers reform 
opportunities that allow to include marginalized groups and minorities into the 
democratic process and thus for a stronger affection with the institution under 
the condition of pluralism.31 It further suggests a compelling vision of political 
decision-making by emphasizing the benefits of political contestation and 
illustrating the dangers of a consensus-focused approach. Therefore, this 
analysis presents the argument that Mouffe’s AMD – particularly her emphasis 
on conflict – can be usefully applied to the discourse on EUI, providing an 
opportunity to understand the functioning of the political system in new ways 
                                               
27 Mouffe (1995b: 6). 
28 Mouffe (1995b: 9). 
29 Mouffe (2000c: 105). 
30 Mouffe (2013). 




and gain a better understanding of the phenomenon under investigation.32 The 
phenomenon under investigation has however not yet been studied from the 
perspective of AMD, receiving hardly any scholarly attention in the field. 
Accordingly, this study aims to address this research gap, aspiring to make sense 
of the emerging resistance and re-nationalization efforts driven by euro-critical 
parties from the perspective of AMD. The research question at the heart of this 
thesis thus reads: “How can resistance towards European integration be best 
understood from the perspective of Chantal Mouffe’s AMD?” 
Seeking to further elaborate on this question and apply Mouffe’s theoretical 
consideration as proposed in her model of “agonistic pluralism,” this thesis 
develops an analytical framework consisting of four categories, namely “excess 
of consensus,” “crisis of identification,” “hegemonic struggle,” and “apathy and 
disaffection”. The application of the framework is further conducted using 
poststructuralist discourse analysis based on Mouffe’s and Ernesto Laclau’s 
theoretical work. Their ideas were originally formulated in their collective work 
Hegemony and Social Strategy (HSS) from 1985 and further developed in 
Laclau’s New Reflections on Revolution of our Time (1990), Emancipation(s) 
(1996) and The Rhetorical Foundations of Society (2014), also in Mouffe’s The 
Return of the Political (1993) and others.33 Mouffe’s and Laclau’s general 
approach is grounded in the ontological assumption that meaning and identity 
is discursively constructed and dependent on contingent relations of 
articulation.34 The discursive in this sense constitutes the social and political 
world.35 It thus rejects the positivist tradition building on empiricism and denies 
the possibility to objectively produce knowledge for scientific progress.36 In 
                                               
32 Down and Wilson (2008: 46); Jones, B. (2014: 253). 
33 For example: Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis (2000); Glynos and Howarth (2007). 
34 See for instance: Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 2-3); Howarth (2000: 8-9, 2005a: 336); 
Torfing (2005: 3-4); Glynos and Howarth (2007); Laclau and Mouffe (2014: 107). 
35 Howarth (2000: 9). 




epistemological terms, it thus follows the social constructivist paradigm37 and 
dismisses the idea of searching for causal explanations and explaining the world 
with in objective universal terms.38 Instead, since the social and political order 
is discursively constructed, poststructuralist discourse analysis aims to 
understand socially-produced meanings.39 Following this understanding, the 
analysis of the discourse of EUI forms the central subject of this study. It 
analyzes how the hegemonic formation around the process of EUI was 
contested and re-articulated by the resistance movements. In order to analyze 
this discursive change, it reframes the established discourse around 
Euroscepticism with the notion of resistance as a counter-hegemonic 
movement, focusing on the production and change of identification within the 
discourse.40 Following the poststructuralist tradition, the thesis is based on the 
qualitative analysis of textual data such as speeches by politicians, media 
reporting or debates around the discourse under investigation. The present study 
thus analyzes the discursive change from the presumed permissive consensus 
towards resistance based on the selected textual corpus, exploring and critically 
discussing Mouffe’s AMD’s theoretical assumptions. 
The analysis conducted ultimately shows that the application of the developed 
framework based on Mouffe’s AMD to the phenomenon of resistance using 
poststructuralist discourse analysis provides useful insights for gaining a better 
understanding of the research question posed. The analysis suggests that the 
process of EUI has experienced a substantial lack of controversial debate over 
its earlier periods of existence. With the emerging crisis of identification 
towards the end of the first period, the project experienced increasing resistance 
and re-nationalization efforts. This growing disaffection with the institution 
ultimately peaked with the UK’s decision to leave the EU. On the basis of this 
analysis, the thesis further presents alternative ways to understand the working 
                                               
37 Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis (2000: 3). 
38 Howarth (2000: 126). 
39 Howarth (1995: 115, 2000: 113); Paul (2009: 242); Carta (2019). 
40 Crespy and Verschueren (2009). 
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of democratic institution. It suggests that the possibility for an agonistic 
confrontation is seems fruitful to confront the growing disaffection within the 
institution of the EU. Since Mouffe’s AMD does not provide agonistic reform 
programs, this study refers to Manon Westphal’s promising proposal, providing 
a comprehensive reform and comparative approach to implementing agonistic 
pluralism in democratic system.41 This would enable the democratic institutions 
of the EU to mobilize passion in more productive ways and open up the spaces 
for participatory politics, therefore, simultaneously stimulating contingency and 
controversy.42 This makes the understanding gained from the conducted 
analysis relevant to the challenges currently facing the European institutions. 
The remainder of the present study is therefore structured as follows. Following 
the introduction, the second chapter elaborates in more detail on the subject 
matter at hand as well as the existing academic discourse available. Here, the 
history and development of the discourse on EUI illustrates the development 
from the permissive consensus to increased resistance and the emergence of 
euro-critical parties in the EP. Further, the study of resistance or Euroscepticism 
is introduced, illustrating the two main groups of analytical work, namely the 
“nature” of the phenomenon and the understanding of its “drivers.” Followed 
by the introduction of the particular research gap of the analysis at hand to lay 
out its relevance and illustrate value added to the field of research. The third 
chapter introduces the theoretical background of Mouffe’s model of agonistic 
pluralism. To gain a better understanding of her agonistic writings, Mouffe’s 
theoretical development from Marxism to poststructuralism is illustrated. 
Further, the discourse-theoretical foundations that she developed together with 
Ernesto Laclau are illustrated, before the AMD by Mouffe is introduced. 
Finally, a conceptual framework is developed for the analysis at hand. The 
fourth chapter elaborates on the research strategy of the analysis. It begins with 
                                               
41 Westphal (2019: 6). Manon Westphal presents a comparison and reform-oriented 
approach for the implementation of AMD. Her approach will be elaborated further later in 
this study. 
42 Jones, M. (2014: 14-15, 20). 
 
10 
elaborating on the ontological and epistemological assumptions. Further, the 
descriptive account of the data gathered and the material for the analysis is 
introduced, finally, the chapter elaborates how the chosen data and material is 
analyzed using poststructuralist discourse analysis. The fifth chapter documents 
the application of the conceptual framework to the empirical data using the 
illustrated research design based on poststructuralist discourse analysis. The 
sixth chapter of the study undertakes a discussion of the results of the analysis 
and draws conclusions regarding both theoretical and practical domains of EUI. 
Furthermore, the underlying theoretical assumptions from Mouffe’s model are 
critically discussed and further substantiated.  
 
11 
2. Resistance to the process of European integration 
This chapter introduces the state-of-the-art of the academic debate on resistance 
towards EUI. First, the development of the discourse from the permissive 
consensus during the earlier period of EUI towards increased resistance and the 
emergence of euro-critical parties in the EP is illustrated. Second, the academic 
study of resistance or Euroscepticism is introduced. Here, the two main groups 
of analytical work are elaborated, namely the analysis of the “nature” of the 
phenomenon and the understanding of its “drivers.”43 Third, the limits of these 
rationalist understandings are illustrated, and finally, the research gap of the 
study is mapped out to lay out the relevance and additional value to the field of 
research. 
2.1 Changing discourse from permissive consensus to resistance 
For much of the history of EUI, political rivalries and ideological conflicts were 
absent and the process proceeded without much debate and conflict.44 Its 
founders – such as Jean Monnet and his companions – were convinced that the 
main drivers of destructive wars and economic destruction over centuries in 
Europe were political and ideological conflicts between its countries.45 One 
major object for the creation of the union was thus the prevention of any further 
European nationalism, in particular regarding the hostility between France and 
Germany.46 They therefore designed a system of governance at the European 
                                               
43 As illustrated earlier, this study takes a poststructuralist perspective and thus explicitly 
rejects the objective and causal explanation of social and political phenomena. From a 
poststructuralist perspective, there exists no “nature” or “driver” of a phenomenon; instead, 
the social is generally discursively constructed. 
44 Leconte (2010: 100-101); Brack (2015, 2018). See also: Vasilopoulou (2013), who 
assumes a somewhat similar division of time periods within the process of EUI. 
45 Hix (2007). 
46 Furthermore, the reconstruction of the economy, and the inner protection in the context 




level that aimed to ensure consensus and peace among its member states and 
avoid further conflicts in the future.47 The modi-operandi within the European 
institutions thus favored consensus over conflict and the institutional setting of 
the post-national political project was dominated by European technocrats and 
political elites instead of an elected government or parliament.48 This approach 
became, for instance, visible when the Schuman Plan in 1950, as a significant 
step in the process of EUI,49 was launched in an almost conspiratorial fashion 
by a small European political elite. This exclusive group of people was able to 
maneuver quick and effectively without significant conflict and much 
involvement of the public.50 The following process of EUI during its first period 
was shaped in a similar way. The process of integration was seen as “an 
accepted part of the political landscape,”51 in which pro-integrationists 
naturalized the process of EUI as desirable and legitimated European politics 
and institutions by using narratives such as “securing peace in Europe.”52 The 
general attitude towards the European project was thus supportive of 
establishing a post-national institutional system,53 functioning as an inclusive 
concept that seemingly united the European political elites and the mass public. 
Objections towards the project remained peripheral and political movements 
                                               
47 Crespy and Verschueren (2009: 377). 
48 Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 22); Taggart (1998: 365); Hix (2007: 5). 
49 The Schuman Plan was presented on May 9, 1950 by French Foreign Minister Robert 
Schuman. It was supposed to consolidate the German and French coal and steel industries 
under common European authority and thus secure peace in Europe. It led to the signing of 
the Paris Treaties between the six founding nations (France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, 
Luxemburg and the Netherlands) and thus created European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1951, thus considered the beginning of European integration in general. It 
further established the High Authority as the first supranational European executive with 
Jean Monnet as its first president and checked by a Common Assembly (McCormick 2007). 
50 Inglehart (1970). As mentioned earlier, previous research assumes that this kind of 
consensus prevailed until the 1970s (Down and Wilson 2008: 46). 
51 Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 62). 
52 Stavrakakis (2005: 88-89). For more research on the pro-integrationist attitude, see also: 
Brack and Costa (2012). 




providing alternatives visions for the process of integration were rather rare.54 
The public discourse on EUI was thus rather uncontroversial and mostly 
dominated by European political elites. The favorable attitude toward EUI and 
the lack of controversial debate was widely labeled as “permissive 
consensus.”55 The presumed consensus was conceived as general support 
among the Western European public toward the European project and its 
receptivity to future growth. It was seen to be persisted during the next steps of 
EUI, such as the signing of the Rome Treaties in 1957, and the following 
establishment of the European Community (EC) in 1967.56 The consensus was 
understood to express a general support of the legitimacy of the EC and its 
institutions. This extended to a wide range of economic and social functions, as 
well as a strong, independent role for the supranational commission. Within 
these parameters, national and supranational decision-maker operated relatively 
freely without encountering significant opposition in the public debate.57 
                                               
54 Here, see for instance: Lindberg and Scheingold (1970); Inglehart (1970); Franklin, 
Marsh, and McLaren (1994); Kopecký and Mudde (2002); Lahr (2002: 248); Hurrelmann 
(2007: 352); Crespy and Verschueren (2009); Leconte (2010); Ross (2011); Bickerton, 
Hodson, and Puetter (2014); Hobolt and Tilley (2014); Rohrschneider and Whitefield 
(2016). 
55 The term “permissive consensus” was coined by Lindberg and Scheingold in 1970 
(Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). According to their study, in the 1950s and 1960s, after 
the Treaties of Paris and Rome were signed, a general consensus among the public 
prevailed in favor of the matter of EUI. Vladimir O. Key first used the term to describe 
general support for certain government actions on foreign affairs by the American public 
(Key 1961). Thus, a similar phenomenon was identified among the member states of the 
EC at the time. As Inglehart elaborates: “There was a favorable prevailing attitude toward 
the subject, but it was of low salience as a political issue – leaving national decision-makers 
free to take steps favorable to integration if they wished but also leaving them a wide liberty 
of choice” (Inglehart 1970: 773). 
56 With the signing of the Rome Treaties in 1957, the EEC (European Economic 
Community) and the EAEC (European Atomic Energy Community) were created. With the 
following Treaty of Brussels in 1967, the executive institutions of ECSC, EAEC, and EEC 
were put together. Together they were known as European Communities (EC) and further 
shared common institutions such as the Commission (replacing the High Authority) and 
the Council, Parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice (McCormick 2007). 




An initial rupture of the Europhile attitude within the European institutions and 
presumed public consensus occurred in the late 1980s with the introduction of 
the Single European Act (SEA) and the program to promote a single European 
market.58 The program initiated the strengthening of European economic 
cooperation by means such as a five-year deadline for removing the remaining 
trade barriers. It further enlarged policy-making competences for the EC and 
thus redefined the division of responsibilities between the national and 
supranational level.59 These substantial changes became a starting point for a 
powerful debate on the institutional configuration of the European system. 
Margaret Thatcher – Prime Minister of the UK from 1979 to 1990 – responded 
to these events and became the first European political leader to directly and 
fundamentally challenge the European project.60 In particular, in her famous 
1988 Bruges speech, Thatcher openly questioned the direction of the integration 
process and revealed a competing vision of the European project.61 Her speech 
was often seen as a turning point in the public debate around the process of EUI, 
stimulating more diverging positions among the public towards the European 
project.62 
                                               
58 The SEA (1987) was introduced by Jacques Delores – eighth president of the European 
Commission (1985-1994) - and was the first major revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
(followed by the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon treaties). The SEA intended to 
create a single market within the EC by 1992, removing trade barriers and allowing more 
competition among its members (McCormick 2007). For a deeper understanding of the 
SEA, see also: Tassin (1995). 
59 See Hooghe and Marks (1997: 6); Flood and Usherwood (2007); Ceretta and Curli 
(2017); Brack (2018). 
60 Flood (2002); Usherwood and Startin (2012: 2). 
61 Thatcher (1988). 
62 Hooghe and Marks (1997); Flood and Usherwood (2007); Brack and Startin (2015). 
These events were further accompanied by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which marked 
a systemic turning point in European history. This event prompted a redefinition of the 
institutional construction of the EC and further raised questions concerning Europe’s 
geographical and geopolitical frontiers, as well as its political, economic, and cultural 




Another important event and qualitative change in the public debate on EUI 
were the negotiations around the Maastricht Treaty at the beginning of the 
1990s.63 The Maastricht Treaty marked a new stage and a major advance in the 
integration process by reforming and transforming the EC from an international 
organization into an economic and political union.64 As such, it blurred the 
boundaries between the national and supranational by transferring wide-ranging 
political and economic competencies from the national to the European level.65 
This concerned competencies such as currency (leading to the monetary union), 
a shared European citizenship, and common foreign and security policies, 
established in a three-pillar system, comprising the EC, home affairs and foreign 
policy.66 The negotiations and ratifications campaigns over the treaty marked a 
substantial change in public engagement, showing a more critical and stronger 
involvement on its direction, spread and contents.67 Party positions at the 
national and European level became further more differentiated and divided on 
the topic.68 Therefore, the previous level of consensus and the unchallenged pro-
integrationist attitude shifted towards a more critical engagement, marking a 
qualitative change in the discourse on EUI.69 
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(2015); Brack and Startin (2015); FitzGibbon, Leruth, and Startin (2017). The Maastricht 
Treaty was signed in 1992/1993. 
64 De Vries (2018). 
65 Crespy and Verschueren (2009). 
66 The pillars system was structured as follows: The first pillar was the European 
Communities, which was responsible for social, environmental and economic policy 
matters, and therefore encompassed the EC, the ECSC (until it expired in 2002), and the 
EAEC. The second pillar was the Police and Judicial Co-Operation in Criminal Matters 
(PJCCM), which was responsible for any cooperation regarding the fight against crime 
between the members states. The third pillar was the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), which was responsible for any foreign policy and military matters (McCormick 
2008; Verney 2011). 
67 Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren (1994). 
68 Down and Wilson (2008); Garry and Tilley (2009); Leconte (2010); Brack and Startin 
(2015); Capuzzi (2016). 
69 See here, for instance: Percheron 1991; Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh 1995; Norris, 
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The change in attitude towards EUI in the post-Maastricht period was widely 
labeled as Euroscepticism.70 The term has been used in the media and academic 
debate as a generic label to describe attitudes of opposition and contestation 
towards the process of EUI and the European project as such.71 Since its primary 
emergence in the late 1980s, the label was more and more used and discussed 
during the 1990s and early 2000s.72 Studies argue that the changing discourse 
and the phenomenon of Euroscepticism became further particularly visible in 
the distribution of political positions within the EP since 2009.73 
In 2014, the elections of the EP showed a substantial success and the growing 
presence of euro-critical and anti-establishment parties.74 This was often called 
the “Eurosceptic storm in Brussels.”75 Around twenty-five percent of seats were 
taken by euro-critical parties and anti-establishment parties, both left and right, 
compared with around sixteen percent in 2009.76 For the extreme-right, parties 
                                               
14; Gabel and Anderson 2004; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2007, 
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70 The earliest reference of the term Euroscepticism – according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary – was in a citation from 1986 in The Times Magazin. It was understood as “a 
person who is not enthusiastic about increasing the powers of the European Union” 
(Harmsen and Spiering 2004b: 15). 
71 See here, for instance: Taggart (1998); Kopecký and Mudde (2002); Flood (2002); 
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2001; Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Harmsen and Spiering 2004a; Brack 2018. 
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such as the FN in France and the Danish People’s Party were able to achieve 
historical success in the EP elections. The extreme-left was also particularly 
successful with parties such as Podemos in Spain and SYRIZA in Greece 
substantially increasing their share. Further, the EP election witnessed the first 
entry of neo-Nazi parties such as the German Nationalsozialistische Partei 
Deutschland (NPD) and Greek Golden Dawn. Moreover, the first radical right 
coalition was formed in the EP, which was called the Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (ENF), which was a successor of the short-lived Identity, Tradition, 
Sovereignty group composed from 2007. Eventually, the euro-critical party 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) achieved to become third 
strongest group in the EP after the election. Therefore, the 2014 elections of the 
EP marked a shift in the political influence of euro-critical parties and a 
substantial change in power in the EP.77 In the 2019 elections of the EP, euro-
critical parties were able to consolidate their success, even achieving a slight 
increase compared to the previous legislature.78 This result was particularly 
manifested with the success of the extreme-right parties such as Fidesz in 
Hungary, Lega in Italy and the National Rally in France, which were the 
strongest in their countries. Also, more moderate center-right, euro-critical 
parties such as Law and Justice in Poland and the Brexit Party in the UK 
achieved increased electoral success. For instance, the Brexit Party achieved 
more than 30 per cent of the votes in the UK during the 2019 elections of the 
EP.79 With these historical successes, of euro-critical parties became an 
established part of the European party system, and thus, as some argue “[they] 
are here to stay.”80  
Outside the EP, the UK showed a particular strong euro-critical or Eurosceptic 
attitude, as Prime Minister David Cameron announced in 2016 that he would 
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hold a referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU if his party won a 
majority at the 2015 general election. The referendum was held in 2016 and 
resulted in the decision to withdraw the UK from the EU. The UK thus became 
the first member in the history of integration to leave the union.81 
The prevalence of the phenomenon illustrated here, has thus been demonstrated 
at a number of levels. These include the emergence of a more controversial 
public debate around the issue of EUI, the increasing support of euro-critical 
and anti-establishment parties on the national and European level, and first 
national attempts to leave the union.82 Many scholars thus proclaim that EUI 
has entered “a new phase of its existence” in the post-Maastricht era, 
characterized by mass criticism and the mainstreaming of a euro-critical 
rhetoric.83 Against this background, a rapidly growing scholarly debate on the 
criticism and resistance towards the process of EUI has emerged. In the 
following section, the state-of-the-art of the academic debate on this issue will 
be illustrated, followed by the elaboration of the selected research gap of the 
study at hand. 
2.2 The study of Euroscepticism 
This section proceeds with an analysis of the state of research on Euroscepticism 
as a sub-discipline of European integration studies.84 Research on EUI has long 
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been characterized by a “policy-academic nexus.”85 Academic studies in the 
field mainly centered around the legitimation of European politics and 
institutions, which blurred the lines between academic research and 
professional politics, therefore allowing for the nexus to emerge.86 Studies thus 
mostly emerged around policy concerns of Brussels practitioners, focusing on 
the political effectiveness of policies or control variables and causalities in the 
domain, such as analysis on “the extent to which integration has occurred, or 
the likelihood that it will occur in the future.”87 The teleological reading 
produced a normative bias naturalizing the process of EUI as desirable and thus 
contributing to a pro-internationalist and a Europhile research community.88 
The research field thus lacked the critical interrogation and contesting of its 
underlying assumptions, processes or institutions, which led to “a surprising 
intellectual homogeneity in European studies,” also called “European 
integration orthodoxy.”89 It was long dominated by rationalist approaches such 
as liberal intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and multilevel governance,90 
and has paid little attention to critical approaches and compared to neighboring 
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analyze and understand the individual implication of the research on the field of study. In 
the case of European studies, scholars have highlighted the “under-researched relationship 
between the object of study (EU politics) and the way we as scholars seek to interpret, 
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85 Klinke (2015). For an early article on EUI, see also: Milner (2000). 
86 Klinke (2015: 568); Chamlian and Nabers (2016). 
87 Rumford and Murray (2003). 
88 Klinke (2015: 568); Ryner (2012); Chamlian (2016); Mudde (2012); Jørgensen, K.E. et 
al. (2015: 5). It further supports an “ideological-pedagogical project” that promotes “a 
European self-understanding supportive of the EU” (Calhoun 2003: 5, 13-20; Klinke 2015). 
89 Klinke (2015); see also: Jørgensen, K.E. (1997); Christiansen, Jørgensen, K.E. and 
Wiener (1999); Diez (1999a); Moravcsik (1999a, 1999b); Puchala (1999); Kelstrup and 
Williams, M.C. (2000); (Marks et al. 2006). Thus, poststructuralist interpretations of the 
EU were rather rare within the field (see here: Waever 1990, 2009: 167; Diez 1996, 1997, 
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90 Waever (2009: 167). It thus heavily relied on positivist approaches, which aim to 
accumulate knowledge about the EU’s nature and functioning without contesting it. Ernst 
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disciplines, such as International Relations (IR) or International Political 
Sociology (IPS).91 
Only in the late 1990s, European studies experience a methodological and 
qualitative turn, which was called “constructivist turn,”92 introducing more 
“critical” and “self-reflecting” approaches to the field.93 In this turn, different 
discursive approaches entered the field of European studies, becoming an 
established part of the accepted theoretical canon of approaches. Studies in this 
tradition focused on the transformation of state, the development of 
transnational identities, or the resistance to supra-nationalization.94 Hereby, 
they challenged traditional scholarship and conceptions of EUI by discussing 
the EU as a discursively-established idea. Poststructuralist discourse theory as 
one of the major approaches in the discursive tradition, often refers back to the 
works of Michel Foucault or Jacques Derrida,95 and was initially mostly 
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(2001); Risse (2003); Diez (2004); Adler-Nissen (2016: 4). 
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represented within the sub-fields and policy areas of European security or 
foreign policy.96 
A similar theoretical development can be observed in the study of 
Euroscepticism, as a sub-discipline of European studies. In the post-Maastricht 
period of EUI, the academic field was characterized by the emergence of “a true 
cottage industry of Euroscepticism studies.”97 However, it remained pre-
dominated by pro-integrationist and rationalist approaches. Therefore, the 
research of Euroscepticism was marked by a lack of more critical theoretical 
approaches and an almost a-theoretical nature.98 The contestation between 
representatives of different schools of thought in the theoretical debate and any 
critical distance or reflexivity to practices of knowledge production were 
missing.99 Instead, two main bodies of knowledge became prevalent in this field 
of research: first, the contention over the “nature” of Euroscepticism;100 and 
second, the explanation of its “drivers.”101 Both bodies of knowledge will be 
introduced in the following. First, the literature on the “nature” of 
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Euroscepticism is reviewed, before the key insights from the literature on the 
“drivers” of Euroscepticism are presented. 
The “nature” of Euroscepticism  
This section aims to illustrate the ongoing academic debate around the “nature” 
of the political phenomenon of Euroscepticism.102 The term Euroscepticism 
generally serves as an “umbrella term” encompassing very different concepts 
and understandings of the phenomenon at hand, mainly focused on political 
party position, voters and their interaction. Due to its indifference, a large debate 
on the usage and the conceptualization of the term has emerged within the 
scholarly debate.103 Several scholars even suggest going beyond the term of 
Euroscepticism due to its aforementioned shortcomings. The study at hand 
chooses a poststructuralist perspective and thus puts forward an alternative 
reading of the term. Based on the poststructuralist perspective, the phenomenon 
is understood as a discursive formation of the notion of resistance in the public 
sphere. In the following section, the mainstream approaches on the “nature” of 
Euroscepticism is primarily illustrated, before it highlights the limits of these 
approaches, followed by elaborating a discursive understanding of the 
phenomenon in the public sphere. 
The first influential definition of Euroscepticism appeared in the 1990s and 
identified the phenomenon primarily as opposition towards EUI. It was the 
result of a study by Paul Taggart in 1998, investigating Western Europe party 
systems in the early-1990s.104 The outcome was the identification and labeling 
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of the phenomenon as Euroscepticism, expressing “the idea of contingent, or 
qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified 
opposition to the process of European integration.”105 Already in this very early 
contribution, the unclear structure and content of the phenomenon was seen, as 
illustrated in the following statement by Taggart: 
“What is surprising is the diversity of this opposition and the various sources 
from which it sprang. In addition to specifically anti-EU parties in France, 
Germany, and Denmark, the issue has been taken up with varying degrees of 
conviction by new politics parties, neo-fascist parties, agrarian and new-
populist parties. Putting these oppositions together produces a strange 
amalgam of discontents from across the political spectrum.”106 
In the wider academic debate, this approach has often been criticized for being 
too general and thus insufficiently specific to capture the rather complex and 
diverse phenomenon of Euroscepticism. However, since this pioneering article, 
scholarly literature seeking to understand Euroscepticism has grown 
exponentially.107 
In a study following this first definition of Euroscepticism, the focus of analysis 
has extended to evaluate an even wider range of established Western and new 
Central and Eastern European democracies.108 Here, an attempt was made to 
introduce some conceptual order by distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” 
Euroscepticism.109 Hard Euroscepticism, on the one hand, describes a situation 
in which a principle opposition to the EU and EUI exists.110 This opposition 
becomes apparent when existing member states show ambition to leave the 
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union, or when candidate states oppose their own membership. In addition, it 
can also be expressed in the dismissal of individual policies, standing for the 
European project as a whole or the process of EUI in its current shape.111 Soft 
Euroscepticism, on the other hand, describes a contingent opposition towards 
the EU. It refers to a critique towards particular EU policies, rather than a 
general opposition to the entire project and ongoing integration.112 This would 
for example be the case if the direction of integration in a certain policy area 
was at odds with the national interest of a particular member state. Thus, the 
implications of the given area would be understood as contrary to national 
interest.113 This initial conceptualization distinguishing between soft and hard 
Euroscepticism grew to be rather influential and was adopted by many scholars. 
It provided the basis for several studies comparing euro-critical parties and 
movements across Europe.114  
The rather influential conceptualization was however also criticized by a 
number of scholars based on several points.115 In particular, the proposed binary 
opposing categories of hard and soft Euroscepticism were criticized as being 
overly simplistic and narrow, neglecting a diverse field of positions towards the 
process of EUI and the more complex and dynamic nature of the 
phenomenon.116 Moreover, the model was seen as being too inclusive and 
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therefore imprecise. It defines Euroscepticism in such a broad manner that it 
encompasses almost any disagreement with the EU and its policy decisions.117 
The indicators given to distinguish between soft and hard Euroscepticism – such 
as support for or opposition to European membership – were further seen to be 
rather poorly defined.118 Finally, it was criticized for neglecting any 
consideration of the ideological dimensions of parties and how these would 
affect the production of policy positions regarding the EU.119 
In response to these shortcomings, an alternative conception was introduced, 
which differentiates between the support for the EU as an institution and the 
process of EUI.120 The concept proposes a four-dimensional matrix that is based 
on two contrasting axes. These axes comprise of an ideological level, including 
Europhiles and Europhobes, and a strategic level, including EU-optimists and 
EU-pessimists. The Europhile/Europhobe axis shows two general attitudes 
towards the process of EUI. The category of Europhiles generally supports the 
idea of EUI. It aspires an institutionalized cooperation at the European level, 
possessing sovereignties and a joint liberal market economy. The category of 
Europhobes is explicitly opposed to or rejects one or more of these concepts. 
The EU-optimistic/ EU-pessimistic axis shows two general attitudes towards 
the EU as a political system. The category of EU-optimists can be critical about 
some policies, although it generally approves the current state and the general 
development of the political system of the EU. By contrast, the category of EU-
pessimists does not approve the political system of the EU in its current state. It 
is pessimistic and critical about the direction and development that EUI is 
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taking.121 Following these categories, the model divides the attitudes towards 
EUI under four labels, leading to the following categories. First, Euro-enthusiast 
(Europhile and EU-optimist) describes the category that is supportive of the 
general project of EUI and optimistic about the general direction in which the 
EU is developing. Secondly, Euro-pragmatism (Europhobe and EU-optimist) 
describes the category that is not supportive of the project of EUI, but it supports 
the agenda and policies of the EU when they match the national or a sectoral 
interest. Third, Eurosceptic (Europhile and EU-pessimist) describes the 
category with a positive attitude towards the general project of EUI but is 
critical of the precise and actual policies and agenda of the EU. Fourth, Euro-
reject (Europhobe and EU-pessimist) describes the category that dismisses the 
general project of EUI as well as the actual development that the EU is showing. 
According to this model, the category of Eurosceptic encompasses a rather 
restricted scope. As illustrated above, it refers to those positions that are positive 
towards the general project but critical about the current development of the 
EU.122 
According to critiques, this concept falls short in solving the terminological 
issues surrounding the definition of Euroscepticism. Much like the hard vs. soft 
model, it assumes an overly simplistic division between Europhile support and 
Europhobic rejection of the general project of EUI. Moreover, the model does 
not acknowledge the many different conceptions of what EUI can look like, 
while it remains blind to the immense variation of ideological currents.123 
Further, it confines Eurosceptics to the rank of attitudes supporting the general 
ideas of EUI and being pessimistic about the EU’s execution of these ideas. The 
model thus describes the category rather narrow and fails to adequately reflect 
its complexity.124 Finally, a problem of nomenclature arises since the term 
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Euroscepticism is used for one of the categories. This leads to the emergence of 
two distinct usages of the term, namely the general sense and the more particular 
sense regarding this model.125 
Considering that the four-scale matrix introduced above may be criticized for 
being overly simplistic and imprecise, a six-point scale of positions was 
suggested, along which broad party positions towards the EU can be situated.126 
This continuum contains the following categories. First, rejectionists are those 
generally opposed to any European policy, institution or the European 
membership of the particular country. Secondly, revisionists reflect positions 
seeking to return to the situation that existed prior to a particular major treaty 
reform. Third, minimalists imply a generally acceptive attitude towards the 
status quo of the EU, while rejecting any further integration. Fourth, gradualists 
reflect a generally supportive position towards integration, although they are 
only acceptive to a slow pace of EUI. Fifth, the term reformist implies positions 
of “constructive engagement” that pursue advancing the existing structure of 
the EU. Finally, maximalists demonstrate strong support of the condition of the 
EU and further integration. All six categories can apply to either the 
configuration of the entire European project or to simply one or several policy 
areas.127 The general intention of the model is to be “value-natural” and free of 
metaphorical associations to avoid any distortion effects of the content. This is 
supposed to enable a relatively descriptive division of the illustrated positions, 
leaving aside any underlying ideological or strategic motivations.128 However, 
this model has also been criticized for being overly specific in its attempt to 
solve the problem of conceptual inclusivity. Therefore, the model is too specific 
and thus becomes partly exclusive.129 Moreover, critics identified challenges 
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regarding the operationalization of the concept.130 When using this framework 
and the categories that it provides, there must be clear criteria of measurement 
in place to avoid any empirically or conceptually overlapping categories. 
However, this is absent from the available literature.131 
Besides the above-introduced models and frameworks, further approaches have 
been brought forward in the academic debate, including a five-point continuum 
comprising the elements of “hard Euroscepticism, soft Euroscepticism, no 
commitment, functional Europeanism and identity Europeanism.”132 Another 
model suggests a more streamlined synthesis of the previous models, 
differentiating between the incentive and significance of the attitude towards 
the project of EUI.133 It thus scales the positions along the two axes of 
“magnitude” (between soft/hard Euroscepticism) and “motivations” (balance of 
ideology/strategy).134 Another popular approach addresses the issue of 
qualitative differences in Euroscepticism. In a two-dimensional framework, it 
combines the objective and the extent of discontent towards the European 
project.135 The first axis implies positions towards the community, its 
authorities and the regime, while the second axis represents positions evaluating 
the extent of discontent and negativity. The framework further evaluates both 
dimensions displayed on the axis. It assumes that different groups of 
Euroscepticism show diverse political attitudes, running from “trust, over 
scepticism to political distrust, cynicism and alienation.”136 In the tradition of 
this approach formulate Krouwel and Abts: 
“Euroscepticism is a complex phenomenon, and a framework should allow for 
such variation. So-called Eurosceptics may first of all differ in the precise 
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arguments for opposing the EU. Attitudes towards Europe can be directed 
against the very idea of European integration; the actual integration process of 
enlargement and/or deepening; the perceived impact of particular 
developments within this process; the EU and its officials, performance, output 
and policies; and, last but not least, politics in general. Secondly, Eurosceptics 
may differ in the degree of opposition. The generic label of Euroscepticism 
may incorporate sceptical, distrustful, cynical or oppositional attitudes.”137 
The study around the nature of Euroscepticism therefore shows a heterogeneous 
and diverse field of concepts and approaches and no consensus on a general 
definition of the term exists.138 A similar situation is prevalent in the second 
large body on literature within the field, which analyzes possible “drivers” of 
the phenomenon. In the following section, the key insights from the second 
body of knowledge on the “drivers” of Euroscepticism are introduced 
accordingly. 
Understanding the “drivers” of Euroscepticism 
A significant amount of literature in the field of study has adopted the focus of 
examining “drivers” of Euroscepticism to gain a better understanding of the 
phenomenon. Here, the field mostly consists of rationalist approaches, focusing 
on either collective party position or public opinion to find causal explanations 
for the dynamics in the process of integration. In contrast to the mainly 
rationalist approaches in this field of study, the study at hand chooses a 
poststructuralist perspective and thus does not search for “drivers” or “causes.” 
Instead, the analysis aims to gaining a better understanding of the phenomenon 
and to analyze how discourse may enable certain actions. However, in the 
following section, the key contributions in the rationalist stream of literature are 
                                               
137 Krouwel and Abts (2007). 
138 See also: Kopecký and Mudde (2002); Conti (2003, 2018); Flood and Usherwood (2005, 
2007); Riishøj (2007). The assumptions of earlier works in the field such as Taggart (1998), 
Szczerbiak (2002), Szczerbiak and Taggart (2001, 2002), or Kopecký and Mudde (2001, 
2002) are further challenged by studies such as Banchoff and Smith, M.P. (1999), Beetham 




primarily introduced, before its limits will be illustrated and an alternative 
understanding suggested. 
The mainstream literature on the drivers of Euroscepticism mainly focuses on 
two aspects, namely either party politics139 or public opinion140. In the first 
stream of literature on party-political positions on EUI, there are generally two 
main approaches that account for most of the academic output on the topic, 
namely approaches privileging the ideological-programmatic competition 
factors and those privileging the strategic-tactical party competition factors. The 
ideological-programmatic approach (also called North Carolina school) 
analyzes how party attitudes and ideological positions towards the EU relate to 
each other.141 It relies on the traditional cleavage theory,142 which functions as 
a filter through which parties respond to the process of integration.143 Studies in 
this tradition suggest that the political family with which a political party aligns 
itself acts as “a reliable and effective indicator” for its position on integration.144 
The approach further assumes that party competition and the individual position 
on European topics can be structured by two major dimensions: “the left/right 
economic cleavage and the GAL/TAN (Green-Alternative-Libertarian/ 
Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist) dimension on non-economic issues such 
as the environment, lifestyle and values.”145 According to this understanding, 
parties on the GAL side most likely have a more pro-EU attitude, such as green 
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parties. The parties on the TAN side are most likely to be more Eurosceptic, 
such as radical right-wing parties.146 Euroscepticism is thus mostly found 
among the ideologically “extreme” parties.147 
The strategic-tactical approach (also called Sussex school) focuses less on the 
ideology of the parties’ position and more on its strategy. The particular position 
of parties is understood as a “strategic calculation in the national 
competition”148. In opposition to the North Carolina approach, it does not 
assume a linear relationship between the particular ideological preference of a 
party on the left/right spectrum and its approach towards the process of EUI: “a 
party’s ideological position does not provide sufficient information to deduce 
its position on the EU.”149 Instead, the approach stresses characteristics of the 
national context as explanatory factors, such as the composition of the national 
institutions and the electoral systems150, the structure of the party 
competition151, or the objectives of the party (office-seeking, vote-seeking, 
policy-seeking).152 This approach understands Euroscepticism mainly as a 
strategic resource in the national party competition mostly taken by opposition 
parties and protest actors or movements.153 
These two approaches therefore provide different perspectives on the study of 
Euroscepticism. Scholars have criticized the fact that while both have published 
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defining works in the field, they largely remained distant to each other with the 
exception of some cross citations.154 This lack of knowledge exchange and 
communication between the two approaches results partly from their different 
ontological and epistemological assumptions and consequently how they 
approach the phenomenon methodologically. Following a positivist tradition, 
the ideological-programmatic approach (or North Carolina school) has utilized 
quantitative, longitudinal data and relied on statistical methods of data analysis. 
Following a constructivist tradition, the more strategic-tactical approach (or 
Sussex school) mostly focuses on comparative analyses and qualitative case 
studies.155 However, more recent work has stressed their complementarity,156 
highlighting the possibility of a mixed-methods procedure bringing together the 
ideas of both schools. Here, the combination and interplay of strategic and 
ideological considerations guide parties’ position on the particular issue, which 
has been called “the most promising avenue for future research.”157 
In the second stream of literature, several studies have attempted to make sense 
of the shift from permissive consensus to Euroscepticism (or even the 
“constraining dissensus”158), focusing on the public opinion on EUI.159 These 
different studies can generally be divided into three clusters: (1) utilitarianism, 
(2) cue-taking and (3) identity, which are briefly outlined in the following.160 
First, the utilitarian cluster comprises studies arguing that the attitude towards 
EUI results from the relation between individual economic utility and its cost-
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benefit analysis.161 Studies in this tradition have adapted utilitarian cost-benefit 
approaches – such as David Easton’s work162 – to the study of EUI.163 They 
assume that with an economic benefit the individuals or a particular country 
experiences through, for instance, the removal of trade barriers within the EU, 
support for the project itself also increases.164 In order to analyze whether 
general support for the project is affected by the economic performance of the 
nation state, the approach uses macroeconomic studies. Here, macroeconomic 
variables such as inflation, unemployment and economic growth are applied165 
to analyze economic models of voting and the relation between the economic 
condition of a particular country and the assessment of its national government. 
The approach further argues that these analyzes can be directly applied to the 
general attitude of a country towards the EU. In this understanding, the 
European public is able to recognize the EU’s implications on economic 
welfare, even if their knowledge on EU affairs is limited.166 However, the 
variation of outcomes from studies in this cluster is significant and largely 
depends on the selected “level of analysis, the use of control variables and the 
operationalization of the dependent variable.”167 
Second, the cue-taking cluster comprises of studies arguing that European 
citizens are not well informed about the basic aspects of the integration 
process.168 Without the necessary information, it further suggests, individuals 
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rely on proxies to form their particular opinion towards the EU and the process 
of integration. Thus, individuals’ support for the EU is affected by proxies, such 
as the national political system, its institutions, or government169, party-political 
cues170, or national politics.171 The cue-taking approach assumes that stronger 
satisfaction with the national political system likely leads to a higher degree of 
support towards European institutions.172 Here, trust in the national system and 
the ability of political elites to influence the public through party cueing173, 
media effects174, and the provision of information175 are taken into 
consideration.176 However, this approach is contested as several studies suggest 
the opposite, showing that the level of support is particularly high where the 
opinion of the national system is lower.177 Following this argumentation, the 
lower opinion on the national system leads to aspiration towards EUI, which is 
“seen as preferable to national political corruption or an undeveloped welfare 
state.”178 It thus remains ambiguous whether the attitude towards the EU 
correlates positively or negatively with the national proxies. 
Third, the identity approach suggests that there is something like a European 
identity. Studies in this tradition analyze the characteristics of the European 
identity and its consequences.179 They suggest at the normative level that the 
creation of a European identity enables a supportive attitude towards EUI. Thus, 
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findings show that the ability to foster increased integration relies on the general 
success of creating and strengthening an European identity.180 It may in fact 
even counter-balance and over-compensate negative individual dispositions 
with the union, such as satisfaction with its democracy and representation181, 
identities182, internationalism183, and degree of religious tolerance.184 On the 
contrary, studies in this tradition assume that the intimidation of the national 
identity and culture by strong European identity can also lead to increasing 
opposition towards the EU.185 Further, strong debate exists around the 
conceptualization and possible measures of identity within the field of study. 
Thus, little consensus on the theoretical foundation of the concept of identity or 
its empirical exposition can be found.186 
Studies on public opinion regarding EUI have further been questioned. The 
critique features three major aspects. First, the data used for these types of 
studies are mostly provided by Eurobarometer, which is widely considered 
controversial.187 Further, there are hardly any other data available, especially 
for the earlier periods of EUI, prior to Eurobarometer’s creation in 1974.188 
Second, studies on public opinion toward EUI analyzing referenda show 
contradictory results. For instance, although research data shows that citizens in 
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France, the Netherlands and Ireland are mostly “pro-European,” their votes 
against the European constitutional treaty have often been interpreted as 
opposition to the current developments with the EU.189 Due to this 
contradiction, the general usefulness of analyzing results from referendums to 
measure public attitudes towards EUI has been questioned.190 Third, some 
research on the mass-level support for EUI has been criticized for using 
questionable variables, such as material interests,191 cognitive capacities,192 or 
national identity.193 Further, the field of study ignores other relevant aspects 
such as an elitist dimension194 the phenomenon of globalization195, or 
similarities to the mechanism of political participation at the domestic level.196 
The limits on the conceptualization of “Euroscepticism”  
As demonstrated in the section above, there is no single universally accepted 
definition or usage of the term “Euroscepticism;” rather, there are various 
understandings and conceptualizations that co-exist, each implementing 
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different categories and groups. The field of study experienced a further 
proliferation of ad-hoc definitions. Since scholars unsatisfied with the existing 
concepts of Euroscepticism, added new conceptualizations suited to their 
particular research, such as euro-indifference,197 euro-realism,198 euro-
ambivalence or euro-alienation.199 This led to an even stronger granularization 
of the term, followed by a “semantic confusion and poor categorizations.”200 
Besides the outlined fuzziness of the term, scholars have highlighted other 
limitations of the existing conceptualizations around Euroscepticism.201 Here, 
studies stress that several aspects upon which the particular concept is based 
remain undefined, making its understanding and usage difficult.202 This 
concerns, for example, the specific targets and ideas implied by phenomenon of 
Euroscepticism, as it remains unclear what it opposes, and thus what “pro-
Europeanism” describes.203 The determination of such aspects is particularly 
challenging, as it presupposes a definition of the EU and a shared vision of the 
“finality of European integration and its structures.”204 Moreover, the proposed 
concepts combine a very diverse and heterogeneous range of political positions 
along the political spectrum under one label. These range from positions that 
are generally in favor of some form of EUI to far-right nationalist positions that 
reject the idea of the EU as such.205 It further implies almost any agent not 
accepting “the EU unconditionally and want[ing] their preferences to be taken 
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into consideration more.”206 The whole field of study is thus no longer about 
the desirability of EUI but about qualified criticisms.207 Finally, scholars 
criticize that it contains a strong normative charge, which is often used to 
“disqualify certain actors or political adversaries.”208 The term therefore 
remains conceptually unclear, impeding its operationalization in the academic 
context.209 Following these elaborations, a debate around its general usefulness 
has emerged, with several studies suggesting abandoning the simplistic pro-
/anti-EU contradiction.210 
The study at hand adopts the more critical approach towards the 
conceptualization of the illustrated phenomenon. It aims to explore the 
phenomenon as an element of discourse and replaces the study of 
Euroscepticism with that of resistance. The term “resistance” is not new to the 
field of European studies and the scholarly debate on EUI. It has been used by 
scholars analyzing Euroscepticism and has been generally defined as 
“manifestations of hostility towards one (or several) aspect(s) of European 
integration perceived as a threat with respect to one’s values.”211 This definition 
enables a discursive conceptualization of the phenomenon, being established in 
discursive practices that oppose European integration.212 It further allows to 
acknowledge the impossibility of objectively determining “the essence of 
European integration.”213 From a poststructuralist perspective, it is not possible 
to ground an analysis in a “given” subject or object because both are constituted 
                                               
206 Usherwood (2005). 
207 Harmsen and Spiering (2004a). 
208 Brack 2018: 18; see further: Ward (1996a, 1996b); Neumayer (2008). 
209 Harmsen (2010: 339). 
210 Such as Flood (2002). Therefore, it is suggest that any study analyzing the phenomenon 
must inevitably provide a precise definition (Kopecký and Mudde 2002). 
211 Crespy and Verschueren (2009: 379), see also: Lacroix and Coman (2007); Costa, 
Roger, and Saurugger (2008); Lacroix and Nicolaidis (2011). 
212 Lacroix and Coman (2007); Crespy and Verschueren (2009: 385); de Wilde and Trenz 
(2009; 2012: 8). Also called the “sociological turn” of EU studies (Delmotte, Mercenier, 
and van Ingelgom 2017). 




discursively and therefore studied by their processes of constitution.214 This 
approach, then, allows to move away from the search for an essence within the 
study of EUI to the identification of the production and contestation of its 
meaning.215 It also makes possible for an analysis of hostility towards Europe 
in a broader and polymorphous sense that includes different social actors216 and 
historical contexts throughout the history of the European project.217 Finally, 
the narrow understanding of the phenomenon as opposition can be broadened 
to include attitudes such as the display of disaffection with democratic 
institutions.218 The discursive constitution of the phenomenon as resistance, 
therefore, makes it a more flexible and unified approach applicable to a variety 
of empirical realities. 
In contrast to conceptually limited rationalist approaches seeking a causal 
explanation of the object of study, this study adopts a discursive and thus more 
comprehensive approach. It argues that it is necessary to reframe the academic 
debate on Euroscepticism around the discourse of resistance in order to provide 
a better understanding of the often-underestimated resistance to the European 
project.219 Accordingly, the phenomenon manifests itself in discursive practices 
of euro-critical positions aiming at re-nationalization and thus showing 
disaffection from the European democratic institutions.220 The particular 
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research agenda and research gap of this study are further elaborated in the 
following section. 
2.3 Research gap 
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the underlying 
phenomenon and the question concerning how resistance to the EUI can best be 
understood, this study adds a more critical discursive poststructuralist approach 
to the existing debate on Euroscepticism by examining Mouffe’s AMD.221 
In contrast to the approaches introduced earlier, the theory applied in this study 
does not search for the essence of things. Instead, poststructuralist approaches 
analyze how discursive practices construct social reality.222 Discourse is thus 
treated as constitutive of social reality, such that no social reality exists outside 
of discursive practices.223 A poststructuralist analysis is therefore primary 
concerned with the discursive production of structures of meaning and 
identification. It focuses on the emergence and transformation of political 
identities and analyzes how articulatory practices are able to produce and 
change relations between elements.224 From this perspective, the social 
phenomenon of resistance to EUI is inherently linked to its discursive 
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construction, and the study focuses on the discourse of resistance toward EUI 
using poststructuralist premises.225 
Chantal Mouffe’s AMD offers a well-researched, discourse-based 
poststructuralist theory of democracy, which is an increasingly popular angle in 
the discipline of IR. It allows for critical examination of the discourse on EUI 
and challenges the accepted canon in academic debate. Her model also draws 
attention to the limitations of consensus-focused approaches and the existence 
of a “Eurocentric” truth in the discourse on EUI. From Mouffe’s perspective, 
the European project lacks the possibility of identification and legitimate ways 
to express a diversity of political positions within the political design. She 
formulates this as follows: 
“Not so long ago, the European Union was something that people could 
identify with. But over the last ten years things have changed: we’ve seen a 
growing movement of Euroscepticism and Euro-rejection. For me the reason 
for that is clear: people today can’t identify with Europe. […]”226 
According to Mouffe’s AMD, for a strong identification to become possible, 
the system needs to provide legitimate ways to channel passion within the 
political system and make an agonistic debate between different positions 
possible. However, in the present conjunction, the European political system in 
a “non-political environment”, which lacks a real political debate over the 
direction of the integration process and therefore real politics, as Mouffe states 
in the following:  
“[…] at present it’s a kind of bureaucratic, non-political environment […] 
elections to the European Parliament need to be contested along genuine right-
wing and left-wing lines with real alternatives offered to voters. […] European 
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institutions do not allow for a real debate over the direction of the integration 
process.”227 
The political system of the European Union therefore needs to be politicized 
and enable for a real agonistic confrontation within the democratic institutions. 
For Mouffe, conflict and power are therefore always present in democratic 
designs and the democratic system needs to provide ways to handle power 
productively. The possibility for legitimate criticism within the democratic 
design must thus be given: “[…] we should understand that people who want a 
different Europe are not anti-European. […] all over Europe there are groups 
getting organized, […] that are critical of the current state of the European 
Union but are not anti-European.”228 The European system thus lacks the 
possibility for an agonistic confrontation within the institution of the EU, which 
is, according to Mouffe, absolutely vital to provide identification. Subsequently, 
she stresses the urgency of fostering an agonistic approach to enable a real 
debate about the EUI process and the contestation of different political projects 
in the democratic system of the EU.229 Her model of agonistic pluralism further 
stresses the dangers of a consensus-based approach, as she formulates in the 
following statement: “[…] Given the current emphasis on consensus, it is not 
surprising that people are less and less interested in politics and that the rate of 
abstention is growing.”230 Mouffe thus advocates a form of radical-democratic 
discourse that is consciously opposed to Kantian liberalism and liberal 
rationalism; instead, it acknowledges the conflictual and agonistic character of 
the liberal democracy.231 As she argues, “radical democracy demands that we 
acknowledge difference – the radical, the multiple, the heterogeneous – in 
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effect, everything that has been excluded by the concept of Man in the 
abstract.”232 
Mouffe’s model thus combines conflict, consensus, democracy and politics in a 
way that allows for a substantial critique of the current of the EUI. The model 
offers opportunities to rethink the composition and practices within the 
European institutions to address the growing resistance and disaffection 
observed.233 It has the potential to provide new insights into the object of study 
and a more comprehensive understanding to the underlying question. However, 
despite the examined relevance of the agonistic approach to the discourse on 
EUI, Mouffe’s AMD has not yet been applied, leaving a knowledge gap on how 
best to understand resistance to EUI. This study aims to fill the identified 
research gap by providing a critical and poststructuralist reading of the 
established assumptions about the process of EUI and the phenomenon of 
resistance. 
This study therefore applies Mouffe’s AMD to the discourse on EUI and 
provides a novel understanding of how resistance to EUI can best be 
understood. The central argument of the study is that, particularly during the 
first period of EUI, the discourse on EUI tended to be uncontroversial and there 
was an excess of consensus. This excess of consensus created the possibility for 
a crisis of identification with the European institution to develop. Further 
accelerated by various political and economic events, the existing hegemonic 
formation dislocated, allowing for a weakening of the level of consensus and 
the emergence of resistance movements. These movements filled the void 
created in the field of identification and eventually established themselves in 
the European institutions, making disaffection a manifest phenomenon. 
Poststructuralist discourse analysis is applied to analyze these assumptions. The 
analysis is based on relevant qualitative data and key texts from different 
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sources such as speeches of politicians, media coverage or debates in the EP. It 
uses discourse analytic techniques proposed by David Howarth, Marianne 
Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, and Dirk Nabers.234 Furthermore, the study 
critically engages with Mouffe’s theoretical assumptions and therefore also 
attempts to substantiate her argument. The following chart present respective 
research agenda235 of the analysis: 
 
Figure 1: Research agenda 
2.4 Conclusion 
The idea of EUI has a long history and gained traction after the Second World 
War. The EU was officially established in the 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty, 
which also marked a shift from permissive consensus to more resistance within 
the discourse on EUI. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, EUI was largely driven by 
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European political elites, while consensus was assumed in the public sphere. In 
the post-Maastricht period, the discourse on EUI became increasingly 
controversial and critical among the broader public. As shown above, this is 
also reflected at a number of levels, including the shift in public debate around 
the EUI, the growing support of euro-critical and anti-establishment parties 
across Europe, and attempts of member states to leave the Union.236 Scholars 
thus proclaim that the EU has entered “a new phase of its existence” in the post-
Maastricht era, characterized by mass criticism and the “mainstreaming” of 
euro-critical rhetoric. 
In response, a growing body of literature has attempted to make sense of the 
phenomenon of Euroscepticism. In terms of its “nature,” conceptualizations 
ranging from hard and soft Euroscepticism along different continua have been 
proposed. However, there is no universally accepted definition or 
conceptualization of Euroscepticism. Research has also sought to understand 
the “drivers” of the phenomenon. The existing literature aims to understand 
such drivers either the political party or public opinion level. From the party 
perspective, two dominant schools of thought have emerged yet not merged: the 
North Carolina school in the positivist tradition and the Sussex school in the 
constructivist tradition. At the public level of analysis, the debated revolves 
around three different perspectives that seek to understand the underlying 
drivers of Euroscepticism; namely economic, cue-taking and identity-based. 
However, this study approaches a more critical understanding of the 
phenomenon. The term Euroscepticism is therefore replaced by the study of 
resistance to allow for a discursive construction of the phenomenon. 
Furthermore, Chantal Mouffe’s AMD is applied to provide a more 
comprehensive answer to the underlying question that informs the research on 
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EUI. This study thus provides a poststructuralist reading of the process of EUI 
and the phenomenon of resistance from the perspective of Mouffe’s AMD.  
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3. Through the lenses of the agonistic model of democracy 
This section introduces Chantal Mouffe’s model of agonistic pluralism. To 
illustrate her model and the theoretical underpinnings in her agonistic writings 
from the 1990s, a recourse to her earlier stages proves helpful. Mouffe’s earlier 
pre-agonistic writings were characterized by two distinct phases: the first period 
was focuses on elaborations based on Marxism, developed primarily in Gramsci 
and Marxist Theory (1979). The second period was considered the post-Marxist 
era, elaborated in the seminal work Hegemony and Social Strategy (1985), co-
authored with Ernesto Laclau. 
The initial Marxist stage was motivated by the struggle of “proletarian subjects” 
for freedom and autonomy. In HSS, Mouffe and Laclau develop their radical 
theory of democracy, a left hegemonic project for collective political action 
under the condition of pluralism. They adopt poststructuralism and combine it 
with Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, thus moving from the initial 
Marxist stage of thought to post-Marxism.237 By turning to poststructuralist 
theory, they place language at the center of their approach to formulate their 
radical democratic project.238 It is against this background that Mouffe develops 
her particular agonistic writings. Thus, these theoretical developments remain 
important foundations for understanding Mouffe’s later agonistic work. The 
following section therefore begins with a reconstruction of the central ideas of 
Mouffe’s earlier works.239 
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3.1 Mouffe’s trajectory from Marxism to post-Marxism 
Mouffe’s early Marxist writings were motivated by the struggle of “proletarian 
subjects” for freedom and autonomy. It generally followed central Marxist 
ideas, albeit it challenged the idea of a “necessary class belonging” and 
transformed all of the ideological components of the Marxist understanding of 
society.240 
The idea of classical Marxism was generally motivated by the collective 
struggle of subordinated subjects for emancipation. It assumed that modern 
society is increasingly divided into two opposing or antagonistic groups. These 
groups are, on the one hand, the bourgeoisie – which rules over the means of 
production such as industry and corporations – and, on the other hand, the 
proletariat – which are the workers in society. The progressive emergence of 
this division in the political sphere was seen as a necessary effect of the 
underlying contradiction in the relations of production in society.241 As Marx 
writes, “the relations of production and the distribution of the conditions of 
production” lead to the domination of the society by the market.242 He goes on 
to suggest that the rule of the market will ultimately fail and that socialism and 
the proletarianization of the working class will be the inevitable result.243 Here, 
the proletariat functions as a privileged agent aiming to provoke revolutionary 
change. 
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Conventional Marxism had already been experiencing a significant political and 
theoretical crisis since the “Second International”244 in the late 19th century.245 
On the one hand, the socialist project failed in number of political events such 
as the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s or the lack of revolutionary 
consciousness among the Western working classes.246 On the other hand, 
Marxism was unable to grasp the growing complexity and fragmentation of the 
social and the corresponding proliferation of political struggle as a central 
characteristic of modern society.247 
These emerging so-called “New Social Movements” from the 1970s were not 
primarily concerned with the relations of production and thus shed their 
previous working-class identity.248 Instead, they turned to heterogenous and 
often unrelated political projects such as peace, feminism, ecological issues, 
sexuality, or ethics. The inability to connect with these movements was seen as 
a major theoretical shortcoming of conventional Marxism.249 As Laclau and 
Mouffe formulate, 
“A whole series of positive new phenomena underlie those mutations which 
have made so urgent the task of theoretical reconsideration: the rise of the new 
feminism, the protest movements of ethnic, national and sexual minorities, the 
anti-institutional ecology struggles waged by marginalized layers of the 
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population, the anti-nuclear movement, the atypical forms of social struggle in 
countries on the capitalist periphery.”250 
With the rise of these social movements, scholars increasingly questioned the 
ontological relevance of the working class the central actor in the revolutionary 
transition from capitalism to socialism.251 As Laclau and Mouffe put it in HSS, 
“What is now in crisis is a whole conception of socialism which rests upon the 
ontological centrality of the working class, upon the role of Revolution, with a 
capital ‘r’, as the founding moment in the transition from one type of society 
to another, and upon the illusory prospect of a perfectly unitary and 
homogeneous collective will that will render pointless the moment of 
politics.”252 
The emergence of diverse and heterogeneous political projects in this period 
thus facilitated the already prevailing theoretical crisis of classical Marxism.253 
From here, Mouffe and Laclau were motivated to develop a post-Marxist 
approach that claims to form a more sophisticated theory for the formation of 
collective political action,254 challenging the central ideological elements of 
orthodox Marxism255 and proclaiming “without apologies” to leave behind its 
historical materialism.256 
These “post-Marxist” aspirations were generally shared by a variety of other 
theorists of the time, such as Cornelius Castoriadis, Jacques Rancière, or Slavoj 
Zizek. Although, they maintained the concern to develop a theory of human 
emancipation. They all strove to “go beyond” the Marxist ideas and the ideal of 
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Soviet communism, thereby problematized and partially displacing its core 
concepts.257 As Laclau and Mouffe argue, “[…] to reread Marxist theory in the 
light of contemporary problems necessarily involves deconstructing the central 
categories of that theory. This is what has been called our post-Marxism.”258 
Laclau and Mouffe’s contribution in HSS arguably represents the most 
important contribution in the post-Marxist tradition.259 In HSS they 
problematize and question central categories of Marxism.260 The main 
criticisms revolve around (1) historical determinism, (2) economic 
determinism, (3) the assumed hostile binary division, (4) the centrality of class 
and ideology, and (5) the authoritative tendencies inherent in Marxism. These 
are elaborated further in the following. 
Laclau and Mouffe challenge Marxist “historical determinism,” according to 
which the communist utopia will unfold in various stages with historical 
necessity. The productive forces will eventually collide with the social relations, 
leading to the revolutionary transformation of society from capitalism to 
socialism. As Marx describes in the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy (1859)261: 
“At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society 
come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—this merely 
expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the 
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framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development 
of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an 
era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead, sooner 
or later, to the transformation of the whole, immense, superstructure.”262 
This leads to the emergence of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the 
construction of a socialist state. The original contradiction between the 
productive forces and social relations will be eradicated, resulting in a 
harmonious society free from class division.263 Therefore, social (or 
revolutionary) change will inevitably occur due to the economic structure of 
society264 and the domination of the market over society.265 As Engels puts it, 
“the final causes of all social changes and political revolution are to be sought, 
not in men’s brains, not in man’s insight into internal truth and justice... but in 
the economies of each epoch”266. 
Laclau and Mouffe further dismiss Marxist “economic determinism” (or 
“economism”), according to which the political and social organization of 
society is coercively based exclusively on economic relations. In this Marxist 
conception, civil society is divided into the “economic base” and the “political 
superstructure.” The competitive relationship between the two classes forms the 
foundation of society and the individual belonging to the social classes is 
inevitably predetermined. The economic system thus determines position and 
power in society.267 The base-superstructure division is further developed in 
Marx’s preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859). 
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“In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely [the] relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material 
forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes 
the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises the legal 
and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of 
men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines 
their consciousness.”268 
Laclau and Mouffe however dismiss the assumed “hostile binary division” 
within society and call this political vision the “Jacobin imaginary.”269 As they 
see it, this Marxist scheme of a simple structural division of society between the 
people and the old regime goes back to the French Revolution.270 However, the 
French society of the late 19th century was also the last moment in which this 
fundamental division retained its validity. As she formulates with Laclau in 
HSS, 
“[…] the opposition people/ancient regimé was the last moment in which the 
antagonistic limits between two forms of society presented themselves – with 
the qualification noted – in the form of clear and empirically given lines of 
demarcation.”271 
In their attempt to capture the changing social relations in a more sophisticated 
approach for collective political action, they leave behind the “Jacobin 
temptation” and further dismiss the ontological “centrality of class.”272 For 
them, there exists no necessary, causal relation between “social beings” and 
their individual consciousness.273 Instead, they strive to acknowledge the 
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individual specificity of political movements in order to connect to the New 
Social Movements. To challenge the class reductionism and strict 
“economism”, they adopt Gramsci’s “non-reductionist conception of the 
superstructures,” which constitutes political subjects not by their class 
belonging alone, but by “a multitude of democratic contradictions.”274 Gramsci 
thus provides the conceptual tool necessary to reject the illusion of a necessary 
class belonging of political identities and dismiss the idea that the working class 
is the only social agent capable of bringing resistance or political change.275 As 
Mouffe asserts in Gramsci and Marxist Theory (1979): Gramsci is “the only 
theorist of the Third International who pointed to a break with ‘economism’, 
‘reductionism’ and ‘epiphenomenalism’”276. 
For Laclau and Mouffe, its essentialist apriorism further leaves Marxism in 
danger of totalitarian closure and gives it a strong “authoritarian tendency” 
when in power, as shown in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.277 Marxist theory 
thus resists an openness and tolerance that is necessary for democracy to 
function. According to Laclau and Mouffe, any essentialist concept must 
therefore be set aside to allow for a democratic equality that maintains the space 
for political difference.278 In their effort to develop a radical theory of 
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democracy for collective political action under the conditions of pluralism, they 
therefore abandon the above introduced concepts of Marxist ideology. As they 
state in the following: 
“At this point we should state quite plainly that we are now situated in a post-
Marxist terrain. It is no longer possible to maintain the conception of 
subjectivity and classes elaborated by Marxism, nor its vision of the historical 
course of capitalist development, nor, of course, the conception of communism 
as a transparent society from which antagonisms have disappeared.”279 
Mouffe’s and Laclau’s earlier theoretical elaborations were therefore 
characterized by the critical discourse of Marxist ideas and the socialist political 
project.280 They problematize and challenge core Marxist concepts in their 
attempt, motivated by the subjects’ struggles for emancipation in the historical 
context of a multiplication of political spaces and the growing proliferation of 
differences. Hereby, they adopt Gramsci’s conception of the political subject 
and add poststructuralism to their theoretical considerations in order to leave 
the essentialist apriorism’s behind and form a sophisticated account for 
collective action.281 
Against the illustrated background, Laclau and Mouffe formulate their 
understanding of discourse and hegemonic contestation in modern times.282 The 
following section elaborates the ontological location from which they embark 
to develop their theory of discourse. It illustrates their post-Marxist theoretical 
development combining Gramsci’s notion of hegemony with poststructuralist 
theoretical conception, and thus transforming hegemony into a “discursive 
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moment of intervention,”283 understanding social change in a non-deterministic 
way. 
3.2 Social ontology of the political discourse theory 
In order to connect with the newly-emerging political movements (the so-called 
New Social Movements) and form an emancipatory subject position in 
contemporary societies, Laclau and Mouffe left behind all traces of the “Jacobin 
imaginary” and the Marxist essentialism.284 As they formulate in HSS: 
“[I]n developing this task, it is important to point out that it cannot be 
conceived just as an internal history of Marxism. Many social antagonisms, 
many issues which are crucial to the understanding of contemporary societies, 
belong to fields of discursivity which are external to Marxism, and cannot be 
reconceptualized in terms of Marxist categories – given, especially, that their 
very presence is what puts Marxism as a closed theoretical system into question 
and leads to the postulation of new starting points for social analysis.”285 
In their attempt to develop the socialist agenda based on liberal values, they 
therefore develop a post-Marxist, non-essentialist framework and provide a 
discursive formation of social subject positions.286 They understand discourse 
as “the condition for any engagement with the world.”287 As they put it in HSS, 
“[in] our interchange with the world, objects are never given to us as mere 
existential entities; they are always given to us within discursive 
articulations.”288 Meaning and identity are thus discursively constructed and 
therefore contingent and always open to change. This understanding avoids any 
attempt to fix meaning over time and allows essentialism and the dangers of 
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authoritarianism – as in the Marxist theory – to be overcome.289 Instead, only 
liberal democratic principles and institutions are able to fully recognize their 
attempt. This theoretical transition beyond Marxism thus builds on 
poststructuralism. The adoption of poststructuralism, with its emphasis on the 
constitutive nature of discourse, thus allows Laclau and Mouffe to move away 
from essentialism.290 
Poststructuralism emerged as an intellectual development in the 1960s. It is 
associated with a tradition of continental philosophers291 and critical theorists 
in the discipline of social and political theory.292 The theorists associated with 
poststructuralism responded to a general discussion and development of ideas 
in a distinct political and social context, such as “the withering of modernist 
values, the death of God, the atrocities of the Second World War, processes of 
decolonization, the decline of the belief in progress, or the democratization of 
university education and the cultural revolution of the 1960s.”293 In addition, it 
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was a response to a series of political events that demonstrated political 
struggles against systems of power, such as “the Algerian and Vietnam wars, 
the Prague Spring of 1968, the May 1968 movement in France, cultural 
expression in Yugoslavia, demands for Third World economic justice, and the 
civil rights, environmental, and women’s movements in the USA and 
elsewhere.”294 
The emergence of poststructuralism in IR appeared in the context of a general 
“critical turn” in social science and humanities in the late-1980s,295 which had 
a strong impact on the fields of study. It was prompted by the dissatisfaction 
with classical theories and often interpreted as a theoretical intervention by 
critical theories such as poststructuralism.296 Because classical theories in IR 
focused mainly on interactions between states, they remained unable to predict 
and understand emerging social and political events, such as the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War,297 or concerns associated with 
globalization.298 In response to these shortcomings, critical theorists combined 
the discipline of IR with more critical theoretical perspective, challenging 
conventional understandings and exposing the limitations of established 
practices.299 Poststructuralism became particularly popular in IR with the work 
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of Richard Ashley (1981, 1984), James Der Derian (1987), R. B. J. Walker 
(1987, 1993), and Michael Shapiro (1988).300 
This pioneering works were followed by diverse and numerous studies over the 
years. These works were strongly devoted to analyzing the discursive 
production, reproduction and change of meaning and identity in the 
international system.301 They examine contemporary problems, such as 
understanding of political subjectivity in a context of globalization and late 
forms of capitalism,302 and further analyze how the particular discourse 
emerged historically in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon 
under study.303 The individual significance attached to a particular social 
phenomenon depends on its discursive power and ability to dominate over a 
period of time.304 They focused on topics, such as studies on diplomacy,305 
foreign policy,306 development aid and famine,307 popular dissent,308 war,309 
borders,310 international finance,311 global health,312 and crisis313. 
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Poststructuralism however is not a homogeneous and self-conscious group that 
seeks to establish an alternative, comprehensive philosophical theory.314 Rather, 
the scholars working in this tradition are united by a critical attitude, approach 
or ethos toward the dominant theoretical tradition.315 In this way, 
poststructuralism differs from other theoretical approaches reflecting an attempt 
to critique in a particular way rather than forming a theory or producing a 
particular paradigm. It sees critique as a necessary exercise aimed at identifying 
and understanding the underlying assumptions within conventional and 
dominate approaches in the particular field of study. Poststructuralist working 
in IR thus move away from any pre-existing or naturally-given subject in 
international politics, such as states or institutions316 and critically examine the 
existing assumptions of positivist theories in relation to ontological and 
epistemological issues.317 In this way, opportunities arise to understand the 
social and political world in alternative ways.318 
Structuralism has played a central role in the development of the 
poststructuralist ethos and the attempt to challenge universalist and positivist 
assumptions.319 Poststructuralism is explicitly associated with those theorists 
reworking structuralist theorists and their attempts to understand the social 
based on a grounded and fixed structure.320 In the spirit of the poststructuralist 
tradition, Laclau and Mouffe also critically evaluate structural assumptions. 
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Like many poststructuralists, they particularly engage with Ferdinand de 
Saussure theory of structural linguistic and his pioneering ideas to understand 
language as a system.321 Therefore, a further illustration of this work seems 
fruitful for the elaboration of their poststructuralist understanding.322 
Saussure’s conception of language introduces radical innovations by 
approaching the study of social phenomena from a linguistics perspective.323 
For him, language generally has an oral and a written tradition. Both traditions 
exist independent from each other, with a clear hierarchy between them.324 
Here, writing serves to represent the oral tradition and is therefore subordinate 
and less relevant to the oral tradition.325 Thus, for Saussure, the oral tradition 
(such as speech) represents the fundamental mode of the linguistic sign,326 
allowing for a pure science of speech.327 It follows from here that “the basic unit 
of any language [is] the linguistic sign.” Every sign is further composed of two 
inseparable components: “a sound or acoustic element (the signifier) and the 
mental image/concept or idea (the signified).”328 However, there is no necessary 
or natural relationship between the two parts; instead, the relation between 
signifier and signified is “arbitrary.”329 Linguistic signs thus do not possess 
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meaning through a “positive” value. For example, as Saussure shows, there is 
no natural relation between the sound “cat” and its underlying concept.330 
Instead, linguistic signs acquire their meaning through difference from other 
linguistic signs. As Saussure asserts: “[in] language there are only differences 
… without positive terms.”331 He illustrates this understanding of relationality 
with the example of chess by noting that the signifier is to be understood like a 
pawn: “it is not defined by its ‘positive content’ – as a pawn ‘in and of itself’ – 
but rather negatively, that is, in its relations to the other chess pieces.”332 It 
follows that meaning is not naturally given or determined by itself; rather, the 
meaning of any term is entirely relational and defined in difference to something 
else. These differences and relational meanings of any given term or sign further 
appear within a structured totality or language systems.333 These language 
systems can vary substantially, organizing and structuring the world differently. 
The meaning of a term thus continues to dependent on the particular context or 
system in which it appears.334 Therefore, different terms in different language 
systems may carry the same concept.335 Saussure’s thus assumes that each 
linguistic sign acquires its meaning through relations within an internal 
structure of signs, rather than in affiliation with reality.336 He understands 
language as “a system of signifiers without positive terms” in which meaning is 
purely relational, dependent on the system or context in which it is invoked.337 
Poststructuralists, including Laclau and Mouffe, generally follow these 
structuralist considerations by Saussure, having similar concerns by analyzing 
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meaning-producing structures. Saussure however further envisions that 
relational signification leads to a closed linguistic system within which it is 
possible to fix meaning over time.338 It presents a linguistic-structural totality in 
which signs are related without being challenge and can be analyzed at a fixed 
point in time rather than investigating the evolution of meaning.339 Laclau and 
Mouffe, and many other poststructuralists, reject this idea of a static linguistic 
structure and a final constituted structural space at a given moment. Instead, 
they assume that the particular relation of a sign is always mutable and never 
fixed or total and thus focuses on the understanding of change within social 
order.340 For them, Saussure’s concept of a closed linguistic system involves the 
search for an underlying structure and a new essentialism.341 As they put it, “a 
discursive formation is [also] not the expression of any underlying principle 
external to itself.”342 It is never “the revelation of [a] previously hidden or 
essential meaning.”343 For them, there exists no pre-given essence, and they 
reject any assumption of a fully structural totality.344 
In their critique of Saussure’s structuralist assumptions, Laclau and Mouffe 
primarily follow Jacques Derrida, who most prominently reworked Saussure’s 
structural linguistics into a poststructuralist understanding.345 As they put in 
HSS: 
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“On this point, our analysis meets up with a number of contemporary currents 
of thought which – from Heidegger to Wittgenstein – have insisted on the 
impossibility of fixing ultimate meanings. Derrida, for example, starts from a 
radical break in the history of the concept of structure, occurring at the moment 
in which the centre – the transcendental signified in its multiple forms – […] 
is abandoned, and with it the possibility of fixing a meaning which underlies 
the flow of differences. At this point, Derrida generalizes the concept of 
discourse in a sense coincident with that of our text.”346 
Derrida generally questions the hierarchical relation between speech and 
writing that Saussure assumes. He claims that when all meaning is relational, it 
is not possible to oppose speech and writing since they are also structured by 
difference. Signs are split into signifier and signified, and language is 
constituted entirely by difference and is not a collection of pre-given terms. 
They thus have common roots and the hierarchy between them must be 
obsolete. Derrida therefore completely abolishes the hierarchy between speech 
and writing, assuming that everything is discourse and that there is “nothing 
outside of the text.”347 He further emphasizes the constitutive character of 
“différance.”348 The notion of différance – in Derrida’s understanding – draws 
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attention not only to spatial difference or binary oppositions between signifiers 
within a given context, but also to the never-ending process of relational 
signification.349 Because of the arbitrary character of the sign, the structuring of 
signs in relation to each other never exhausts all possibilities. Thus, language 
and meaning creation remains an endless process of identity and difference in 
which any given signifier can be part of numerous relations. The never-ending 
relational signification disrupts any attempt to finalize meaning within the 
“organizing principle of [a given] structure”350 and therefore also makes 
Saussure’s attempt of a final closure of meaning impossible. 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s terminology, Derrida’s concept of structure is turned 
into a concept of discourse. They assume that if articulation is a practice of 
ongoing relational signification between signifiers, “it must imply some form 
of separate presence of elements which that practice articulates or 
recomposes.”351 These separate elements in the process of articulation, 
moreover, lack an immanent meaning, and are thus floating with a polysemy 
character. As soon as these elements are connected to other connotative 
signifiers and therefore discursively structured, they can different ascriptions of 
meaning attached to them.352 These discursively-structured elements further 
turn into moments. Moments, then, are elements to which a temporally fixed 
meaning is attributed. They are constituted as relational difference from 
something else within a particular discourse. Discourse therefore reduces the 
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polysemy character of elements and enables the formation of moments into a 
temporal discursive structure. It thus temporally interrupts relational 
signification.353 This describes the process of articulation, as Laclau and Mouffe 
put it in HSS: 
 “[…] we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory 
practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will 
call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated 
within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast we will call element any 
difference that is not discursively articulated.”354 
The practice of articulation therefore converts elements into moments within a 
discursive totality and establishes their temporal meaning.355 The practices of 
articulation is, as noted above, is only possible since “every moment is 
subsumed from the beginning under the principle of repetition.”356 The 
polysemy character of elements allows any discursive structure to be penetrated 
and disarticulated.357 The meaning of elements can thus be disarticulated and 
then fixed again in a different discursive context, making final articulation 
impossible.358 This makes the disarticulation of a discursive structure possible 
and the conversion of elements into moments never exhausted or final. It further 
makes any temporary transition to a relational totality within a discursive 
structure contingent and never the revelation of a deeper essence.359 
The impossibility of closure in the process of articulation further rests on the 
assumption that any discursive system exists surrounded by a “surplus of 
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meaning.”360 In Derrida’s terminology, since the meaning of every sign is 
constituted in difference, any sign always implies a trace of what it is not. 
Accordingly, signs bear the traces of eternal other signs by which they are 
surrounded. Derrida calls this the “originary of trace,” which has far-reaching 
implications for his reading of Saussure.361 Any attempt to establish fixed 
synchronic structures is thus overflown by the excess of relationality that 
prevents their stable articulation.362 Laclau and Mouffe call this surplus of 
meaning the “field of discursivity,” which comprises everything that a particular 
discourse is not. The field of discursivity thus has the potential to disrupt and 
destabilize any discursive system.363 This makes instability an intrinsic 
characteristic of any discourse and its most essential possibility. Therefore, no 
“discursive totality is absolutely self-contained;”364 it arises from “a relational 
space unable to constitute itself as such.”365 
The purely relational character of meaning further applies to the dimension of 
identification.366 In a particular discourse “where every element has been 
reduced to a moment of that totality,” all identification is constituted 
relational.367 Identification thus becomes the field of “overdetermination” 
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always threatened to be disarticulated again.368 This makes identification never 
final and it exists “no identity that is self-present to itself and not constructed as 
difference,”369 as put in HSS: 
“As a systematic structural ensemble, the relations are unable to absorb the 
identities, but as the identities are purely relational, this is but another way of 
saying that there is no identity which can be fully constituted.”370 
Discursivity thus presents the requirement for the constitution of identification 
but also its impossibility.371 “[T]he precariousness of every identity, which 
manifests itself as a continuous movement of differences”372 further applies to 
the “category of subject,” which is presented within a discursive structure and 
not separately as the determination of any social relation.373 Following the 
assumption that all subject positions are discursive and that no discourse is 
finally fixed, different positions and the relationships among them are also never 
fixed or present themselves in a “closed system of difference.”374 Instead, the 
category of subject is also affected by the “ambiguous, incomplete and 
polysemical character which overdetermination assigns to every discursive 
identity.”375 
Laclau and Mouffe thus do not break with the structuralist episteme but 
radicalize it in two regards. First, following Derrida’s example, they emphasize 
the absence of any external, extra-discursive logic, thus necessarily excluding 
any objective authority.376 Second, they emphasize “the impossibility of closing 
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any context” that produces meanings.377 In other words, discourses are not static 
structures; they are produced and reproduced, maintained and transformed in 
articulations. Discourse are therefore “a structure in which meaning is 
constantly negotiated and constructed.”378 
Laclau and Mouffe further base the final impossibility of any stable discursive 
order on the ontological dimension of antagonism.379 For them, antagonism 
denotes neither a simple dialectic negation such as labor versus capital in 
orthodox Marxism, nor a stable and objective relation of otherness, since this 
would imply an essentialist difference between two prior opposed entities.380 
Instead, it expresses the unavoidable and always-present division of any 
discursive space. In this sense, antagonism prevents any discursive system from 
being fully constituted and thus represents “the final impossibility of any stable 
difference and thus of any objectivity”381 As Laclau and Mouffe further put it, 
“[o]ur thesis is that antagonism are not objective relations, but relations which 
reveal the limits of all objectivity.”382 On the one hand, then, antagonism in its 
discursive presence represents the impossibility of any closed totality. On the 
other hand, since any discursive system is relational and constituted in 
difference, antagonism is also the very condition for the constitution of any 
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signifying structure. As Laclau puts it, “[a]ntagonism is not only the experience 
of a limit to objectivity but also a first discursive attempt at mastering and re-
inscribing it.”383 
The lack of a final ground and the impossibility of “ultimate fixity”384 does not 
however lead to a “chaotic postmodern universe;” instead, the constitution of 
meaning clearly needs the possibility of temporally fixation.385 Thus, any 
discourse within this structure is ultimately understood as an effort to 
temporarily interrupt the flow of difference and dominate the field of 
discursivity to establish a center. Laclau and Mouffe call these discursive points 
of partial fixation within the general dynamics of meaning construction nodal 
points.386 Nodal points, then, are particular discursive centers in a given 
discourse that connect meaning in a certain way.387 It is from here that their 
notion of articulation emerges: 
“The practice of articulation, therefore, consist in the construction of nodal 
points which partially fix meaning, and the partial character of this fixation 
proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant 
overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity.”388 
Laclau and Mouffe’s further assert that the “purely relational or differential 
character” of signification cannot be reduced to the realm of language, but 
“holds relevance for all signifying structures – that is to say, for all social 
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structures.”389 Against this background, the social is constructed as a 
“discursive space” constituted and organizes entirely by articulatory 
practices.390 Hence, their innovation also lies in the application of Saussurean 
“notion of value” to all social structures and relations.391 The social is thus 
intrinsically relational and acquires its meaning and identity through discursive 
practices.392 As a result, Laclau and Mouffe do not distinguish between 
linguistic and behavioral aspects within the social: 
“It affirms: a) that every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar 
as no object is given outside every discursive condition of emergence; and b) 
that any distinction between what are usually called the linguistic and 
behavioural aspects of a social practice, is either an incorrect distinction or 
ought to find its place as a differentiation within the social production of 
meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive totalities.”393 
Thus, according to Laclau and Mouffe, discourse comprises not only linguistic, 
but also non-linguistic elements,394 since any non-linguistic material – such as 
institutions or economic processes – is always also constructed in difference 
within discursive systems.395 This implies that the social is entirely discursive 
and that there is nothing outside of discourse.396 Since discourse is inherently 
unstable, the social is also not directed by any structural determination. It can 
only be selectively structured and is never perfectly sutured.397 
Any temporarily organized social space is thus never fixed or a closed essence. 
Laclau and Mouffe thus chose an anti-essentialist ontology for their approach. 
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For them, there is no given essence that defines meaning and identities within a 
fixed structure.398 Society has no positive quality or a unified principle: “[t]here 
is no sutured space peculiar to ‘society’, since the social itself has no 
essence.”399 Instead, the social has a “negative essence” characterized by a 
constitutive openness.400 Following the Derridean and poststructuralist 
terminology, social structures are characterized by an “undecidability” and, 
moreover, are incomplete and permanently threatened by internal crises.401 As 
a result, the social is a “relational space unable to constitute itself as such”402, 
and society as an objective entity is never completed or total. Instead, it exists 
only “as an effort to construct that impossible object.”403 
This section thus far has illustrated the ontological location from which Laclau 
and Mouffe embark to develop their theory of discourse. The following section 
will further elaborate on the political level of the discourse theory. 
3.3 The political level of the discourse theory 
While the previous paragraphs referred to the social ontology of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory of discourse (also called theory of hegemony), this section 
focuses more on the political level of their theory, emphasizing political 
processes and discursive struggles. In their attempt to develop a sophisticated 
account of collective action in a pluralist environment, they combine Derridean 
poststructuralism with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony.404 The treatment of 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony reflects Laclau and Mouffe’s concern to 
eliminate class reductionism and “economism” from the Marxist conception of 
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ideology.405 With Gramsci, they instead create a “discursive substitution of the 
hegemonic struggles,”406 and thus consider discourse as the constitutive horizon 
for politics and social subject position.407 This allows them to abandon the 
“single political space” as the necessary arena for political articulation.408 
Gramsci’s theoretical novelty lies in defining hegemony as “political and moral 
leadership” over allied groups with the potential to structure an emergent 
historical bloc.409 Unlike Lenin, hegemony is not defined simply as an 
instrumental political strategy, or merely as a political leadership within a class 
alliance with predetermined identities and ideologies.410 Instead, the 
establishment of hegemony involves the creation of a “higher synthesis,” which 
is the ideological construction of a “collective will.” The construction of a 
collective will functions as a means of political action and implies the 
transformation and re-articulation of existing ideological elements.411 This 
process of ideological transformation through re-articulation is further referred 
to as intellectual and moral reform.412 In order to form a unified political subject 
or a collective will, the creation of a subject’s identity independent of economic 
class-belonging becomes necessary.413 Understanding hegemony as moral and 
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intellectual leadership thus dismisses the idea of a necessary class-belonging.414 
As Mouffe puts it in her earlier work Gramsci and Marxist Theory: 
“The social agent possesses several principles of ideological determination, 
[such as] sex, a family, of a social class, of a nation, of a race or as an aesthetic 
onlooker, and he lives these different subjectivities in which he is constituted 
in a relation of mutual implication. In reductionist perspective each of these 
has a necessary class-belonging. But if we accept the principle of 
overdetermination, we must conclude that there can exist no necessary relation 
between them, and that it is consequently impossible to attribute a necessary 
class-belonging to them.”415 
Gramsci here moves beyond the necessary class-belonging and instead 
understands hegemony as the creation of a unity through the fusion of different 
elements.416 This requires the construction of a contingent hegemonic formation 
that implies that the superordinate group represents the concerns of the 
subordinated groups.417 The final triumph of the proletarian struggle, according 
to Gramsci, ultimately rests on the ability of the working classes to form a 
“collective national will.”418 The working class must therefore open up its 
narrow class identity and “persuade these allies to accept its definition of the 
‘nation’, of the ‘national-popular’ will [which implies the] re-articulation of 
existing ideological elements.”419 The resulting unified political subject 
provides the ideological cement required to form the basis for its leadership in 
a new historical bloc, independent of the class origins of the individual 
hegemonic agents.420 This understanding of hegemony as moral and political 
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leadership thus represents more than a class alliance and has a genuinely 
democratic and pluralistic potential.421 
From this perspective, however, the hegemonic struggle and change remains 
possible only in the context of the working class becoming the national class 
and representing the interests of various social groups.422 The industrial working 
class ultimately stays the central historical agent that serves the socialist project 
to build a collective project and wins over the peripheral struggles of the newly 
arriving movements for the interests of the proletariat.423 Gramsci therefore 
ultimately remains within the logic of economic determinism, the conventional 
base/ superstructure topography, as well as the teleology of the Marxist theory 
of history. The fundamental classes (working class and bourgeoisie) determined 
through the relations of production are key protagonists in Gramsci’s account 
of hegemony,424 as Laclau and Mouffe put it in HSS: 
“Yet even for Gramsci, the ultimate core of the hegemonic subject’s identity is 
constituted at a point external to the space it articulates: the logic of hegemony 
does not unfold all of its deconstructive effects on the theoretical terrain of 
classical Marxism. Here remains a last redoubt of class reductionism.”425 
In order to take the discursive construction of the hegemonic struggles and the 
social subject position seriously,426 they thus abandon the privileged position of 
the fundamental classes in the struggle for social hegemony. As they formulate: 
“[The] defined break with ‘economism’ implies the abandonment of Gramsci’s 
thesis that only the working class can [ultimately] provide the articulating 
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principle of the totality of anti-capitalist and democratic struggles…and give 
them a socialist orientation.”427 
Laclau and Mouffe thus abandon the centrality of the working class in 
articulation of any social and political concerns.428 Instead, for them, the 
plurality and individual specificity of political or social movements must be 
recognized, none of which represents a predetermined centrality.429 As they put 
it in HSS: 
“Once the conception of the working class as a ‘universal class’ is rejected, it 
becomes possible to recognize the plurality of the antagonisms which take 
place in the field of what is arbitrarily grouped under the label of ‘workers’ 
struggles’, and the inestimable importance of the great majority of them for the 
deepening of the democratic process.”430 
Laclau and Mouffe therefore dismiss Gramsci’s conception of hegemony in two 
respects: first, that “hegemonic subjects are necessarily constituted on the plane 
of the fundamental classes,” and second, that “[…]every social formation 
structures itself around a single hegemonic center.”431 The departure from these 
two remaining essentialist assumptions in Gramsci’s theory rests primarily on 
the emphasis on the constitutive effect of discourse on politics and the 
construction of subject positions.432 As illustrated above, Gramsci conceives of 
politics as articulation capable of transforming social identities and shaping the 
formation of hegemony through, thus providing the basis for a new, enlarged 
understanding.433 For him “politics is the very activity through which social 
relations are constituted [and] it becomes evident that everything in society is 
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political.”434 Laclau and Mouffe, however, further radicalize Gramsci’s concept 
of articulation and politics by considering discourse as the constitutive horizon 
for any hegemonic activity.435 This allows them to abandon the idea of a “single 
political space” as the necessary arena for political articulation and to allow for 
a plurality of struggles in democratic political space.436 As Mouffe and Laclau 
note in HSS: 
“It has been through the development of certain intuitions and discursive forms 
constituted within Marxism that we have constructed a concept of hegemony 
which, in our view, may be a useful instrument in the struggle for a radical, 
libertarian and plural democracy.”437 
Laclau and Mouffe therefore reject the idea that hegemony is a given set and 
the simply domination of a particular group.438 Instead, they understand 
hegemony as a phenomenon that emerges from political interaction, which 
allows them to leave behind the class reductionism of conventional Marxist. 
As shown in the previous section, Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of 
articulation forms the bases of any social order, which is also characterized by 
undecidability and the absence of a fixed essence. In a relational space 
characterized by contingency, articulatory practices attempt to temporarily fix 
meaning by turning elements into moments and constructing nodal points.439 
These temporary discursive fixations that constitute any concrete social order 
are always “an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow 
of differences, and to construct a center.”440 Therefore, according to Laclau and 
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Mouffe, any attempt to fix meaning and install a particular order in a situation 
of contingency is a political intervention that articulates a particularity.441 They 
therefore refer to these attempts as hegemonic practices of articulation.442 As 
Laclau puts it, “in a society (and this is finally the case of any society) in which 
its fullness – the moment of its universality – is unachievable, the relation 
between the universal and the particular is a hegemonic relation.”443 According 
to this understanding, hegemonic practices are articulatory processes that may 
install a particular social order.444 
Laclau and Mouffe call a relatively unified space constituted through 
hegemonic practices a “hegemonic formation.” This is generally based on 
Gramsci’s understanding of an articulated totality of difference as a “historic 
bloc.”445 Laclau and Mouffe further assume that the creation of a hegemonic 
formation takes place in a space characterized by antagonism.446 As they 
formulate in HSS: 
“A social and political space relatively unified through the instituting of nodal 
points and the constitution of tendentially relational identities, is what Gramsci 
calls historical bloc. The type of link joining the different elements of the 
historical bloc – not unity in any form of historical a priori, but regularity in 
dispersion – coincides with our concept of discursive formation. Insofar as we 
consider the historical bloc from the point of view of the antagonistic terrain in 
which it is constituted, we will call it hegemonic formation.”447 
In a hegemonic formation, linguistic and non-linguistic fractions of a discourse 
are transformed into nodal points and jointly constitute a structure of differential 
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articulations. It therefore comprises a number of basic articulatory principles, 
which are combined as an “articulated totality of difference.”448 
The hegemonic formation as a relative unified space is further constituted 
through the interplay of two competing articulatory logics of difference and 
equivalence.449 The logic of equivalence, on the one hand, allows for the 
constitution of identifications that are equivalent, expressing the negation of a 
discursive system.450 As Laclau and Mouffe put it, “[t]he condition of 
equivalence is that the discursive spaces is strictly divided into two camps. 
Antagonism does not admit tertium quid.”451 The logic of difference, on the 
other hand, works in the contrary way. It disintegrates existing chains of 
equivalence and extends an present system of difference by integrating the 
disarticulated elements from disintegration.452 Thus, while the logic of 
equivalence works to divide discursive space by establishing meaning between 
two antagonistic centers, the logic of difference seeks to disperse a given 
antagonistic center and shift this discursive division.453 Therefore, equivalents 
are always precarious as they prevent differences from being fully 
constituted.454 As formulated in HSS: 
“Every historical bloc – or hegemonic formation – is constructed through 
regularity in dispersion, and this dispersion includes a proliferation of very 
diverse elements: systems of differences which partially define relational 
identities; chains of equivalences which subvert the latter but which can be 
transformistically recovered insofar as the place of opposition itself becomes 
regular and, in that way, constitutes a new difference; forms of 
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overdetermination which concentrate either power, or the different forms of 
resistance to it; and so forth.”455 
Laclau and Mouffe deduce form this that the interplay of the two competing 
logics of equivalence and difference is never complete and that society is 
therefore “not totally possible, neither ... totally impossible” – namely, as an 
“objective” and universally agreed concept – or “signified.”456 Instead, any 
social or political order is a temporally “articulated totality of difference” that 
is constituted through a series of articulatory practices such as the logics of 
equivalence and difference. 
Hegemonic practices that establish a temporal hegemonic order are thus 
inseparable from the exercise of power.457 However, since the interplay of these 
hegemonic practices is never complete, power is also never foundational, but 
only a temporal configuration of social space. As Laclau and Mouffe put it in 
HSS: “The important point is that every form of power is constructed in a 
pragmatic way and internally to the social, through the opposed logics of 
equivalence and difference; power is never foundational.”458 Political or social 
spaces that appear natural at a given moment are thus “never the manifestation 
of a deeper objectivity,” but rather the result of articulatory practices that create 
a hegemonic formation. As Laclau and Mouffe formulate: 
“[…]no hegemonic logic can account for the totality of the social and constitute 
its center, for in that case a new suture would have been produced and the very 
concept of hegemony would have eliminated itself. The openness of the social 
is, thus, the precondition of every hegemonic practice.”459 
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Despite the claimed “openness of the social”, hegemonic practices can have 
very material power effects. Laclau and Mouffe make use here of the Husserlian 
distinction between “sedimentation” and “reactivation.” The notion of 
sedimentation refers to the various ways in which hegemonic articulations 
become institutionally and materially fixed (sedimented) in society.460 
Sedimented hegemonic practices thus constitute society and create an 
institutionalized structure through the articulation of a discursive system in 
which meaning is temporarily fixed.461 This momentary fixation allows the 
sedimented meaning associated with the particular hegemonic discourse to be 
“de-politicized.” Meaning in this situation, then, presents itself as given or 
natural and allows for the emergence of a relatively stable social order, even 
though its constitution is based on hegemonic practices.462 However, since 
discursive systems are inherently unstable and unable to fully hegemonize the 
field of discursivity and overcome the always-present ontological condition of 
antagonism, the possibility of reactivation and “re-politicization” of the 
sedimented hegemonic discourses on which it is based always remains.463 As 
Laclau and Mouffe note, “[w]e could say that the social is equivalent to a 
sedimented order, while the political would involve the moment of 
reactivation.”464 Thus, a situation of sedimentation overcovers the contingent 
political acts necessary for its institution, and in a situation of reactivation, the 
political becomes visible again.465 Political activity is thus an ever-present 
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possibility capable of shaping the social.466 This in turn generates contingency 
and the possibility for resistance and change in society to emerge.467 
In order to experience hegemonic activity and make the re-articulation of 
meaning under the condition of antagonism possible, the sedimented social 
space must be weakened. Laclau and Mouffe call this moment the “notion of 
dislocation.”468 The notion of dislocation describes a situation in which a 
relatively stable discursive system collapse.469 As a result, fixed nodal points 
become unfixed and articulated elements become floating again.470 The 
meaning attached to the particular discourse becomes lose and a proliferation of 
floating elements emerges, making the transformation of elements into 
moments possible.471 Mouffe and Laclau thus describe the notion of dislocation 
as follows, “[a] conjuncture where there is a generalized weakening of the 
relational system defining the identities of a given social or political space, and 
where, as a result there is a proliferation of floating elements.”472 
Despite the fact that the social is always already “dislocated insofar as it 
depends on an outside which both denies that identity and provides its condition 
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of possibility at the same time.”473 Dislocation generally occurs when a 
hegemonic discourse encounters a situation that cannot be integrate into the 
discursive system in question. Although discursive systems are generally 
relatively flexible, they will eventually reach their limits and thus be unable to 
integrate a particular situation. The inability to integrate a particular situation 
eventually weakens the discursive system and allows dislocation to occur.474 As 
Laclau states, “[d]islocation refers to unsymbolized events, external to the 
hegemonic order and aiming at its disruption.”475 It remains however 
completely contingent which moment becomes the site of reactivation or re-
politicization. The dislocation of a situation will only become visible 
retroactively through the process of de-sedimentation and reactivation.476 
Nonetheless, the result is always the emergence of a structural crisis, which 
Gramsci calls an “organic crisis.”477  
Dislocation thus implies a productive dimension, as it gives rise to a situation 
of structural or organic crisis, in which the reactivation or re-politicization of a 
relatively stable, sedimented system becomes possible and a proliferation of 
antagonism emerges.478 This makes hegemonic activity and the re-articulation 
of temporally fixed meaning possible. It allows the existing system to be 
challenged and for new ways of forming hegemonic formations to emerge.479 
As such, dislocation has an intrinsically emancipatory potential, making new 
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articulations and social and political change possible, thus serving as “the 
foundation on which new identities are constituted.”480 It thus functions as a 
rupture to a relatively stable situation, making it a crucial aspect in the process 
of hegemonic practices.481 
In the process of re-articulation in a situation of structural crisis, dislocated 
sedimented hegemonic discourses are newly-assembled around empty signifier 
that operate as nodal points.482 Empty signifier are essentially signifier without 
a signified.483 Since they do not have a fixed content, they can represent a 
totality by establishing a chain of equivalence between different demands and 
thus function as a nodal point, while at the same time demarcating this identity 
from the outside.484 Empty signifiers thus exist due to the impossibility of any 
final signification.485 The lack of stability of meaning and identities further 
constitutes the condition in which the battle between different social groups play 
out.486 Different hegemonic projects thus aim to construct unifying chains of 
equivalence by means of particular empty signifiers. They struggle to fill empty 
signifiers with their particular objectives and present them as universally valid, 
which Laclau describes as the process of hegemonization.487 He argues that, 
“[t]he presence of empty signifiers [...] is the very condition of hegemony.”488 
Hegemony is only possible because “a particular signifier (‘people’, ‘nation’, 
‘revolution’) which is emptied of its particular meaning […] comes to represent 
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the ‘absent fullness’ of a symbolic order.”489 In a situation characterizes by 
dislocation, hegemonic projects thus aim to install a hegemonic formation by 
successfully filling empty signifier with their particular, presenting them as 
universal.490 
The emergence of hegemony has thus very precise conditions. First, the already-
mentioned lack of immanent stability and “dimension of structural 
undecidability.”491 Hegemony presupposes an incomplete social terrain that is 
open for articulation and re-articulation.492 Within an established order where 
the meaning of all articulatory elements are finally fixed, and where objectivity 
determines the structural arrangement, contingent hegemonic practices and re-
articulation of empty signifier or floating elements would not be possible.493 As 
Laclau and Mouffe formulate in HSS: 
“The general field of the emergence of hegemony is that of articulatory 
practices, that is, a field where the ‘elements’ have not crystallized into 
moments. In a closed system of relational identities, in which the meaning of 
each moment is absolutely fixed, there is no place whatsoever for a hegemonic 
practice. A fully successful system of differences, which excluded any floating 
signifier, would not make possible any articulation; the principle of repetition 
would dominate every practice within this system and there would be nothing 
to hegemonize.”494 
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Second, hegemonic articulation occurs in a space that is characterized by the 
always present dimension of antagonism. In this phenomenological sense, 
antagonism describes the moment in which the potential for conflict realizes 
itself and at the same time political identities emerge as a shared opposition 
towards an aspect of the social order.495 The ineradicable existence of 
antagonism thus allows for a plurality of political spaces and the confrontation 
of hegemonic practices.496 Laclau and Mouffe therefore describe the two 
necessary conditions for the emergence of hegemony as follows: 
“The two conditions of hegemonic articulation are the presence of antagonistic 
forces and the instability of the frontiers which separate them. Only the 
presence of a vast area of floating elements and the possibility of their 
articulation to opposite camps – which implies a constant redefinition of the 
latter – is what constitutes the terrain permitting us to define a practice as 
hegemonic.”497 
The proliferation of antagonism and the undecidability of the social are thus the 
sources for hegemonic practices and change.498 It permits the articulation of 
different hegemonic formations and thus negates the “single political space.”499 
Instead, different discursive projects participate in an ongoing battle for 
hegemony.500 They struggle to implement a different interpretation of the social 
world, defining society and identity by using the opposing logics of equivalence 
and difference.501 Hegemony is therefore essentially the discursive struggle 
between different hegemonic projects aiming to install political leadership and 
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construct a collective emancipatory project.502 This struggle for hegemony – 
which Gramsci calls the “war of position”503 – is ongoing until a particular 
discursive position succeeds as the dominant group in the field.504 Hereby, it is 
undetermined which of the different projects struggling within the war of 
positions might succeed.505 As Laclau formulates in Emancipation(s): 
“[…]if all differential struggles […] are equally capable of expressing […] the 
absent fullness of the community, […] if none is predetermined per se to fulfil 
this role; what does determine that one of them rather than another incarnates, 
at particular periods of time, this universal function?”506 
Hegemony is further conditioned by the impossibility of suture. It is generally 
impossible to fill the gap between particular and universal. Therefore, any 
hegemony is never a final state, even though, they temporarily take the place 
for the universal. However, although the full closure of the social is impossible, 
this does not mean that closure, fullness, or full representation disappear from 
political discourse. Instead, the concept of final closure or fullness continues to 
serve as an impossible ideal that hegemonic struggles aim to achieve, as Laclau 
states: “[…] it will always show itself through the presence of its absence.”507 
The ongoing attempt to fill the unachievable lack of fullness is precisely what 
describes the category of politics.508 Politics thus becomes possible because the 
social is characterized by a constitutive impossibility. It presents itself through 
the production of empty or floating signifier filled with particular meaning, 
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presenting them as universal.509 The modus of politics is thus the permanent 
discursive struggle around hegemony, aiming to establish order in a context of 
contingency.510 Laclau and Mouffe further emphasize the primacy of politics, 
since any social or political order ultimately bases on hegemonic practices and 
the always-present antagonism in its ontological dimension.511 The political is 
thus, “[…] the dimension that is inherent to every human society and that 
determines our very ontological condition.”512 This makes all social relations 
ultimately political and the political a hegemonic terrain.513 It follows that any 
social order is vulnerable to those that are excluded and social division is always 
possible in democratic politics.514 The concept of hegemony thus takes place in 
a social space characterized by an irreducible plurality.515 As Laclau and Mouffe 
state in HSS, “[t]his proliferation of political spaces and the complexity and 
difficulty of their articulation is a central characteristic of the advanced 
capitalist societies.”516 
In contrast to orthodox Marxism – which fixes meaning a priori as essentialist 
manifestations of the economic base – for Laclau and Mouffe meanings and 
identities are thus contingent and always open to contestation, change and 
negotiation.517 From here, they drew the simple conclusion that only liberal-
democratic principles and institutions fully recognize the unfixity of meaning 
and the plurality of positions. Any attempt to fix meaning for all time would 
result in authoritarianism.518 Based on these assumptions and the dynamics, 
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Mouffe develops her agonistic pluralism, which is further elaborated in the next 
section.519 
3.4 Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic model of democracy 
Chantal Mouffe’s post-HSS work focused less on post-Marxist theory. She had 
“given up the idea of a radical alternative to the capitalist system”520 and 
regarded Marxism as “unlikely” to recover due to its discredited totalitarian 
association and its inability to respond to the aspirations of the New Social 
Movements owing to its class reductionism.521 As for socialism, if defined as 
the democratization of the economy, she argued that this was a “necessary 
component of the project of radical and plural democracy” and could only be 
attained through a liberal-democratic regime.522 Mouffe thus left behind the idea 
of class at the center of political change. Instead, she focuses on the 
conceptualization of collective democratic action under the condition of 
pluralism, combining Derridean poststructuralism with Gramscian notions of 
hegemony and Carl Schmitt’s depiction of the political.523 Mouffe develops her 
explicit agonistic writings, constructing an “analytic theory of democracy” from 
the early-1990s in The Return of the Political (1993), The Democratic Paradox 
(2000), On the Political (2005) and others. These were strongly informed by the 
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theoretical assumptions developed in HSS and thus widely seen as a hegemonic 
maneuver within contemporary political theory.524 
Within political theory, the concept of agonism has become increasingly 
influential and been subjected to many different interpretations. Besides 
Chantal Mouffe, theorists such as William E. Connolly, Bonnie Honig and 
James Tully have provided agonistic approaches.525 Despite their differences, 
they all agree on the relevance of passion, the constitutive dimension of 
pluralism and the necessary presence of conflict in contemporary democratic 
systems.526 Inspired by either Hannah Arendt, Friedrich Nietzsche, or Carl 
Schmitt, each approach suggests different concepts on how to deal with these 
dimensions in a democratic context.527 
Chantal Mouffe’s “agonistic pluralism” is arguably the most influential 
agonistic model of democracy. Mouffe shares with the other theorists the 
general acknowledgment of the dimensions of passion, pluralism and conflict. 
For Mouffe, the main difference between her and the other agonistic theorists is 
however that they understand “agonism without antagonism.”528 Here, she 
means that they consider agonism as a kind of individual self-realization, while 
Mouffe insists on a collective and political interpretation of the concept. 
According to her, the world is ontologically antagonistic and conflictual, and 
agonism is a way to mitigate and control this always present dimension of 
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antagonism.529 She develops her model of “agonistic pluralism” to provide the 
theoretical foundation to create a democratic system under the condition of 
pluralism where antagonism and power are acknowledged. The main task for 
democratic institutions in an agonistic pluralism is thus to provide legitimate 
political channels to convert power into forms that are compatible with 
democratic ideas and values and enable different political projects to constantly 
struggle for hegemony.530 From her perspective, the problem with 
contemporary political theory is that “few attempts have been made to elaborate 
the democratic project on an anthropology which acknowledges the ambivalent 
character of human sociability and the fact that reciprocity and hostility cannot 
be dissociated.”531 She therefore bases her approach on the ontological 
“dimension of radical negativity that manifests itself in the ever-present 
possibility of antagonism.”532 Mouffe’s reflections thus belong to the 
dissociative view of the political in democratic theory, assuming that society 
cannot exist beyond power and conflict,533 which she develops explicitly in 
opposition to the “associative view,” seeing the political as a space of freedom 
and public deliberation.534 
The associative tradition is strongly connected with the liberal form of 
contemporary political philosophy. This view asserts that the political is an 
arena of liberty and consensus-focused policy.535 In The Return of the Political 
(1993) – one of her most popular books – Mouffe discusses the associative 
view.536 Mouffe particularly criticizes the evolution of liberal thought, which 
has – according to her – always been stuck between economics and ethics. Here, 
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she focuses on the two main liberal paradigms, the “aggregative” and the 
“deliberative.” The aggregative model of democracy was dominant in the 
second half of the 20th century.537 It essentially applies the idea of the market 
to the terrain of politics, employing concepts from economics. It further 
understands the process of politics as the determination of a compromise 
between different groups in society. The individual in such a setting is 
interpreted as a rational being, acting in an instrumental way in a political world 
and driven by the maximization of one’s own particular interest.538 One of the 
main theoretical contributions in the domain of the aggregative approach is 
Joseph Schumpeter’s seminal work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(1943). His aggregative approach focuses on democratic processes for “the 
aggregation of preferences” in the wake of the development of mass democracy. 
The aggregation takes place through a competitive electoral system in which 
citizens are able to accept or reject political groups and parties and their politics 
at regular intervals.539 The aggregative model was further developed by 
Anthony Downs in his work An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), aiming 
to provide a descriptive perspective of democracy, rather than a normative 
one.540 Scholars in this domain typically assume that under the condition of 
modern democracy, pluralism has to be acknowledged and thus historical 
concepts such as the “common good” or the “general will” to be abandoned. 
The aggregative view on democracy therefore separates democracy from its 
normative dimension and instead approaches it from a purely instrumentalist 
standpoint.541 
The deliberative approach of liberal thought emerged in the second half of the 
20th century in response to the dominance of the instrumentalist model, outlined 
above. It generally dismisses the idea that democracy should be reduced to 
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procedures enabling pluralism among interest groups.542 Instead, it aims to 
develop a model that reactivates the normative dimension of democracy and 
creates a link between morality and politics through communicative 
rationality.543 Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls – as two main representatives 
of the deliberative approach – suggest that a rational consensus with a moral 
dimension can be reached through a set of deliberative processes between free 
and equal citizens.544 Habermas and Rawls differ in their concepts for 
implementing and achieving such consensus. Rawls suggests in his publication 
A Theory of Justice (1971) – a key publication in the liberal domain – that the 
achievement of normative rationality lies in the use of “free public reason” and 
the emphasis on “principles of justice.” In order to achieve rational results, he 
elaborates that the participants in a discourse need to take the position of the 
original state, the “original position.”545 This position of the original state 
enables the participants to discard their particularities and interests and thus find 
a rational consensus in the debate.546 Rawls formulates this as follows, “I have 
said that the original position is the appropriate initial status quo which insures 
that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. This fact yields the name 
“justice as fairness.””547 
Habermas advocates a strictly procedural approach of “communicative 
action.”548 For him, the deliberative process must meet the condition of “ideal 
discourse” to achieve reasonable results and generate communicative power. 
These conditions presuppose that the deliberative process is impartial, equal and 
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open, so that the participants can be guided by the better argument without 
constraint. In this way, the political decision-making and opinion-forming 
processes can produce “reasonable and fair results” that reflect the common 
interests and can be accepted by all concerned.549 It thus generates the common 
good among free and equal citizens in a process of deliberation free from 
domination.550 
Both forms of deliberative democracy theory presented here, Rawls and 
Habermas, thus see the possibility for achieving normative rationality through 
predetermined procedures of deliberation, such as the illustrated ideal discourse, 
communicative action and the free, public use of reason.551 For Habermas and 
Rawls, the rediscovery of the moral dimension in consensus-building is – under 
the condition of the “fact of pluralism”552 – decisive for the future of the 
Western liberal democracy.553 Such a consensus is, according to them, capable 
of representing generalizable interests and can thus create a stable basis in 
liberal democracy, which contributes to securing the future of liberal-
democratic institutions.554 
Mouffe generally shares their concern about the current state of democratic 
institutions and the associated criticism of aggregative models of democracy.555 
She agrees that the aggregative model does not adequately prepare democratic 
societies for the political challenges linked to pluralism. Mouffe thus formulates 
already in HSS with Laclau: 
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“Like them, we criticize the aggregative model of democracy, which reduces 
the democratic process to the expression of those interests and preferences 
which are registered in a vote aiming at selecting leaders who will carry out 
the chosen policies. Like them, we object that this is an impoverished 
conception of democratic politics, which does not acknowledge the way in 
which political identities are not pre-given but constituted and reconstituted 
through debate in the public sphere. Politics, we argue, does not consist in 
simply registering already existing interests, but plays a crucial role in shaping 
political subjects. On these topics, we are at one with the Habermasians. 
Moreover, we agree with them on the need to take account of the many 
different voices that a democratic society encompasses and to widen the field 
of democratic struggles.”556 
While Mouffe shares the concerns of deliberative democracy theory, she 
however considers their proposed solutions to be inadequate and even counter-
productive in dealing with pluralism in democratic societies.557 From Mouffe’s 
perspective, the creation of active democratic citizenship and the associated 
identification with democratic values and institutions is not based on intellectual 
approval or rational justification. Instead, it is a matter of passion and takes 
place via “continuous recognition” and the “passionate commitment to a system 
of reference.”558 As she states in Dimensions of Radical Democracy (1995), “[a] 
radical, democratic citizen must be an active citizen, somebody who acts as a 
citizen, who conceives of herself as a participant in a collective undertaking.”559 
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Democratic citizenship is thus created through the availability of democratic 
forms of identification and subjectivity.560  
Instead of replacing the prevailing “rationality of purpose” of the aggregative 
model with a “reasonable” or “communicative” rationality,561 it is necessary to 
recognize the limits of all rationality and understand passion and conflict as the 
central dimension of the political.562 Mouffe puts therefore power at the center 
of her approach, instead of eliminating it from the public space.563 As already 
laid out in HSS, the core thesis here is “that social objectivity is constituted by 
acts of power”564 and the point of convergence between power and objectivity 
is understood as hegemony. Any social or political order has a hegemonic nature 
and expresses a temporal configuration of power. It is “never the manifestation 
of a deeper objectivity,”565 and always contains traces of exclusion of other 
possibilities that are currently not in power, which are however decisive for its 
constitution.566 The hegemonic nature of any social order shifts the traditional 
relationship between democracy and power. The task of democratic politics is 
no longer to offer ways to prevent power, but rather to find forms of power that 
are compatible with democratic values.567 For this reason, Mouffe advocates a 
democratic model that offers space for dispute over power. 
Deliberative models remain unable to acknowledge the essential role of power 
and passion in securing identification with democratic values.568 Under the 
condition of pluralism, they assume the possibility for a common good or a 
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general consensus on perspectives and values building a “non-conflictual 
ensemble,” as Mouffe states in the following: 
“[t]he typical liberal theories understanding is that we live in a world in which 
there are indeed many perspectives and values and that, owing to empirical 
limitations, we will never be able to adopt them all, but that, when put together, 
they constitute an harmonious and non-conflictual ensemble.”569 
This understanding of pluralism, which assumes the possibility for the building 
of a “non-conflictual ensemble,” further negates “the political in its antagonistic 
dimension.” 570 For Mouffe, every particular order rests however on a diversity 
of positions due to the antagonistic dimension constitutive to their existence. 
The notion of antagonism thus forecloses the possibility of rational consensus 
since any consensus is always based on exclusion.571 Conflict and division are 
therefore the precondition for every democratic system under pluralist 
conditions. Without conflict and division, a pluralist democratic politics would 
not be possible. Different positions shape the pluralistic environment and thus 
enable deliberation in the first place.572 The ideal of a rational consensus without 
exclusion therefore eventually eliminates pluralism.573 Mouffe describes this as 
follows: 
“Because it postulates the availability of a consensus without exclusion, the 
model of deliberative democracy is unable to envisage liberal democratic 
pluralism in an adequate way. Indeed, one could indicate how, in both Rawls 
and Habermas — to take the best-known representatives of that trend — the 
very condition for the creation of consensus is the elimination of pluralism 
from the public sphere.”574 
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Mouffe thus rejects the idea to overcome particularity and achieve a universal 
consensus with a moral dimension that reflects the common good of the citizens 
in dealing with pluralism. Instead, the “limits of rationality”575 must be 
recognized and the idea of a rational consensus be abandoned.576 Mouffe 
describes this as follows: 
“Seeing things in that way should make us realize that taking pluralism 
seriously requires that we give up the dream of a rational consensus which 
entails the fantasy that we could escape from our human form of life. The 
obstacles that stand in the way of such rationalistic tools as the original state or 
the ideal discourse are in no way empirical or epistemological, but 
ontological”577 
This understanding is presented in Mouffe’s model of “agonistic pluralism.” In 
order to introduce her theoretical conception, the following section elaborates 
further on relevant elements, such as the notion of antagonism and hegemony. 
Agonistic pluralism 
Against this background, Chantal Mouffe provides her agonistic model of 
democracy. She presents her model of “agonistic pluralism” as an anti-
essentialist or post-foundationalist counterpoint to the “naïve idealism of the 
consensus theories.”578 She rejects the consensus-oriented liberal approaches 
and does not seek to ground her ideas of politics in the moral dimension. For 
her, there is no ultimate reason, the common good or a deeper essence of things. 
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She therefore takes an anti-essentialist perspective and identifies the 
shortcomings of the rationalist and individualist theory of democracy in her 
approach.579 
The first central theme in Mouffe’s democratic theory is her understanding of 
“the political” characterized by an antagonistic dimension.580 Its central tenet is 
directly taken from HSS describing that the dimension of antagonism is 
constitutive to human societies, expressing the unavoidable division on 
ontological matters between subjects within any given society. Mouffe’s 
depiction of the political is further inspired by the German conservative political 
philosopher Carl Schmitt,581 who understands the political in terms of the 
ineradicability of passion-driven, human conflict.582 As Schmitt claims, 
“antagonism is an ever-present possibility, the political belongs to our 
ontological condition.”583 The political thus belongs to the ontological 
conditions of society characterized by the always present dimension of 
antagonism.584 
The pervasive potential of antagonism further presents itself in the radical 
negativity or “negative essence” of the existing. It follows from here that social 
or political order dismisses any kind of essence or final form.585 Rather, order 
is the result of hegemonic articulatory practices aiming to create order in the 
context of contingency.586 This makes the political deeply connected to the acts 
of hegemonic institutions.587 It further establishes that order is characterized by 
the dimension of undecidability and rests on the exclusion of other possibilities. 
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In a relatively stable structure, these other possibilities are temporally 
suppressed and can be reactivated through hegemonic articulatory practices, as 
illustrated above.588 As Mouffe formulates it, “[e]very hegemonic order is 
susceptible of being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, i.e. practices 
which will attempt to disarticulate the existing order so as to install other forms 
of hegemony.”589 The concept of hegemony thus holds central relevance when 
addressing “the political.”590  
The actual practices and institutions that mange these hegemonic dynamics 
further belong to the sphere of “politics” and are thus clearly distinguished from 
“the political”. Politics are thus the mere collection of practices and institutions 
that design a certain social order.591 Their main task being the diffusion of 
potentially antagonistic relations. In this way, the co-existence in a social order 
is always potentially conflicted since it is based on the political and its 
antagonistic dimension592 A fully inclusive political space where antagonism, 
division and conflict disappeared becomes impossible. Order is however always 
political and characterized by an exterior that is the condition of its existence.593 
Antagonism as a key constituent of the political also affects the construction of 
identity through processes of relational exclusion.594 Following the 
poststructuralist tradition, Mouffe highlights that the construction of identities 
is purely relational and thus results from processes of differentiation.595 She 
further introduces the term “constitutive outside,” which was originally 
proposed by Henry Staten.596 Staten’s concept draws on several notions from 
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Derrida, such as “supplement,” “trace,” and “différance.”597 According to this 
understanding, no identity is “self-present to itself” but constructed through the 
assertion of difference by distinguishing itself in an antagonistic fashion from 
an constitutive “other” that is “exterior” to itself. Identity is therefore purely 
contingent and the result of the established division between a discursive inside 
and an outside.598 
At the collective level, the creation of a group identity is further about the 
creation of a “we” in differentiation from a “they.”599 It entails the division 
between those who belong to the “we” and those who are outside it.600 
Collective identities are therefore also constituted in an antagonistic fashion 
being never completely fixed. Any temporal established we/they opposition is 
never the expression of essentialist identities, pre-existing the process of 
identification.601 As Mouffe aptly states, 
“[…] the social agent [it] is constructed by a diversity of discourses, among 
which there is no necessary relation but a constant movement of 
overdetermination and displacement. The identity of such a multiple and 
contradictory subject is therefore always contingent, precarious, temporarily 
fixed at the intersection of those discourses and depend on specific forms of 
identification.”602 
The we/they relations further entail the potential to become an antagonistic 
relation. This is what Mouffe calls the friend/enemy opposition. This relation 
appears when the counterpart in the process of identification questions the 
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individual identity and threatens its existence, instead of considering each other 
as simply different.603 Relations between enemies can take extreme forms in 
ethnic, national, economic or religious issues and thus become the place of 
political antagonism over non-negotiable moral values that have the potential to 
tear up society.604 
Up to this point, Mouffe generally shares her understanding of identity 
construction with Schmitt. She agrees with him that individuals and groups 
define themselves as a we/they relation and that this relation can become 
political, thus turning into friend/enemy.605 For Schmitt, the political is thus 
characterized by antagonism and hostility, which can take different forms.606 
However, in contrast to Mouffe, he did not see the possibility to turn “the 
political” into “politics” and thus domesticate the passions created by 
antagonism.607 Schmitt’s model is therefore unable to transform the hostile 
relation between “enemies” into a friendly form compatible with liberal 
democracy.608 In order to be political, this we/they relation takes inevitable an 
antagonistic form. For Schmitt, under the condition of pluralism and the ever-
present threat of extreme antagonism, democratic polity therefore requires a 
strong sovereign who secures the basis of political unity and ensures that the 
conflict between citizens will not dissociate into a state of extreme hostility.609 
Schmitt therefore shares Hobbes’ view that any degree of pluralism will 
eventually result in the dissolution of the unity of the political whole.610 For 
him, democracy is therefore only possible under the condition of a homogenous 
society, which precludes any kind of pluralism, as he puts it: 
                                               
603 Mouffe (1993: 2-3, 91, 114, 147; 1994b: 108-109; 2013: 5). 
604 Mouffe (1993: 2, 141; 2000c: 21, 104; 2005a: 14-15; 2013: 5-7). 
605 Schmitt, C. (1976: 35); Mouffe (1993: 2). 
606 Mouffe (1993: 2; 2005a: 11); Schmitt, C. (1976: 35). 
607 Mouffe (1993: 2-4; 1994b: 108). 
608 Mouffe (2000c: 101–102). 
609 Mouffe (2005a: 14, 16); Schmitt, C. (1976: 39; 1999: 203). 




“Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals equal 
but unequals will not be treated equally. Democracy requires, therefore, first 
homogeneity and second - if the need arises - elimination or eradication of 
heterogeneity.”611 
Schmitt therefore identifies a fundamental contradiction between liberal 
pluralism and democracy,612 as Mouffe formulates in The Return of the 
Political: 
“For [Schmitt], pluralist democracy is a contradictory combination of 
irreconcilable principles, whereas democracy is a logic of identity and 
equivalence, its complete realization rendered impossible by the logic of 
pluralism, which constitutes an obstacle to a total system of identification.”613 
Mouffe follows Schmitt in his argumentation that these two logics contradict 
each other and that the promise made by the liberal democracy to solve this 
conflict is impossible, and instead only contingent hegemonic forms of 
stabilization can be found.614 She therefore identifies a “paradox of 
democracy”615 in pluralist societies, as she formulates in the following: 
“[…] pluralist democracy contains a paradox, since the very moment of its 
realization would see its disintegration. It should be conceived as a good that 
only exists as good so long as it cannot be reached. Such a democracy will 
therefore always be a democracy ‘to come’, as conflict and antagonism are at 
the same time its condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of 
its full realization.”616 
Unlike Schmitt, however, Mouffe arrives at a different conclusion. She rejects 
his assumption that liberal democracy is a “non-viable form of government.”617 
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Instead, for her, the tension between equality and difference is the very essence 
of pluralist democracy, making it a particularly suitable form of government,618 
as she states in the following: 
“[…] far from bewailing this tension, we should be thankful for it and see it as 
something to be defended, not eliminated. […] The desire to resolve it could 
lead only to the elimination of the political and the destruction of 
democracy.”619 
Mouffe, however, proposes to maintain a pluralist democratic order under these 
“Schmittean” conditions and thus “think with Schmitt, against Schmitt”.620 As 
she formulates: “My objective is […] to use his insights in order to strengthen 
liberal democracy against his critiques.”621 She further elaborates: 
“Schmitt is right to stress the deficiencies of the kind of pluralism that negates 
the specificity of the political association […] but I do not believe that this must 
commit us to denying the possibility of any form of pluralism within the 
political association.”622 
For her, Schmitt’s negative view of liberal democracy is based on his inability 
to solve the tension between freedom and equality and transform human conflict 
into something less destructive.623 However, to meet this challenge, it is 
necessary to find a we/they relation that is compatible with pluralist democracy. 
It is necessary to enable the construction of a “they” as a legitimate enemy and 
not as an enemy that needs to be demolished. Mouffe therefore introduced the 
category of an “adversary.” The adversary is a legitimate opponent whose ideas 
are challenged, albeit remaining able to defend its political position. The 
adversary generally shares the “ethico-political principles” of a liberal 
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democracy, such as liberty and equality, with the “we.” Nevertheless, ongoing 
disagreement exists over the interpretation and implication of those shared 
principles of liberal democracy.624 Accordingly, the category of adversary 
allows disagreement and thus does not eliminate antagonism from the public 
sphere. 
Mouffe thus reworks Schmitt’s concept of the political regarding his idea of the 
“friend-enemy” relation.625 Her novelty of Mouffe’s is that she does not seek to 
overcome the potential antagonistic we/they division in society. For her, 
democratic pluralism and the ineradicability of antagonism do not negate each 
other.626 Instead, it is the main challenge for democratic systems to combine 
them by keeping “the emergence of antagonism at bay” and at the same time 
“constitute the framework of a consensus within which pluralism can exist.”627 
Democratic order thus requires some extend of consensus among its citizens “a 
form of commonality strong enough to institute a ‘demos’.”628 The common 
bond or “res publica” however needs to be compatible with “[...] religious, 
moral and cultural pluralism,”629 to make room for differences in many cultural 
terms,630 as Mouffe states, “an extreme form of pluralism, according to which 
all interests, all opinions, all differences are seen as legitimate, could never 
provide the framework for a political regime.”631 
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With the introduction of the category of the adversary, Mouffe further 
complexifies the concept of antagonism by distinguishes between antagonism 
and agonism. Mouffe calls antagonism the battle between enemies and agonism 
the ongoing disagreement over the ethico-political principles between 
adversaries. The aim of the democratic political institutions is to “transform 
antagonism into agonism.”632 They thus need to provide structures that allow 
conflicts to take place in an agonistic fashion, in which the opponents are not 
enemies but rather adversaries.633 As Mouffe formulates, “they provide the 
terrain in which passions can be mobilized around democratic objectives and 
antagonism transformed into agonism.”634 Mouffe thus redirects the threat of 
extreme forms of conflict by acknowledging the presence of antagonism, and 
further finding ways to translate antagonism into constructive forms of 
contest.635 
The agonistic confrontation within the political institutions must further be 
conducted through democratic procedures that the adversaries agreed on.636 
Under these mutually-agreed democratic conditions and procedures, each 
participant aspires to implement a different interpretation of the shared ethico-
political principles.637 Participants in an agonistic democracy thus find 
themselves in a paradoxical situation: they are friends because they share 
ethico-political principles such as liberty and equality, yet they are also 
adversaries because they want to organize these principles in different ways and 
thus implement different hegemonic projects.638 As Mouffe formulates, 
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“[…]there will always be disagreement concerning the meaning of those values 
and the way they should be implemented. This consensus will therefore always 
be a ‘conflictual consensus’.”639 The disagreement over the interpretation of 
liberty and equality creates diverse conceptions of citizenship, such as “liberal-
conservative, social-democratic, neo-liberal, radical-democratic, etc.”640 This 
represents different interpretations of the “common good” and thus provides for 
a conflictual nature of society, aiming to create unity in a context of conflict and 
diversity.641 
The availability of different contending forms of identification within a 
democratic polity is therefore absolutely vital in Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism 
to foster affection to its democratic institutions.642 When these agonistic 
dynamics of pluralism and the identification with conflicting positions are 
hindered, the ground is laid for identification and political confrontations over 
non-negotiable moral values outside the democratic system.643 The lack of 
confrontation ultimately allows for the creation of a void that enables collective 
identification “that put[s] into jeopardy the civic bond that should unite a 
democratic political association.”644 The lack of confrontations has the potential 
to release antagonism that cannot be managed within the democratic process 
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and therefore endanger the very basis of any democratic society.645 This 
substantially differentiates her agonistic model from deliberative approaches, as 
Mouffe states in The Democratic Paradox: 
“[a]n important difference with the model of ‘deliberative democracy’ is that 
for ‘agonistic pluralism’, the prime task of democratic politics is not to 
eliminate passions from the sphere of the public, in order to render a rational 
consensus possible, but to mobilize those passions towards democratic 
design.”646 
This makes the liberal idea of dispersing power through rational debate an 
illusion that endangers democratic institutions. The fixation on consensus and 
the negation of ongoing confrontation further enable apathy and disaffection, as 
Mouffe states in the following, “[d]emocracy is in peril […] when its agonistic 
dynamic is hindered by an apparent excess of consensus, which usually masks 
a disquieting apathy.”647 The liberal model is therefore incapable and even 
counter-productive in its attempt to solve the challenges in dealing with 
pluralism in democratic societies. 
“[…] Liberal theorists are unable to acknowledge […] the integrative role that 
conflict plays in modern democracy. A democratic society requires a debate 
about possible alternatives and it must provide political forms of collective 
identification around clearly differentiated democratic positions.”648 
Mouffe presents her agonistic model as a counterpart to the liberal consensus-
focused theories,649 which acknowledges the existence of power, conflict and 
antagonism in pluralist modern democracies. It provides ways to sublimate 
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passion and conflict into constructive forms of contest to allow political 
association with the democratic institutions.650 
The institutional setting of the agonistic pluralism 
Mouffe further emphasizes that agonistic confrontation should take place within 
the existing liberal political institutions. She considers the political institutions 
of “formal democracies” to be perfectly suited for meeting the demands of 
agonistic politics.651 These democratic institutions must therefore provide the 
political procedures and the processes for the articulation and realization of 
public demands and make room for agonistic confrontation between these 
different positions to take place.652 According to Mouffe, civil society and extra-
parliamentary movements play a central role in formulating political demands, 
although the realization of these demands must explicitly take place within the 
democratic institutions.653 She further criticizes extra-parliamentary 
“autonomous” movements such as “Occupy Wall Street,”654 arguing that their 
political influence remains limited and weakens the democratic system by 
staying outside of the established institutions. Instead, these movements should 
seek real power and influence in the institutions and government.655 Mouffe 
describes this as follows: 
“[T]he refusal of these horizontal movements to engage with the political 
institutions limited their impact. And without any form of articulation with 
institutional politics, they soon began to lose their dynamics. Although such 
protest movements have certainly played a role in the transformation of 
political consciousness, it is only when they have been followed by structural 
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political movements, ready to engage with political institutions, that significant 
results have been achieved.”656 
This emphasizes the importance assigned to the parliamentary system in the 
process to enable the articulation of demands of civil society. Therefore, Mouffe 
further pleads for an institutional reform of processes and procedures within 
existing democratic institutions to enable agonistic procedures and 
confrontation, as she elaborates, “to accord parliament and parties a crucial role 
in modern democracy […] in no sense amounts to defending these institutions 
as they currently function.”657 The institutions of “formal democracies” need to 
make visible a wider range of positions and emerging conflicts and make them 
available for the shaping of society. In order to enable active disruption and 
politicization, it needs to be possible to challenge the entrenched power relations 
in the existing democratic institutions.658 As she formulates, “[w]e need a war 
of position where progressive forces can build real influence in civil society, the 
dominant institutions, mainstream culture, and the media.”659 In this way, 
political institutions can serve as instruments for identifying and resolving 
conflicts and do justice to the constitutive character of the social.660 
The inability of political systems around the globe to allow the articulation of 
demands and permit controversial debate lies, according to Mouffe, at the origin 
of the success of anti-establishment and extreme parties that articulate anti-
democratic political identities. These parties therefore articulate their demands 
outside the given system, “they articulate, albeit in a very problematic way, real 
democratic demands which are not taken into account by traditional parties.”661 
They move into the vacuum created by consensus-focused democratic systems 
and technocratic post-politics. According to her, this has been shown in the 
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electoral success of parties such as the FN in France and the Freedom Party in 
Austria, as well as the strong support for the British National Party in the UK.662 
These trends thus open the door to extremist parties and have the negative effect 
of bringing about political polarization outside the democratic design and 
therefore endanger the very basis of society.663 As Mouffe elaborates in the 
following: 
“[…] the blurring of the line between Left and Right mean that conflict cannot 
find a form of expression through representative institutions and through 
democratic parties.’ ‘For example, this was the case with the riots in the 
banlieues in France in 2008. People were saying, ‘But these people have no 
demands, this is not politics, just destruction of public buildings!’ Well, 
precisely. They could not forward political demands because the system does 
not allow them to express their demands in a political form. So, for me, the 
agonistic struggle concerns the manner in which different demands can find 
political expression.”664 
In order to analyze the phenomenon of resistance in the process of EUI, the 
following section develops an analytical framework that incorporates the central 
theoretical categories and concepts of Mouffe’s agonistic model, which is used 
in this study for the analysis of the phenomenon under investigation. 
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3.5 Analytical framework 
In order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of resistance within 
the discourse on EUI, this analysis applies the central categories of Mouffe’s 
agonistic pluralism. The application to the problematized object of investigation 
demands constructing a theoretical framework. This involves the articulation of 
relevant theoretical concepts, categories and dimensions from the agonistic 
model for the analysis of discursive change. This chapter therefore develops an 
analytical framework that implies the necessary categories for the analysis 
conducted in chapter 5 of this study. The developed model is illustrated in the 
following figure: 
 
Figure 2: The phenomenon of resistance 
The single components of the framework above are further outlined in the 
following sections. Beginning with the illustration of the aspect of “excess of 
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consensus,” followed by “crisis of identification,” then “hegemonic struggle,” 
and finally the category of “apathy and disaffection.” 
Excess of consensus 
The theoretical starting point of the framework is a situation of excess of 
consensus in a democratic system. It assumes a political constellation in which 
a clear differentiation between left and right party positions no longer exist and 
a “consensus at the center” is established.665 The dominant idea here is that the 
dissolution of the left-right spectrum and the focus on consensus in the center 
best serves the democratic community. Furthermore, it is assumed that the 
focusing on consensus shows a particularly high degree of political maturity 
that ultimately lead to a unified and pacified world.666 This political 
constellation is what Mouffe calls in The Return of the Political an approach or 
situation of excess of consensus.667 It corresponds with the assumption of liberal 
theory that the determination of the common good or “a universal consensus 
based on reason” is possible.668 Under the condition of pluralism a variety of 
perspectives and values exist in society. However, due to empirical constrains, 
they cannot all take place simultaneously in a democratic community. 
Nevertheless, deliberation and rational debate under predetermined conditions 
enable the creation of “a harmonious and non-conflictual ensemble.” In contrast 
to this understanding, Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism suggests that society is 
characterized by the dimension of antagonism, which reveals the very limit of 
any rational consensus. It emphasizes that in order to think politically, the 
existence of radical negativity must be acknowledged, which implies the 
impossibility of ultimate objectivity, instead; the always present dimension of 
antagonism characterizes the political, and the moment of decision is therefore 
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inescapable.669 Mouffe identifies such situation of excess of consensus in 
various representative systems around the world.670 Here, she observes blurring 
of the line between the center-right and center-left within democratic systems, 
which she calls the ideology of the Third Way.671 In this understanding, political 
conflicts are no longer expressed through the left-right metaphor that was 
typical of industrial society.672 It is believed that a consensus can be established 
between experts, politicians, industrialists and citizens on political priorities and 
the effective management of risks.673 The Third Way rhetoric of inclusion and 
modernization effectively forecloses the possibility of opposition. An 
opposition can now only be thought of in negative terms. There is no choice 
between significantly different policies.674 Mouffe sees this as a “post-political” 
situation that lacks real alternatives and real choices for citizens. Therefore, 
such systems lack the passion and thus the possibility “for people to identify 
with a project.”675 It eliminates the political and democratic space in which 
different political projects have the chance to confront each other. The 
conflictual dimension that is constitutive of democratic politics and the political 
is further dismissed.676 Instead, politics is about the management of the existing 
order, which is dominated by political elites.677 Therefore, Mouffe suggests that 
consensual practices presuppose the very disappearance of what constitutes the 
viral core of democracy. 
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Crisis of identification 
In a situation characterized by an excess of consensus, following Mouffe’s 
theoretical model, the formation of collective identities becomes unavailable. 
She assumes that identification is constituted as difference, emphasizing the 
notion of the “constitutive outside.” Accordingly, identification is always 
relational created by determining something “other” that shows its particular 
“outside.” Moreover, the creation of collective identities requires the 
constitution of a common bond or a “we” in opposition to a “they.”678 The 
availability of various contending forms of identification is absolutely necessary 
to foster affection for democratic institutions.679 It is the central task of the 
democratic institutions to enable identification with various political positions 
and “mobilize those passions towards democratic design.”680 The political 
system is therefore responsible for making a vibrant conflict between different 
identities possible. These struggles ideally take place between adversaries over 
different interpretations of ethico-political principles. In a situation of excess of 
consensus, however, the processes of identification become unavailable 
because the antagonistic or conflictual dimension, as illustrated above, is 
eliminated. This allows for a crisis of identification in a system of consensus to 
emerge.681 For Mouffe, the possibility for an agonistic confrontation is thus a 
necessary requirement for the working of a democracy in a pluralist 
environment. Since liberalism is unable to adequately understand pluralism in 
this way, the ideal of “consensus without exclusion and the hope for a perfectly 
reconciled and harmonious society need to be abandoned.”682 Therefore, 
Mouffe assumes that the absence of a political frontiers is not a sign of political 
maturity, but a symptom of a void that endangers the democratic system. 
Instead, conflict is essential to pluralist democracies and therefore cannot be 
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eradicated. If these agonistic dynamics of pluralism are impeded, the ground is 
laid for a “crisis of identification” which may endanger the political system.683 
Hegemonic struggle 
Mouffe’s AMD suggests that the overemphasis on political consensus and the 
lack of agonistic political confrontation within a democratic system can lay the 
ground for a “crisis of identification.” In such a configuration, political frontiers 
between different parties’ blur and confrontation between diverse democratic 
political positions is absent. As a result, voters lack the possibility to identify 
with a variety of democratic political positions. Political institutions further fail 
to secure people’s demands, and passion cannot be channeled in a productive 
and democratic way. The void created in a situation of crisis of identification 
continues to enable the dislocation of the existing hegemonic formation. As a 
consequence, the re-activation of the sedimented hegemonic practices and thus 
a weakening of the hegemonic formation becomes possible. This is 
accompanied by the emergence of a hegemonic struggle or structural crisis and 
the proliferation of antagonism, allowing the disarticulation and destabilization 
of the existing order.684 According to Mouffe, these processes become possible 
since every order is constituted on the exclusion of other possibilities. This 
makes order inherently unstable and open to change. Things could always be 
different, and the threat of resistance and re-articulation to the temporally 
established discourse always remains.685 As Mouffe formulates it, “[e]very 
hegemonic order is susceptible of being challenged by counter-hegemonic 
practices, i.e. practices which will attempt to disarticulate the existing order so 
as to install other forms of hegemony.”686 The counter-hegemonic practices thus 
aim to negate the established order by re-articulating the existing hegemonic 
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formation using discursive practices such as the logics of difference and 
equivalence.687 In a situation of hegemonic struggle, different hegemonic 
projects seek to establish order and gain political leadership in the context of 
conflict and diversity.688 They struggle over the interpretation of the shared 
ethic-political principles and thus different conceptions of citizenship, such as 
“liberal-conservative, social-democratic, neo-liberal, radical-democratic, 
etc.”689 Each interpretation can dominate as a result of a provisional hegemony 
and a temporal stabilization of power in the context of agonistic struggle.690 The 
different hegemonic projects therefore aspire to fill the void emerged in society 
and satisfy multiple demands by implementing a different interpretation of the 
“common good.” As Mouffe states in HSS, “[t]he major aim of these hegemonic 
projects is to compete for hegemony and fix meaning in a way that makes them 
look like universal ones preventing opposing forces from articulating these 
terms.”691 They thus have the potential to re-configurate the social order as 
previous political logics are challenged, and a new hegemony can be 
established.692 
Apathy and disaffection  
The hegemonic struggle among diverse hegemonic projects strives to fill the 
void created representing different conceptions of citizenship. They therefore 
strive to satisfy multiple demands and gain political leadership in the context of 
conflict and diversity.693 Each conception can be dominate as a result of 
provisional hegemony and temporal stabilization of power in the context of 
agonistic struggle.694 However, if the political system lacks democratic 
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processes allowing hegemonic struggle within the system, the void created can 
easily be occupied by forms of collective identification outside of the 
democratic design.695 The types of collective identification outside the classical 
forms of political participation have the potential to grow around essentialist 
identities, such as the nationalist, religious, or ethnic kind. They are thus based 
on non-negotiable moral values, which pays the ground for the emergence of 
extreme antagonisms and calls into question the functioning of the democratic 
system.696 As Mouffe puts it, “[it can] put into jeopardy the civic bond that 
should unite a democratic political association.”697 Moreover, the emergence of 
such collective identification outside the democratic design symbolizes 
disaffection with political participation and even apathy toward democratic 
institutions. Therefore, Mouffe’s model suggests that democratic systems under 
pluralist conditions must allow for the agonistic confrontation of democratic 
political positions. If this capacity to mobilize people around different political 
projects within the democratic system is lost, the ground is laid for the 
emergence of apathy and disaffection, which endangers the basis of society. The 
illustrated void in a crisis of identification thus provides a fruitful terrain for 
political demagogues to formulate their political concerns. According to 
Mouffe, euro-critical and anti-establishment parties articulating anti-democratic 
political identities around the globe are moving into the vacuum created by the 
absence of vibrant democratic debate in technocratic, post-political, and 
consensus-focused democratic systems.698 These trends thus open the door to 
extremist tendencies and have the negative effect of bringing about political 
polarization outside the democratic design.699 
The framework presented (see Figure 2 in this chapter) is applied in the 
following analysis to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of 
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resistance in the discourse of EUI. The central thesis of the present study is that 
in a situation of excess of consensus and lack of identification in the post-war 
EUI, euro-critical anti-establishment parties formulated demands that expressed 
growing disaffection and apathy with the democratic system. The strong appeal 
of these parties was thus possible due to the incapacity of the democratic system 
to put forward ways for significant alternative political positions to be 
expressed. Instead, the system was dominated for decades by an elite- and 
consensus-focused approach. An agonistic debate about the direction of EUI 
within the political system was therefore missing. In order to further substantiate 
this thesis and gain a better understanding of the discursive change from excess 
of consensus to resistance in EUI, the research question of the present study is 
formulated as follows: “how can resistance towards European integration best 
be understood from the perspective of Chantal Mouffe’s AMD?” In the 
following analysis, the presented analytical framework based on Mouffe’s 
AMD will be applied using poststructuralist discourse analysis. The next 
chapter thus addresses how the analysis is conducted and the framework is 
applied. 
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter introduced the theoretical underpinnings to Chantal Mouffe’s 
model of agonistic pluralism and developed an analytical framework based on 
its central theoretical concepts. Mouffe’s earlier pre-agonistic writing was 
characterized by a Marxist stage, which was motivated by the battle of 
“proletarian subjects” for freedom and autonomy. Here, she generally followed 
central Marxist ideas, albeit challenging the “necessary class belonging” and 
thus transforming and enhancing the ideological components of the Marxist 
understanding of society. The later stage is considered a post-Marxist era, which 
she mostly elaborates in the seminal work Hegemony and Social Strategy 
(1985), co-authored with Ernesto Laclau. Here, Laclau and Mouffe aim to go 
beyond Marxist ideas to form an emancipatory subject position and understand 
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newly-emerging social antagonism in contemporary societies.700 To this end, 
they combine Derridean poststructuralism with Antonio Gramsci’s notion of 
hegemony, considering discourse as the constitutive horizon for politics and 
social subject position.701 
Against this background, Mouffe develops her particular agonistic writings. She 
leaves behind the idea of class at the center of political change and focuses on 
the conceptualization of collective democratic action under the condition of 
pluralism.702 In demarcation to liberal theory, Mouffe develops a dissociative 
view of the political in democratic theory, conceiving the political as the field 
of antagonism and power. In her model of agonistic pluralism, the central thesis 
is that particular interests cannot be overcome to achieve a universal consensus 
in dealing with pluralism; instead, diverse political positions shape the 
pluralistic environment and thus enable deliberation.703 Her model thus suggests 
that political contestation between differing political positions in a democratic 
system under the condition of pluralism is vital. The absence of agonistic 
confrontation further leaves room for disaffection and apathy in democratic 
systems.704 
Her model is well discussed in the debate of democratic theory and has been 
applied to several political phenomena at the national and international level, 
showing apathy and disaffection from democratic institutions.705 However, 
despite the illustrated relevance, the model has not yet been applied to the 
dynamics in the process of EUI and the discursive development from consensus 
to resistance. For this purpose, an analytical framework based on Mouffe’s 
model of agonistic pluralism has been developed and presented. This involved 
articulating relevant concepts, categories and dimensions from the AMD for this 
                                               
700 Laclau and Mouffe (2014: 82-83). 
701 See also: Laclau and Mouffe (2014: 55ff.). 
702 Wenman (2013); Davidson (2016). 
703 Mouffe (1996a: 1; 2008: 23ff., 100). 
704 Mouffe (1995b: 134; 2000c: 105; 2005a). 
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particular analysis. The framework generally comprises four categories, namely 
excess of consensus, crisis of identification, hegemonic struggle and apathy and 
disaffection. With these considerations in mind, the next chapter elaborates on 
the research design used to analyze the illustrated research question of this 
study.   
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4. Research design of the study 
This section illustrates the chosen research design, including its ontological and 
epistemological premises, the selection and collection of empirical data, as well 
as the techniques and approaches used to analyze the data.706 The aim of the 
analysis conducted in the chapter 5 of the present study is to address the 
identified research gap and the illustrated research question through 
poststructuralist discourse analysis. There are many different kinds of discourse 
analysis within the social sciences. They emerged primarily in the 1970s during 
the so-called “linguistic turn,” which evolved into a “discursive turn” as the 
major social science disciplines increasingly recognize the importance of 
studying of discourse. In this way, discourse theory has participated in the 
critical revision of various disciplines, such as “IR-theory, EU-studies, public 
administration, mass media analysis, cultural geography, and urban studies.”707 
Here, the poststructuralist discourse theory – in its various forms – seems to 
have dominated. Many scholars developed new ideas around the 
poststructuralist discourse analysis over the decades. For instance, works by 
Carl Cederström and André Spicer (2014) and Tomas Marttila (2015a, 2015b, 
2018) have developed the poststructuralist approach toward a “post-
foundational discourse analysis.”708 The present study focuses on the 
                                               
706 As illustrated earlier, it is called a research design instead of methodology to incorporate 
the ontological, normative, and sociological assumptions relevant for this particular 
research. 
707 Torfing (2005: 21-22). 
708 Glynos and Howarth (2007: 100ff.); Marchart (2007: 8, Ch. 3; 2010: 2); Torfing (2005: 
3). Post-foundationalists assume that society is based on founding narratives that their 
proponents believe to be incontestable. Since not all citizens will accept these logics, their 
implementation will always involve the establishment of power. Thus, this implies that 
“society will always be in search of an ultimate ground, while the maximum that can be 
achieved will be a floating and contingent grounding ... a plurality of partial grounds” 
(Marttila 2019c: 17ff.). See also: Laclau and Bhaskar (1998); Mouffe (2005b: 222ff.; 2007: 
25; 2008: 36f.; 2018: 87f.).Other studies have considered the emergence of a “material 
turn” in the field, see here for instance: Lemke (2015); Marttila (2015b, 2019c: 17ff); 
Angermüller, Maingueneau, and Wodak (2014). On related topics see further: Torfing 




poststructuralist discourse analysis mainly inspired by Laclau’s and Mouffe’s 
elaborations, further following approaches by David Howarth (2005), Marianne 
Jørgensen and Louise Phillips (2002), and Dirk Nabers (2015). 
In order to introduce poststructuralist discourse analysis as the main means of 
analysis, it is necessary to first elaborate the differentiation between discourse 
theory and discourse analysis. Poststructuralist discourse theory, on the one 
hand, is primarily interested in the more abstract, ontological level against 
which society is formed, as mentioned above.709 The ontological position of 
poststructuralist discourse theory has already been laid out in chapter 3 of this 
thesis. In general, it assumes an anti-essentialist ontology and argues that there 
exists “no pre-given, self-determining essence” that determines meaning and 
identity within a fixed structure.710 Instead, the notion of discourse, understood 
as the relational configuration of elements, functions as the ontological horizon. 
It thus understands the social as being discursively constructed, therefore any 
given system underlies the principle of radical contingency and is thus 
incomplete and in a state of constant change.711 Poststructuralist discourse 
theory therefore rejects the presence of any non-discursive foundation of the 
social, further establishing the condition for the examination of the social 
reality.712 
Discourse analysis, on the other hand, is concerned with the examination of any 
social reality. It engages with the concrete analysis of social phenomena 
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approach to social inquiry makes about the nature of social reality - claims about what 
exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each 
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characterized by the ontological presumptions illustrated above.713 These 
presumptions further entail some epistemological consequences in terms of how 
the social reality can be analyzed.714 Following the poststructuralist conception 
of discourse and the ultimate contingency of social order, discourse analysis 
rejects the essentialist idea of knowledge production.715 Instead, any 
investigation implies the dimension of discursive construction and production 
of meaning, epitomizing the idea that scientific methods always produce the 
objects they study.716 Poststructuralist discourse analysis further displaces the 
positivist notions that assert that natural actors are able to adopt exterior 
positions and thus objectify reality.717 Laclau calls this “the death of the death 
of the subject.”718 Instead, it follows the conviction that the production of 
research results unaffected by the research is not possible.719 It thus follows the 
constructivist approach, which assumes that it is not possible to “step outside 
the world that we are thrown into.”720 
Poststructuralist discourse analysis thus dismisses the idea that it is possible to 
uncover causal truths and produce any universally valid knowledge721 and thus 
“explain phenomena and events in objective universal terms.”722 It thus denies 
                                               
713 Heidegger (1962: 31-35; 1967). 
714 Hansen, L. (2006: 20); Paul (2009). Epistemology refers to the question of “what can 
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satisfy in order to called knowledge rather than belief” (Blaikie 1993: 7; also: Hay, D. 
2013). 
715 Howarth (2000: 132). Knowledge is thus viewed as indeterminate, a position also 
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the existence of “brute facts” and claims that there are “only theoretically 
informed and socially shaped descriptions of a discursively constructed 
reality.”723 Any facts, methods, or criteria that assert to secure the enclosure of 
true and universal knowledge outside of the discursive are thus dismissed. In 
this way, the approach allows the researcher to question central theoretical 
categories presupposed in political analyses, and it follows an anti-
foundationalist or even anti-epistemology position that criticizes both 
empiricism and positivism.724 In contrast, poststructuralist discourse analysis is 
interested in understanding the socially created meaning, making the positivist 
dichotomy of “empirical discovery” and “theoretical explanation” obsolete. In 
this way, it agrees with and even radicalizes the post-positivist critique of 
epistemology.725 
In poststructuralist discourse analysis, the relation between theoretical 
assumptions and empirical research instead relies solely on the notion of 
articulation. As discussed above, articulatory practices establish discursive 
system that constitute any social order through relational signification.726 This 
does not imply that all material existence of objects is denied. Instead, it allows 
analyzing the discursive construction and production of meaning attributed to a 
particular object or event in social reality.727 Poststructuralist discourse analysis 
thus seeks to understand the discursive production of meaning and 
identification.728 It therefore focuses on “concrete social practices in which 
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progresses through the production of objective knowledge. The development of stable 
theories and search for causal explanations about the social and political world is the main 
goal (Kirchner and Mohr 2010: 556). 
725 Howarth (2000: 113); Paul (2009); Glynos and Howarth (2007: 41); Marttila (2019c: 
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social actors’ “articulate” discursive elements along the axes of what they call 
equivalence or difference.”729 It is particularly suited to reconstruct discourse 
and further uncover power relations and logics of political action and change.730 
It usually focuses on qualitative data from a variety of possible sources,731 
which can include both linguistic and non-linguistic data.732 
Any research that seriously seeks to embrace the anti-essentialist ontology 
rooted in poststructuralist discourse theory therefore further opposes the idea of 
a predetermined set of techniques and methods applicable to any kind of 
empirical object. The classical understanding of method, which refers to the 
identification of independent variables applied by permanent rules, must 
therefore be abandoned.733 Nevertheless, discourse analysis, when applied, 
offers a wide range of techniques and analytical tools to select material and 
analyze data.734 However, as mentioned above, there is not one way to conduct 
poststructuralist discourse analysis, but rather a number of different approaches 
and styles compatible with the particular social ontology.735 In general, the 
empirical deployment of discourse theory was extensively debated around the 
“problem of application.”736 Initially, questions about the method and research 
strategies of discourse theory played a “Cinderella role” in the field of study.737 
Some commentators suggested that the application of discourse theory followed 
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a “methodological anarchism” or was “irrational”738 because the extensive 
reflection on these matters was missing.739 Over the decades, however, this gap 
has been filled, and various approaches have been developed.740 
The availability of a diversity of ways to operationalize discourse theory, 
therefore, makes the choice of the research design crucial for the conduction of 
discourse analysis. In each specific research case, the suitable research strategy 
for the particular phenomenon investigated must be articulated by the 
researcher.741 This differs depending on the disciplinary embeddedness, the 
subject matter, and the research question elaborated. It further implies the 
individual selection and adaptation of the available research tools and 
techniques.742 It thus applies to the operationalization of theoretical concepts as 
well as to the choice and analysis of data.743 The creation of a research design 
using discourse analysis is therefore akin to “applying a rule” in the 
Wittgensteinian sense,744 whereby the exact shape of the rule is dependent on 
the instance to which it is applied.745 
Poststructuralist discourse analysis therefore requires several decisions about 
the research design up front.746 It is essential that the tools and techniques 
chosen resonate and are aligned with the ontological presuppositions of 
                                               
738 Glynos and Howarth (2007: 201). 
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poststructuralist discourse theory.747 It must further be “flexible” in analyzing 
the phenomenon at hand gaining a comprehensive understanding, but also 
“rigorous in deconstructing the discourse under investigation.”748 Furthermore, 
the chosen research design must be illustrated n a descriptive and 
comprehensible manner to make it inter-subjectively traceable and enable 
critical reflections.749 
In order to address these concerns, the next section of this chapter elaborates on 
the particular research design of this study and the discourse analytical tools and 
techniques selected to generate and analyze data will be illustrated and 
established. 
4.1 Selected text corpus 
This section addresses the selection and generation of empirical data for the 
analysis of the present study. It lays out the process of identifying discursive 
data relevant for the further analysis.750  
In general, discourse analysis data focuses on qualitative data compiled from 
the discourse under investigation. The analytical subject of concern in the 
present study is the discourse on EUI. The analysis generally aims to cover the 
development of the discourse on EUI over the three defined periods of 
integration, as illustrated above. The first period proceeds from the early stages 
of integration in the 1950s until the late-1980s, the second ranges from the early-
1990s until the late 2000s and the third period lasts until the election of the EP 
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in 2019.751 Relevant empirical data from all three relevant time periods is thus 
selected.  
Determining which texts belong to the particular discourse under investigation 
and the reasoned selection of the empirical material that is suitable for 
adequately depicting the discourse, is one of the main challenges of discourse 
analysis. The criteria governing this process are multiple and generally shaped 
by the purpose of the particular research.752 The material for the corpus of data 
favors qualitative data753 and comprises all relevant linguistic or non-linguistic 
data that may disclose discursive practices within the discourse under 
investigation.754 There are further no limitations on the sources from which the 
data used for discourse analysis is obtained. It is however recommended that 
research designs include multiple different types of qualitative data, such as 
newspaper articles, official documents, scripted speeches and debates, as well 
as personal biographies or videos.755 These sources can be accompanied by 
other secondary research such as studies and journal articles on historical and 
political accounts. The analysis of the historical accounts is particularly relevant 
for defining the discourse within the field of study. It further supports the critical 
investigation of the history meaning and identity construction within the 
discourse under investigation, tracing the emergence of the dominant 
representations.756 These textual modes of investigation in poststructuralist 
discourse analysis can also be complemented by a wide range of non-linguistic 
data that comprise of information about institutions, such as the configuration 
of rooms, the setting of the buildings, and other places within which deliberation 
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93ff.); Hansen, L. (2006: 73-78); Nonhoff (2011); Angermüller (2014). 




takes place.757 The study at hand, makes use of a multi-data approach and thus 
includes a variety of different kinds of data and a plurality of text.758 It further 
gives priority to the study of linguistic data, such as official documents, 
speeches by politicians or media reporting, as well as newspaper articles.759 The 
corpus of data is further supplemented by other secondary literature, such as 
studies and journal articles on historical or political accounts of EUI.760 This 
enables to investigate how the particular discourse on EUI emerged historically 
and to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon under investigation.761 
The corpus further excludes any type of in-depth interviews, ethnographic 
forms of investigation or observations, and non-linguistic data, as these forms 
of empirical material require a strong engagement and influence from the 
researcher and are thus at risk to being subjective and biased, as outlined 
above.762 
Another central question related to data collection is the amount of existing 
literature that needs to be studied to obtain a comprehensive picture of the topic 
under study. In general, the decision whether to collect an extensive or even 
exhaustive corpus of data or include only representative samples depends on the 
phenomenon under investigation.763 In the case of research analyzing a 
narrowly-defined scope, an extensive or even exhaustive corpus is possible. In 
the case of more open-ended research, the appropriate context of study needs to 
be precisely defined. The researcher herself needs to determine the precise 
scope of research and the suitable contextualization of the phenomenon within 
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multiple and overlapping contexts.764 The choices and principles underpinning 
these decisions must always be “explicit, consistent, and justified.”765 In the 
case of the present study, conducting a comprehensive analysis that investigates 
the development and change of the relevant discourse on EUI over several 
decades from 1950 to 2019 is too extensive and endeavoring to be covered 
reasonably in this thesis. Therefore, the analysis focuses on carefully selected 
key text and documents that are crucial to the discursive change under 
investigation within the discourse on EUI. The text corpus therefore represents 
a selection of relevant data, with a focus on text linked to specific historical and 
political events relevant to the development of the discourse under 
investigation. 
The process and criteria of selecting key text and documents within the 
determined scope remains central to understanding the analysis conducted and 
is therefore elaborated in the following.766 Lene Hansen, as a particular 
prominent poststructuralist discourse analyst, suggests two criteria when 
choosing the material, namely the time under study and the strong relevance to 
the discourse at hand.767 In order to evaluate the particular relevance of the data, 
she further suggests that the material should comprise “key texts that are 
frequently quoted and function as nodes within the intertextual web of 
debate.”768 In order to evaluate whether a text can be considered a key text in 
the particular discourse, Hansen recommends taking into consideration the 
following four aspects. First, the material should be widely read and thus also 
easily available and accessible. Second, the text should take a relevant and 
central role for the definition of the discourse under investigation. Third, the 
text should incorporate a certain degree of formal authority for the definition of 
their political positions. Fourth, the selected text should depict a distinct 
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articulation of identities and policies, which makes it easier applicable to 
discourse analysis.769 In addition, Hansen suggests including different types of 
text to ensure that all criteria are met. Some text might explicitly articulate 
identities and policies, while other have a particularly high degree of formal 
authority. She further asserts that a particular text is relevant only as long as it 
provides new and helpful insights for the study.770 This further implies the 
necessary contextualization of the chosen corpus of material, certain material 
might be only relevant in a particular context yet not in another.771 
The present study generally follows Hansen’s widely used approach and the 
distinctive criteria developed for the selection of empirical material for 
poststructuralist discourse analysis.772 In this way, it is ensured that the selected 
material is relevant to the context of the analysis and that key texts have been 
appropriately identified and analyzed. Therefore, this process ensured that the 
selected corpus contains the most relevant key text and documents and thus 
represents the discursive development of EUI over the three defined time 
periods from the 1950s to 2019. Further, some variety of text was included in 
the corpus to ensure the comprehensive coverage. Therefore, part of the 
qualitative data comes from official papers such as constitutions, treatments, 
and agreements. These are coupled with more direct articulated text, such as 
parliamentary debates, statements or speeches by high political representatives 
in the discourse on EUI. Given that many of the earlier documents in the 
discourse on EUI are not available online, the selection of texts was further 
influences by their availability. The available texts and documents were further 
accessed through the relevant online archives, such as the EU websites, or 
several newspapers, but also through Google Scholar using various search 
quires. The collected linguistic data finally encompasses the following texts: 
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Period Year Text 
Author / 
Institution  
1950s-1980s 1946 The Tragedy of Europe Winston Churchill 
 1950 The Schuman Declaration Robert Schuman 
 1950 Speech “On the Birth of Europe” Robert Schuman 
 1952 Speech at Common Assembly Jean Monnet 
 1954 Speech “The United States of Europe” Jean Monnet 
 1951 Speech at the Council of Europe Konrad Adenauer 
 1952 Speech “On Schuman” Konrad Adenauer 
 1952 Interview by Friedländer Konrad Adenauer 
 1954 Speech at the German parliament Konrad Adenauer 
 1956 Press statement Konrad Adenauer 
 2016 Speech “State of the European Union” Jean-Claude Juncker 
 1986 The Single European Act European Union 
 1957 Treaty of Rome European Union 
 1988 Speech at Conference Margaret Thatcher 
 1988 Speech “The Monetary Union” Jacques Delors 
 1993 Speech about Margaret Thatcher Charles Powell 
1990s-2000s 1988 Speech “The Bruges Speech” Margaret Thatcher 
 1994 Speech “The Bournemouth Speech” James Goldsmith 
 1996 Speech “The Brighton Speech” James Goldsmith 
 1993 Report in “The Times” James Goldsmith 
2010s-2019 2010 Speech at the European Council Van Rompuy 
 2010 Speech “On the European Union” Nigel Farage 




Speech “Eurosceptic storm in 
Brussels” 
The Financial Times 
Table 1: Empirical data overview 
After illustrating and establishing the selection criteria and the collected text 
corpus of this particular research design, the following section will elaborate on 
the discourse analytical tools and techniques used to analyze the selected 
empirical material. 
4.2 Data analysis procedures 
This section elaborates how the aforementioned selected corpus of data is 
analyzed. The analysis generally uses a defined set of poststructuralist discourse 
analytical tools and techniques to investigate the research question of the study. 
This set bases on the discourse-theoretical assumptions by Laclau and Mouffe, 
already illustrated in chapter 3.773 Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theoretical 
elaborations however do not provide any detailed instructions on how to apply 
their theoretical categories and concepts to empirical material. Therefore, it is 
primarily necessary to elaborate on the practical question of how to convert and 
operationalize those theoretical concepts into a practicable analytical tool.774 To 
solve this issue, several theorists in the field of poststructuralist discourse theory 
have elaborated on the operationalization, albeit without achieving any 
consensus.775 The approach selected in the present study primarily follows 
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suggestions laid out by scholars such as David Howarth (2005), Marianne 
Jørgensen and Louise Phillips (2002), and Dirk Nabers (2015). The following 
section introduces the particular approach selected for this analysis, illustrating 
the analytical tools used and steps taken to execute the discourse analysis. 
The present study incorporates a number of theoretical tools introduced by 
Laclau and Mouffe. These are logics and mechanisms such as the discourse 
theoretical notions of equivalence and difference or the production of floating 
and empty signifiers.776 Many of these are employed to analyze the 
particularities of the way resistance is articulated by agents in the discourse of 
EUI. However, as illustrated in the previous section, the application of 
theoretical and social logics requires a certain degree of adaptation of these 
logics and concepts to the particular research.777 Therefore, in the following, the 
tools and techniques used for this analysis are presented and further adapted to 
render them suitable for this particular analysis. 
In general, when using discourse analysis, it is necessary to primarily 
differentiate between quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative 
approaches to discourse analysis, in the sense of body analysis or French 
lexicometry, generally relate to large collections of text. They enable for the 
systematic processing of a large amount of selected and annotated linguistic 
material using statistical, mathematical, or computational techniques. These 
techniques further aim at generating theories or hypotheses about the 
phenomenon or the overall discursive context by processing large amounts of 
text.778 In contrast, qualitative approaches focus on smaller, more concentrated 
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textual excerpts to do justice to case-specific logics and to elicit discursive 
practices hidden in the text.779 The qualitative approach thus investigates 
specific material at a deeper analytical level with the aim of describing and 
exploring meaning through data. The present study aims to deconstruct and 
understand the discursive production of meaning and identities in the discourse 
under investigation. Quantitative approaches are therefore less suitable for this 
type of analysis, as they are limited in their potential to reveal discursive 
patterns.780 Further, the discursive change under study spans several decades, 
from the 1950 to 2019. The choice of a quantitative approach aiming to cover 
all available material in the relevant time period is thus not reasonable within 
the scope of this study. The study therefore focuses on a selection of key text 
chosen using the Hansen-criteria presented above. The analysis further provides 
for an in-depth qualitative examination and close reading of singular selected 
key texts to gain a better understanding of discursive change in the process of 
EUI. The single analytical steps taken are further illustrated in the following.781 
As demonstrated above, poststructuralist discourse analysis treats social reality 
ontologically as discursively constructed. In the more ontic sense,782 different 
discourses establishing and representing social and political reality.783 It is this 
understanding of discourse that forms the central subject of this study. The 
discourse on EUI is thus considered as one instance of such discourse. In order 
to gain a better understand of the change in the discourse of EUI, the production 
and reproduction of meaning and identify is explored. In the process of 
articulation meaning is produced by building temporal relations among pre-
existing discursive elements.784 The sum of articulatory practices is discourse 
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that is contingent and has thus “no necessary correspondence.”785 In the process 
of understanding the production of meaning in a certain discourse, it is thus 
necessary to first analyze the qualitative data and identify relevant elements and 
their particular relations.786 
The first step of the analysis is therefore “the deconstruction of the internal 
structure of a discourse.”787 Through the process of coding the text under 
investigation is examined and relevant elements are extracted from the corpus. 
Coding is a procedure to make qualitative empirical material accessible for 
analysis.788 Codes are meaningful labels that are assigned to textual data in order 
to structure and categorize it. It thus enables to explore and organize the text 
corpus under investigation. In this way, the empirical data can be analyzed 
against the background of the theoretical concepts and it allows the research to 
develop propositions through the understanding of the particular data.789 In the 
present study, the coding is conducted in small sections with a limited amount 
of data, using “AntConc” as a concordance program for corpus analysis. With 
the help of the program, the material under investigation can be accessed and 
organized in a coherent way. The extracted elements from the corpus are further 
analyzed using discourse theoretical logics and mechanisms to explore the 
discursive structures and interpret them against the background of the research 
question addressed thus providing new insights.790 
The elements within a discursive structure hold differing importance in the 
process of meaning production. Laclau and Mouffe particularly emphasize the 
notion of nodal points as discursive center within a discursive system. Nodal 
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points function as “privileged discursive points that partially fix meaning within 
signifying chains.”791 They are central points of reference within the particular 
discourse, as elements articulated into moments achieve their meaning in 
relation to these discursive points.792 As such, they are positioned at the center 
of a discourse and assemble numerous moments around them. In the articulation 
of hegemonic projects, they can further present themselves in the form of empty 
signifier in the context of articulating hegemonic projects. Empty signifier can 
therefore function as nodal points in the articulation of hegemonic projects and 
are signifiers without a signified.793 Therefore, they have the potential to 
represent a totality by establishing a chain of equivalence between different 
demands and thus function as a nodal point. While at the same time demarcating 
this identity from the outside, because they do not have a fixed content.794 
Different hegemonic projects rival each other to present their objectives as 
universal by filling out the empty signifiers.795 This filling function of an empty 
signifier is thus understood as the process of hegemonization.796 In the process 
of meaning production and hegemonic practices, empty signifiers are further of 
central relevance.797 This makes the identification of nodal points or empty 
signifiers of the essence in a discourse analysis investigating hegemonic 
practices and discursive change.798 The identification of empty signifier holds 
therefore central relevance to the understanding of meaning production, fixation 
and subversion in discourse under investigation. 
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Further, the analysis looks at the notion of metonyms and metaphors. These two 
figures also play a central role in the production of meaning, following the 
poststructuralist approach.799 While metaphors are based on the principle of 
comparison, replacing one signifier with another,800 metonyms describe the 
combination of signifiers,801 representing “the syntagmatic axis of language.”802 
The concept of a hegemonic practice is, for instance, conceived as a 
metonymical operation in which a particular group or movement takes up 
demands articulated by contiguous groups or extends one set of demands into 
adjacent spheres. This makes poststructuralist discourse analysis available to 
more than the analysis of discursive structures. It is thus possible to investigates 
what is not present in a text, such contradictions or tension in the subject 
itself.803 This is particularly helpful in the rhetorical analysis of politicians’ 
speeches and presumes the basic categories of discourse theory.804 Therefore, 
the notion of metonyms and metaphors also constitute an important set of tools 
for analyzing the construction and subversion of meaning. 
Once these logics have been identified, the investigation further focuses on the 
identity-building processes and the related discourse theoretical logics. This 
holds crucial relevance in investigating meaning construction and discursive 
change, as these processes of identity-building are at the center of the 
constitution of any relatively stable system. Here, the focus lies on the 
employment and interplay of the discursive process of difference and 
equivalence within the particular discursive structures.805 The notion of 
difference, on the one hand, is particularly relevant since identification always 
depends on the construction of an outside. This is what Laclau and Mouffe 
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called the “constitutive outside” as the requirement for any kind of 
identification, which is further created in and through social antagonism.806 The 
logic of equivalence, on the other hand, allows for the articulation of a diverse 
set of demands around a chains of equivalence.807 It thus enables the 
constitution of identifications that are equivalent808 and the differentiation of a 
collective identification from an antagonistic outside.809 These logics are 
therefore at the heart of the constitution of any temporal stable order or 
hegemonic project. The logic of equivalence links together the different 
articulations of diverse social groups, interests or identities to create one 
hegemonic project. In contrast, the logic of difference comes into play when the 
social groups with their identities and interests are within their differential 
positions.810 The identification of these articulatory practices therefore holds 
central relevance for understanding meaning and identity construction and 
change in the discourse of EUI. 
Taken together, these theoretical logics and concepts allow analyzing the 
constitution of chains of equivalences through the establishing relations of 
similarity or difference within discourse, the selected research approach is 
particularly well suited to operationalize the discourse theoretical framework 
and apply it to the empirical research.811 It therefore enables to gain a deeper 
understanding how social realities and hegemonic formations emerge, are 
contested, and transformed. These discourse-theoretical tools are further helpful 
to apply the developed analytical framework (see Figure 2) based on Mouffe’s 
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AMD to the selected corpus of data and gain more insights into the central 
research question.812 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter laid out the research strategy applied in the present study. Here, 
poststructuralist discourse analysis was introduced including its theoretical 
premises and its challenges associated with the application of the approach. 
Since it exists not one way to conduct poststructuralist discourse analysis, an 
individual research design suitable for the study at hand was elaborated. The 
chosen techniques and analytical tools for the selection and analysis of the 
empirical data resonating with the ontological assumptions of poststructuralist 
discourse theory by Laclau and Mouffe were presented. Here the analysis leans 
on suggestions made by scholars such as Lene Hansen (2006), David Howarth 
(2005), Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips (2002), and Dirk Nabers 
(2015). 
The developed research design is generally directed to the textual 
deconstruction and analysis of meaning production, fixation and change in the 
defined empirical text corpus to gain a better understanding of the discourse on 
EUI. It therefore suggests to first extract relevant elements from the text corpus, 
using qualitative techniques such as the process of coding. This is followed by 
a theoretical analysis of such elements, using the relevant discourse-theoretical 
logics and mechanisms, such as nodal points, empty signifiers, or equivalence 
and difference.813 The general analytical procedure is illustrated in the following 
figure: 
                                               
812 Glynos et al. (2009: 9ff.). 




Figure 3: Focus of analysis 
As the illustration shows, the analytical focus lies on the analysis of carefully 
selected qualitative linguistic data using the logics of equivalence and 
difference to determine meaning and identity-building processes within the 
discourse under investigation. Since the logics allow analyzing the constitution 
of chains of equivalences through the establishing relations of similarity or 
difference within discourse, the selected research approach is particularly well 
suited to operationalize the discourse theoretical logics and apply it to the 
empirical research. This further enables the application of the analytical 
framework developed in Figure 2 in the course of the analysis, using the 
research strategy introduced and the tools illustrated in Figure 3.814 
The following analysis is structured according to the four categories illustrated 
in the analytical framework, such as excess of consensus, crisis of identification, 
hegemonic struggle and apathy and disaffection. In each section, the selected 
linguistic data is analyzed using the particularly well-suited discourse-
theoretical procedures and tools introduced above to uncover discursive 
meaning production and change in the discourse on EUI. The theoretical 
assumptions of the analytical framework based on Mouffe’s AMD are further 
applied and evaluated to facilitate the analysis. However, since the study choses 
a poststructuralist discursive approach, the general purpose of this analysis 
cannot be to find empirical evidence or seek verification and falsification of the 
central thesis of this study. This would be in stark contrast to the ontological 
assumptions made in this study, instead; the analysis aims to gain more insights 
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to the research question and a more comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomenon of resistance within the discourse of EUI. 
In the next chapter, the illustrated research design will be implemented using 




5. The agonistic model of democracy and resistance 
In this chapter, the actual analysis of this study is conducted using the analytical 
framework and research design introduced over the previous chapters.815 The 
analysis focuses on the development of resistance in the discourse on EUI over 
the following three periods. The first period ranges from the early stages of 
integration in the 1950s until the late-1980s, the second period from the early-
1990s until the late-2000s, and the third period until the election of the EP in 
2019.816 On the grounds of the carefully selected empirical data from those time 
periods, the analysis applies the analytical framework based on Mouffe’s AMD 
to gain a better understanding of discursive change from consensus to resistance 
and thus provide more answers to the research question of this study. Therefore, 
the following figure shows the approach taken: 
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Figure 4: Resistance and European integration 
The analysis therefore brings together the phenomenon of resistance in the 
discourse of EUI developed over three time periods and the analytical 
framework based of Mouffe’s AMD, containing the categories excess of 
consensus, crisis of identification, hegemonic struggle, and apathy and 
disaffection. The selected text corpus is therefore analyzed using 
poststructuralist discourse analytical tools and techniques, as illustrated in the 
previous chapter.817 In the following, each section of the analysis is focused on 
one of the illustrated categories of the analytical framework and re- and 
deconstruct the discursive material. Hereby, the discourse-theoretical 
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background will first be illustrated and applied to the selected empirical material 
to uncover discursive structures and dynamics in the overall debate on EUI. In 
this way, the theoretical assumptions from Mouffe’s AMD used in the 
established framework can be evaluated to gain a better understanding of the 
phenomenon under investigation. 
It is important to stress that this analysis is not looking for the validation or 
falsification of a statement or thesis based on the empirical material used. 
Instead, the study refers to the discursive constitution of the social and political 
order and thus aims for a better understanding and the provision of more 
answers to the leading question of this study, as shown above.818 
5.1 Excess of consensus 
As its starting point, in this section, the analysis aims to gain a better 
understanding of the first period of EUI from the 1950s until the late-1980s. The 
analysis is conducted on the basis of the relevant discursive data identified in 
the previous chapter and against the background of the analytical category of 
“excess of consensus” of the framework introduced above. 
In order to gain a better understanding on how the discourse on EUI was 
structured during its first period, the analysis first focuses on the deconstruction 
of the hegemonic formation prevalent. This way, it becomes possible to gain 
more insights on the existence of a presumed excess of consensus in the 
discourse on EUI. To this end, the internal structure of the discourse on EUI 
will be analyzed and deconstructed, primarily exploring mass media data, and 
speeches from political elites as well as official documents.819 
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As illustrated in chapter 3 of the present study, following Laclau and Mouffe’s 
poststructuralist discourse theory, within an anti-essential approach without a 
transcendental center, a hegemonic formation constitutes a temporarily stable 
order. A hegemonic project is based on a sedimented discourse and thus builds 
the requirement for any hegemonic politics to be successful. Sedimented 
hegemonic discourse or hegemonic formation are therefore prerequisites for an 
excess of political consensus to be possible.820 The hegemonic formation builds 
the basis for the political stability and it temporarily forecloses the possibility 
of any other positions to dominate in the established order. In such a setting, the 
possibility arises for the establishment of an excess of consensus on policy 
priorities built between experts and the political elite.821 
Hegemonic formations generally are created through the interplay of the 
discursive logics of difference and equivalence.822 Here, empty signifiers, 
functioning as nodal points for the temporal determination of meaning, are 
instituted and identities are created relational around these discursive centers 
within an antagonistic terrain.823 The construction of empty signifiers thus holds 
central relevance in the implementation of hegemonic formations. In the attempt 
to install a hegemonic formation, hegemonic projects aim to build chains of 
equivalence by means of empty signifiers.824 Here, different political projects 
struggle to fill empty signifiers with their interests and make their individual 
objectives look like universal ones. The filling of an empty signifier thus 
describes the process of hegemonization.825 Empty signifiers are therefore 
capable of including a diverse group of signifiers in a chain of equivalences and 
thus enabling the construction of identification.826 In order to analyze the 
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implementation of a hegemonic formation within the discourse of EUI, this 
analysis begins by identifying central nodal points and empty signifiers. 
During the earlier times of integration, the hegemonic discourse of EUI matured 
around the empty signifier of “unity.” Unity, as a pure example of what Laclau 
calls an empty signifier, allows unifying various struggles and demands in a 
chain of equivalences across Europe. It constitutes a commonality or a common 
ideal among a diverse group of signifiers around the empty signifier of 
European unity in a chain of equivalence and thus enabling the construction of 
a hegemonic formation. This becomes apparent in a series of places within the 
discourse on integration. The most central examples are for instance, shown in 
an important speech by Winston Churchill– Prime Minister of the UK until 1964 
– in 1946. As part of the European political elite during the first period of EUI, 
he states in his speech The Tragedy of Europe – presented at the University of 
Zurich: 
“If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance, there 
would be no limit to the happiness, to the prosperity and glory which its three 
or four hundred million people would enjoy. […] We must build a kind of 
United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers 
be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living 
[…].”827 
As shown in the statement above, the empty signifier of “unity” is surrounded 
with the following content. “once united” the people in Europe will “regain the 
simple joys and hopes.” The unification will thus enable “unlimited happiness, 
prosperity and glory” across Europe. Churchill further elaborates that with the 
unification of Europe, there will be an end to “Germany’s Thirty Years War for 
hegemony on the continent.”828 This facilitates building a chain of equivalence 
among various struggles and demands and further constitutes a common ideal 
with the unification of Europe. Similar discursive structures are also shown in 
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the following statement by Jean Monnet. Monnet – a French entrepreneur and 
post-war planner – was also part of the European political elite during the first 
period of EUI and became later president of the High Authority. He stated in a 
famous speech in the 1950s: 
“[…] a unified Europe has a meaning for civilization that is deeper even than 
security and peace […]. [W]e are not uniting states, we are uniting human 
beings. […] We are determined to act. We are determined to unify Europe and 
to unify it quickly. With the Schuman Pan and the European Army, we have 
laid the foundations on which we shall build the United States of Europe – free, 
strong, peaceful and prosperous.”829 
Despite the filling of the empty signifier of unity, constituting the possibility for 
identification among the European citizens, in this statement Monnet further 
refers to an assumed totality of the united Europe, as the United States of 
Europe. These discursive constructions can therefore be further identified as an 
empty signifier that functions as a “myth.” According to Laclau’s theoretical 
considerations introduced above, a myth describes the notion of an empty 
signifier referring to a totality.830 For him, a myth symbolizes the ideal chain of 
equivalence, which can create a particular social order and at the same time 
produces processes of exclusion.831 Laclau introduced the notion of myth in his 
post-HSS work New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time832 in which he 
builds on Georges Sorel’s conception of how myth is structured.833 Sorel 
elaborates on the notion of myth in relation to “the general strike.” According 
to Sorel, the general strike – like the proletarian class struggle – is not an actual 
event but rather a social myth. Separated from actual political strikes, it is a 
dimension that unifies a variety of struggles and actions over a whole historical 
period.834 Through an ensemble of equivalent images, it is capable of weakening 
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particularistic meaning and galvanizing the masses’ imaginations, thus 
launching them into collective action.835 As Laclau puts it in the following: 
“[The general strike has lost] all the detailed descriptive features; it has no 
particular objectives; it is merely an empty image galvanizing the 
consciousness of the masses; it is exhausted in this last function without 
possibly corresponding to any actual historical event. It is a radical non-event 
that is, paradoxically, the condition of all events if there is going to be grandeur 
in society.”836 
From Sorel’s perspective, the myth of the general strike therefore functions to 
endlessly recreate the workers’ separate identity. For him, “the unity of the class 
is therefore a symbolic unity.”837 The Sorelian myth is thus the essence of what 
Laclau understands as an empty signifier.838 It establishes through hegemonic 
practices of articulation a unified discursive space around a particular set of 
nodal points, which allows identification and further involves an element of 
ideological totalization.839 Thus, for Laclau myth is an empty signifier referring 
to a totality, and thus another possibility to represent an absent fullness.840 
Myths can therefore establish a relation to “the pure origin” and thus function 
as the foundation of society.841 According to Laclau, this kind of founding myth 
is therefore significant to any society, “[…] myth is constitutive of any possible 
society,”842 and it represents the missing fullness of a society, a particular nation 
thus materializes in articulatory practices organized around a national myth.843 
However, myth also functions as an illusion that is never achievable.844 Further, 
when myths successfully conceal social dislocation by inscribing a wide range 
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of social demands, they can be transformed into imaginaries.845 This 
transformation further involves “the metaphorizing of the literal contents of 
particular social demands.” The social imaginary functions as a platform or 
“horizon,” which includes many different demands, as Laclau argues.846 
Sedimented practices therefore often mature around naturalizing and 
universalizing myths and imaginaries.847 The construction of myths is therefore 
an important aspect for the constitution of hegemonic formation, involving the 
creation of “a new objectivity by means of the re-articulation of the dislocated 
elements.”848 Therefore, founding myths represented in political actions but also 
institutions and norms is a relevant object to poststructuralist discourse 
analysis.849 The identification of myths in a discursive construction demands 
determining the hegemonic moves used to present a myth as universally true.850 
To this end, it is necessary to identify the initial moment when the signifier and 
signified were united.851 Therefore, in the following, the analysis focuses on 
these discursive constructions of myth and imaginaries during the emergence of 
the discourse around EUI in its earlier periods. 
In the case of the EUI, the ideal of EUI and its absolute unity and self-present 
identity functioned as a founding myth and an illusion that can never be fully 
reached.852 This is shown in a number of empirical text data and documents. 
The most relevant being, for instance, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU), as an official document by the European organization.853 Here, EUI 
conceptually stands for an “ever closer union of the European people.” It can 
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further be elicited from several other statements by Monnet, as he states, “[…] 
the form of the peaceful democratic revolution which Europe is undergoing, we 
believe, will end by the erection of the United States of Europe.”854 He further 
suggests: “The unification of Europe will bring them faith in the future, and 
prosperity and peace.”855 Further, he elaborates in the following statement on 
the uniting myth of unity, “Europe’s people must unite if there is to be an end 
to the state of rivalries which have already precipitated the nationals into two 
world wars and almost ruined Europe itself.”856 Moreover, Konrad Adenauer – 
the first German Chancellor from 1949 to 1963 – stated in a speech at the 
German Bundestag in 1954 about the process of EUI: 
“European unity was a dream of a few people. It became a hope for many. 
Today it is a necessity for all of us. It is, ladies and gentlemen, necessary for 
our security, for our freedom, for our existence as a nation and as an intellectual 
and creative international community.”857 
In this way, as illustrated in these discursive examples above, the empty 
signifier of absolute unity functioned as a founding myth and was able to unify 
a great variation of demands and struggles in one image of unification connected 
to the aspiration of happiness, prosperity and glory. Accordingly, this lays the 
ground for the constitution of a hegemonic formation and a European society as 
it provides for its missing fullness and enables identification. The founding 
myth is therefore further translated into an imaginary horizon, functioning as an 
illusion that can never be fully reached. 
Empty signifiers are further established around nodal points or discursive 
centers. In the case of EUI, the myth of unity was coupled with the imperative 
of providing peace from the very beginning. The concept of peace thus serves 
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as a discursive center, allowing for the temporal determination of meaning and 
relational identification around this discursive center within an antagonistic 
terrain.858 The idea of EUI matured around the notion of peace, already long 
before the discourse on EUI materialized in the 20th century. At least from the 
14th century, monarchs, popes, generals, and philosophers had debated EUI in 
relation to its ability of bringing peace to Europe by pacifying the region 
internally and externally. These ideas were laid out in the various works, the 
most central being, for example, the essay Towards the Present Peace of Europe 
written by the British writer William Penn in 1693. In the context of the War of 
the Grand Alliance between England and France, he elaborated his vision on 
the future of Europe as a community of peace.859 A few years later, Abbe de 
Saint-Pierre – a French author and proponent of the Enlightenment – published 
a major project for Settling an Everlasting Peace (1717).860 Here, he proposed 
establishing an international organization in Europe to establish peace. His 
novel ideas had major influence on later philosophers, as it inspired German 
poet Friedrich von Schiller, who wrote his Ode to Joy (1785), which was further 
adapted by Ludwig van Beethoven in his Ninth Symphony (1824). Here, 
Beethoven formulates, “[t]hy magic reunites those whom stem custom has 
parted, all men will become brothers under thy gentle wing,”861 which later 
became the European anthem. Jean-Jacques Rousseau – as an important 
political theorist and pioneer of the French Revolution – further promoted the 
implementation of a European federation in his writings. Also following the 
remarks of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Immanuel Kant in his work Thoughts on 
Perpetual Peace (1795) famously describes a situation in which lasting peace 
between the European nations is established.862 Therefore, a variety of authors, 
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poets and philosophers subsequently explored the theme of peace through unity 
regarding European integration over several centuries. 
The emergence of hegemonic politics and the further manifestation of a 
hegemonic formation in the discourse around EUI was further rendered possible 
through the establishment of institutions as the sedimentation and 
materialization of the hegemonic discourse around the idea of EUI. The 
perception of the need to establish common European institutions in order for 
the idea of EUI to sustain became visible in a number of discursive 
constructions. The most relevant being, for instance, a statement by Robert 
Schuman – French foreign minister from 1886 until 1963 – who famously 
requested in a speech in 1950, “stop talking and act […] at least we are moving 
out of the realm of dreams!”863 Monnet further emphasized a couple of years 
later that in order to settle an idea, the implementation of institutions is 
inevitable: “The life of institutions is longer than that of men, and thus 
institutions may, if they are set up in the right manner, accumulate and transmit 
the wisdom of succeeding generations.”864 The discourse on integration was 
therefore perceived by the majority of the European political elite in the first 
period of EUI.865 It was not, however, until the foundation of the ECSC in 1952 
that the hegemonic project on EUI finally sedimented and materialized into a 
political institution.866 With the implementation of the High Authority, the first 
supranational institutions in Europe was established, “replacing national 
rivalries on our continent by the Union of people in freedom and in diversity.”867 
Accordingly, these institutions gave “substance to the idea of a united 
Europe”868 for the first time. 
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In the process of sedimentation and materialization of the discourse on EUI, the 
identified discursive center of peace remains of central relevance. For the 
establishment of the High Authority in the ECSC, Schuman names peace as the 
central motivation in his declaration on the Birth of Europe (1950): 
“World peace cannot be safeguarded if constructive efforts are not made 
commensurate with the dangers that threaten it’; ‘peaceful relation’, ‘cause of 
peace’, ‘United Europe’. […] Without distinction or exception, with the aim of 
raising living standards and promoting peace […] Setting up a new High 
Authority […] These proposals will bring to reality the first solid groundwork 
for a European Federation vital to the preservation of world peace.”869 
Moreover, Monnet stated at the opening session of the Common Assembly in 
1952 that peace remains the central motivation, as he further elaborates: 
“[…] by bringing about their own unity, by giving Europe back its strength, by 
creating new and enduring conditions, the Europeans are making a contribution 
towards peace. In this way, they are avoiding the maelstrom into which, 
regardless of the treaties they may have concluded, they would be dragged with 
the other nations by their antagonistic actions and their weakness, if they were 
to remain divided. In building up Europe, the Europeans are laying the very 
foundation of peace.”870 
Two years after the founding of the ECSC, Monnet elaborates further in his 
speech The United States of Europe has begun (1954) and confirms the general 
ambition of the European project to bring peace, as shown in the following 
statements made by him: “[…]to make Europe is to make peace.”871 He goes on 
as follows: “[a] federated Europe is essential for the security and peace of the 
free world.”872 Monnet also argued that only a united Europe would have the 
potential to establish lasting peace: “In order to […] develop them into a lasting 
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peace, we must change the European situation by uniting the Europeans. […] 
The kind of unity that will assist in the establishment of a lasting peace, is unity 
within a United Europe.”873 Sustained peace would further only be possible by 
establishing an institutional setting, as he formulated in the following: 
“Today, peace does not only depend on treaties and agreements. It depends 
essentially on the creation of conditions which, though they may not change 
the nature of men, will direct their conduct towards each other into peaceful 
channels.”874 
The identified discursive center of peace remains of central relevance 
throughout the history of EUI, as the official European documents introducing 
the European Union in 1990s claim to be “the most successful peace project in 
the world, bringing democracy, prosperity and security to the countries of the 
Union.”875 The central means for the peace project of European integration to 
manifest and expand is integration, calling it the process of “shared power for 
greater benefit.”876 In the TFEU, the union is further described as a post-national 
project, constraining past national rivalries and promoting a sphere of peace and 
stability in and around European states.877 Moreover, Jean-Claude Juncker – 
President of the Commission from 2014 to 2019 – stated in a speech in the EP 
in 2016 that “Europe means peace.”878 The discourse on the process of EUI has 
therefore historically been structured around the discursive center of peace. 
The articulation of chains of equivalence around the empty signifier unity and 
the discursive center peace further allow a relatively stable system of meaning 
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and identification to emerge.879 This allows the sedimentation and de-
politicization of hegemonic practices within a relatively stable discursive 
system allowing for a hegemonic formation to emerge.880 Thus, the EU as an 
institution is understood as the sedimentation of a hegemonic discourse on EUI 
that has been temporarily de-politicized. This hegemonic formation further 
defines what appears natural or pre-given in the particular social and political 
order of the European community. The ongoing hegemonic discursive practices 
further allow for the hegemonic formation within the discourse on EUI to 
prevail. The discourse on EUI thus functions as the ongoing enforcement of the 
existing and dominating hegemonic formation. In this way, the approximation 
of the myth of unity in the process of EUI is possible through further integration, 
thus becoming the means for the manifestation of the hegemonic project or 
formation. On the basis of the sedimented and materialized hegemonic 
formation, a consensus-focused policy of the European political elites on the 
supranational level becomes possible. 
The sedimented hegemonic practices allow for a consensus policy to emerge. 
In the case of EUI, this becomes visible particularly during its first period from 
the 1950s. During this time, the prevailing hegemonic order was seen to be 
based on popular consent, as European political elites predominantly assumed 
that the ongoing process of integration and unification was expressing the 
“common will” in Europe. This becomes prevalent in a statement from Monnet 
in 1954, claiming that the European project “[..] merges a portion of their 
respective national sovereignties and submits it to the common interest.”881 
Monnet further assumed the existence of a homogenous idea and also ideal of 
the European project, “[…] in addition to their concrete solidarity, they have 
their common ideal of peace, freedom, and social progress.”882 He therefore 
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concludes that the further integration of European project reflects the common 
ideal. This becomes further visible when considering the following statement, 
in which Monnet asserts a kind of homogenous benefit for the entire population 
in Europe: “Europe will bring about an improvement in the standard of living 
for the population as a whole.”883 He continues to elaborate on this aspect in the 
following statement, as he claims that “[t]he improvement of the prospects of 
peace and of conditions of human life, will be greatly enhanced.”884 Moreover, 
when Adenauer addressed the Council of Europe in 1951, he also claimed that 
“[speaking] before the group of persons that may claim, more than any other, to 
represent the public opinion of Europe.”885 Adenauer thus assumes a collective 
will of the European public, represented by the European political elite. He 
further elaborates that the Council – which comprises the political elites in the 
EU – best represents the assumed collective will of Europe, as the following 
statement shows: 
“In other words, here we find an expression of the European conscience. And 
it is also greatly significant that here, at any rate, there is a place where almost 
the whole of Europe gathers together, despite all the different shades of opinion 
that have shown themselves in our efforts to achieve closer organisational co-
operation. European policy in every country will ultimately receive its impetus 
from the collective will of the European peoples. But nowhere is this so 
manifest as a collective will as it is in the Council of Europe.”886 
In this regard, Adenauer assumes a collectivity of the German nation for which 
he further claims to speak, as shown in the following: “[t]he whole German 
nation acknowledges the values of Europe and also is desirous that the unity of 
Europe should find its expression in some political form.”887 These European 
political elites, illustrated in these examples, therefore assumed the prevalence 
of a general consensus among the European public. This Europhile attitude was 
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widely labeled as “permissive consensus.”888 It describes that political elites 
seemed to be convinced that the European project was “an accepted part of the 
political landscape”889 and that the general strategy of the European project was 
accepted and shared by the public, as formulated in the following by Lindberg 
and Scheingold (1970): 
“[the] goals of the community are widely shared and that normal operations of 
the community system will be accepted as authoritative and legitimate. And if 
these goals and these normal operations conduce to the progressive growth of 
the system, this too is likely to meet with general acceptance”890. 
The process of EUI can therefore be interpreted to have initially been driven as 
an elitist project led by its founders. The presumed consensus allowed European 
elites to accelerate the process of integration without much debate or 
opposition.891 Against this backdrop, Jean Monnet and his colleagues were able 
to maneuver swiftly and effectively without much debate. In a similar way, they 
were further able to launch the Schuman Plan from 1950 in an almost 
conspiratorial fashion.892 Although not generally reprehensible or very 
unusual,893 the tactic of Monnet and his supporters was only possible due to the 
presumed consensus and the general lack of public involvement, reducing the 
possible public objections and debate to a minimum. The Treaties of Paris and 
Rome therefore left out possible objections that were likely to be raised by 
various national or local political movements and groups. Thus, the chosen 
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tactic in the process of EUI, ending in a supranational compromise, served not 
only to satisfy but also to quiet major political forces.894 
The understanding of the European project as elite-driven based on the 
avoidance of public involvement becomes further apparent looking at an 
interview Adenauer gave in 1952 with März Friedländer, in which he claims 
that the political union among the European states was intended by the European 
elites from the very beginning. He further elaborates that no real alternative 
exists to the idea of a united Europe: 
“Both the Schuman Plan and the European defense community were always 
only intended as a preliminary stage for a political union, that is, a European 
state. […] Do you think there is a real alternative to your European policy at 
all? Dr. Adenauer: No, Mr. Friedländer, there is no alternative.”895 
In this way, Adenauer re-establishes the general myth of a United Europe. He 
further formulates his vision for the development of the EUI, which should end 
in the aspired “United States of Europe,” as he puts it in the following: 
“[t]he Schuman Plan, the treaty about the European Defense Community are 
only the beginning according to the estimation of those playing an active part. 
[…] I am sure: if it starts off with six countries, then one day all the other 
European states will join too.”896 
The consensus-focused approach in the process of EUI was further manifested 
by the aspirations of the European elites to build a system of governance at the 
European level that prevents such conflicts. Since they assumed that the wars 
and economic demolition of the 20th century emerged on the grounds of national 
political and ideological conflicts across Europe. The political system was 
therefore designed to ensure the ongoing control of policy-making by European 
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and national technocrats, instead of any elected government or parliament. The 
members in the common European institutions were therefore directly selected 
by their national governments. Representatives from dominate national parties 
favoring the EUI were thus over-represented.897 Although, the necessity of 
political parties at the European level to form a political will was generally 
acknowledged, as stated in the Treaty of Rome: “[p]olitical parties at European 
level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute 
to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the 
citizens of the Union.”898 Political parties remained without any significant 
influence during the first period of EUI. Moreover, any processes for decision-
making at the European level were designed to avoid open conflict and secure 
a general consensus.899 In this regard, it was ensured that the ECSC was 
carefully engineered to secure maximum public support and avoid any 
controversial debate among a broad political base to facilitate the growth of the 
community. 
The European leaders and political elites therefore promoted supranational 
loyalty and further encouraged members of supranational institutions to support 
a pro-European discourse.900 The first generations of European officials and 
civil servants openly acted in a Europhile sentiment. The combination of ideal 
and interest encouraged them to aspire the strengthening of the European 
supranational institutions and the deepening of the EUI.901 It was also assumed 
that political leaders would “go off to Brussels” acting in their individual 
interests.902 The institutionalization process was thus characterized by a general 
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“supranational allegiances and a pro-integration bias.”903 These factors provide 
a better understanding of the pre-dominantly pro-European attitude of the actors 
within the European institutions.904 These dynamics during the first period of 
EUI, were further accompanied by the dominance of the neo-functionalist 
approach. The neo-functionalist approach suggested a general spill-over effect, 
which accelerates an expansion of integration. It is further described as a 
process by which “a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation 
in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which 
create a further condition and a need for more action.”905 In this way, neo-
functionalist approach provided a strategy that allowed ignoring any conflict or 
division on topics such as nationality, authority and many others.906 
Despite the strong support of the European project and its expansion during the 
first period of EUI, the activities at the inter- and supranational European level 
also provoked some negative reactions from its member states. The most 
powerful reaction during that time was the Empty Chair Crisis from 1965 to 
1966. Charles De Gaulle – post-war president of France until 1969 - boycotted 
the European aspirations to extend supranationalism. He rejected any enhanced 
European influence beyond national borders and therefore any federalist 
tendencies of EUI.907 Further criticism was also voiced with regard to the 
relatively high supranational power of the High Authority implemented in 1952. 
As an independent supranational executive controlled by a Common Assembly, 
the implementation of the High Authority was one of the core ideas in the 
ECSC. With Jean Monnet – who was also the architect of the ECSC – as its first 
President, the strong influence of the institution was challenged, which later led 
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to the introduction of a council (of governments) and parliament (of deputies) 
as a counterweight.908 However, resistance in such manner remained rather 
unheard during this time, being only peripheral and at the margin of the political 
system. 
The first period of EUI was therefore characterized by a number of peculiarities. 
The sedimented hegemonic formation under the direct control of the European 
political elites matured around the myth of unity and the discursive center of 
peace. It enabled the design and installation of a new political settlement and an 
overall hegemonic project dominated by an elite-based consensus strategy. The 
elite bias was initially shown during the materialization of the supranational 
system, which further showed the continues enforcement of the hegemonic 
project. As the project progressed, the role of technocratic elites was further 
enhanced, and they were considerably free from parliamentary control. The 
process was therefore dominated by pro-integrationists supporting the European 
project and legitimized European politics with general narratives such as 
“securing peace in Europe.” 909 This was also prevalent in the lack of different 
political positions, considering alternatives to supporting the EU and the process 
of integration in its existing form.910 The public discourse on EUI remained 
therefore uncontested and uncontroversial, and interference, political rivalries, 
and ideological conflicts were mostly absent for much of the earlier history.911 
According to Mouffe’s AMD, this describes a situation of post-politics or “post-
democracy,” in which the possibility of exercising popular sovereignty through 
the battle between different projects disappears, instead; the existing order is 
managed by political elites.912 Here, she refers to Jacques Rancière, who argues 
that: “post-democracy is the government practice and conceptual legitimation 
of a democracy after the demos, a democracy that has eliminated the 
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appearance, miscount, and dispute of the people.”913 The focus on elite-driven 
consensus politics therefore requires the disappearance of a viral core of 
democracy. 
The analysis conducted in this section thus suggests that the immediate post-
war period of EUI describes a post-democratic situation characterized by an 
ephemeral excess of consensus (also called permissive consensus) exercised by 
the European political elites. It reflects a lack of opportunity for the exercise of 
democratic sovereignty and the possibility for the public to decide between real 
alternatives.914 Therefore, for much of the earlier history, EUI proceeded 
without much debate and conflict and the possibility for politics and legitimate 
dissent was absent. The general modi-operandi within European institutions 
instead favored compromise over conflict.915 This consensus strategy was 
further based on a hegemonic formation under the direct control of European 
elites, which matured around the myth of unity and the discursive center of 
peace, further enabled designing and installing a new political settlement and 
an overall hegemonic project.916 The discursive change from a relatively stable, 
sedimented discourse in a situation of consensus on EUI toward more resistance 
in the discourse on EUI is analyzed further in the next section. 
5.2 Crisis of identification 
This section analyzes the change in the discourse on EUI toward a deepening 
“crisis of identification” and increasing resistance in the context of an excess of 
consensus in the post-war period. As demonstrated in the previous section, for 
much of the post-war period, EUI was characterized by an excess of consensus, 
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in which a pro-integration bias prevailed among the majority of the European 
political elites supporting the European project.917 In the late-1980s, however, 
this presumed permissive consensus started to weaken and a more controversial 
debate emerged.918 In order to gain a better understanding of this change in the 
discourse on EUI and the weakening of the permissive consensus during these 
years, this sections begins with a further elaboration on the identification 
processes within the discourse on EUI. 
In the process of identification, as illustrated earlier, for Mouffe, the logic of 
equivalence and difference are of central importance. The notion of difference, 
on the one hand, is particularly relevant since identification is generally created 
relational and through the differentiation from an outside, an antagonistic 
other.919 This antagonistic other, according to Mouffe, is further determined as 
the “constitutive outside” to the particular identity. Identity is thus created in an 
antagonistic fashion by distinguishing itself from something else that lies 
outside itself. It has nothing in common and excludes everything outside of the 
particular discourse in question. This leads to the assumption that no identity is 
“self-present to itself” but rather purely contingent.920 At the collective level, 
similar processes are in place. Here, identification is about the differentiation of 
an external “they.”921 The source of identification is thus the antagonism itself: 
“the joint opposition, a shared negation of the respectively challenged aspect of 
the social order, generates a basis for different or new identification.”922 The 
logic of difference comes therefore into play when a social group with its 
identities and interests is within its differential positions. 
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The European project, therefore, needed to be coupled with a discursively-
articulated antagonistic other, a constitutive outside, to form a temporal stable 
hegemonic order. Here, the articulation of the Cold War as a substantial external 
threat posed to European countries functioned as an antagonistic other. The 
corresponding articulatory practices constituting the antagonistic outside are 
shown in speeches of European political elites. One of the most relevant 
contributions in this regard is Adenauer’s at the German Bundestag in 1952, in 
which he elaborates: 
“[…] das Ziel der sowjetrussischen Politik in Bezug auf die Bundesrepublik 
geht darauf hin, die Bundesrepublik zu neutralisieren […] weil es weiß, daß 
dann ohne weiteres das übrige Westeuropa auch in seine Hand kommt, und 
weil es sich dann stark genug fühlt, den Krieg gegen die Vereinigten Staaten 
zu führen. […] Für uns würde ein Einbeziehen in die sowjetrussische 
Machtsphäre nichts anderes bedeuten als Sklaverei und Ausbeutung.”923 
Adenauer therefore claimed in his speech that it was the declared goal of the 
Soviet Union to neutralize the Federal Republic of Germany, which would be 
followed by neutralization of the rest of Western Europe. Therefore, he argues, 
it poses a serious threat to the existence of the European countries as such. He 
further elaborates that the external threat to Europe is so great because it “is for 
all practical purposes concentrated in one hand.”924 It can therefore be argued 
that the notion of an external threat posed by the Cold War and the Soviet Union 
after the Second World War can thus be seen as a differentially-constituted 
articulatory practice, allowing for the constitution of a unifying identification.925 
Moreover, the constitution of an excluded other that poses a substantial threat 
to the existence of a particular discursive system is significant to the constitution 
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of a particular order. As Laclau formulates in Emancipation and Difference 
(1996): “Only if the beyond becomes the signifier of pure threat, of pure 
negativity, of the simply excluded, can there be limits and system (that is an 
objective order).”926 The construction of a relatively stable particular order thus 
involves the creation of a threatening other that is incompatible with the 
particular discursive system. These processes of differentiation therefore enable 
the constitution of identification and the stabilization of a discursive system and 
thus for the sedimentation and materialization of the European hegemonic 
project.927 
Besides the logic of difference, articulating an outside to a particular discursive 
system, collective identification demands the constitution of an inside or a “we.” 
Here, the logic of equivalence becomes relevant, linking together the different 
articulations of diverse demands, interests or identities to create one hegemonic 
project.928 In the case of the European project, as already elaborated above, the 
unity among the European states and the notion of peace functioned as empty 
signifier and discourse center around which the hegemonic project matured. The 
determination of a “common project” with mutual interest and goals is therefore 
necessary. The termination of the hostility between European states was of 
central relevance, as elaborated above. Mouffe further elaborates this in the 
following: 
“[…] remember the intentions of people like Jean Monnet and Robert 
Schumann, who after the Second World War advocated the European Project? 
Their aim was to create the institutions that would impede the emergence of 
another manifestation of antagonism between France and Germany. They 
understood that this could only be done by creating a ‘we’ that incorporated 
both countries, jointly with some others, in a common project […]”929 
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The general intention and demand for the creation of such common project is 
therefore further reflected in a statement by Monnet at the Common Assembly 
1954, as he claims about the European countries that “[d]uring these hundred 
years, each one followed his own destiny, or what he believed to be his destiny, 
by applying his own rules. […] the countries were tempted into crossing their 
frontiers in an effort to dominate the others.”930 He further states in another 
speech in 1954 that “[…] nationalist antagonism, misunderstandings and lack 
of understanding among the people, suspicion, continue to exist.”931 Other 
statements from European political elites show similar interests further 
emphasizing the central necessity to overcome the hostility between France and 
Germany. The most relevant being, for instance, Schuman’s remarks in his 
speech on the Schuman Declaration and the Birth of Europe, where he 
emphasizes the need for a unifying bond between European states, as he claims 
that “[t]he gathering of the nations of Europe demands the elimination of the 
age-old antagonism of France and Germany.” Churchill further formulates in 
1946 in The Tragedy of Europe that: “[…]the first step in the re-creation of the 
European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this 
way only can France recover the moral leadership of Europe.”932 Moreover, 
Adenauer supports this approach as he sees the process of EUI “as a decisive 
step to a close connection between Germany and France and thus to a new order 
in Europe that is based on peaceful cooperation.” He continues that this 
connection is further necessary in order to “[…] prevent future military conflicts 
between Germany and France once and for all.”933 He further stated in a press 
conference in 1956 that “[t]he first period of European integration […] was to 
ensure that a war may never break out between the European people.”934 The 
prevention of any further hostility within Europe was only possible – according 
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to Monnet – by creating a common institution that takes a part of the national 
sovereignty of each member. As Monnet stated in 1954: 
“[it] cannot eliminate our national antagonisms, as long as national sovereignty 
is not surmounted, such antagonisms can only be aggravated […] which merge 
a portion of their respective national sovereignties and submits it to the 
common interest.”935 
Thus, only the institutionalization of a common project would allow the creation 
of a sufficiently strong bond, further assuming that it would serve the “common 
interest.” According to these statements and elaborations, the objective of the 
European project was to create a bond among its members through their 
participation that made it less likely that those involved would treat each other 
as enemies, which would further serve their “common interest.”936 Therefore, 
as already noted in the previous section, the notion of peace as an underlying 
principle of unity functions as a discursive center around which the articulation 
of chains of equivalence among diverse demands became possible. This enabled 
the constitution of a “we” or a common bond among European states aiming to 
create peace through unity further allowing for the sedimentation and 
materialization of the discursive system in common institutions. 
According to Mouffe’s AMD, however, in order to continuously reinforce 
identification and affection with a particular hegemonic formation and political 
system, the possibility for an agonistic confrontation between different political 
positions and legitimate ways to challenge the existing order need to be 
available. The democratic institutions are therefore responsible to enable such 
political participation and provide legitimate channels to engage in conflicts 
over the “common good,” question the existing order and propose alternative 
ways to structure it.937 If such agonistic confrontation within the political 
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institutions is missing, the system lacks means for identification, it shows a thus 
shows a system in which “the ineradicable character of existing antagonisms 
and pluralism of values” is suppressed.938 
Given the emphasis on consensus during the post-war period of EUI and the 
absence of different political positions proposing alternative ways for the 
process of EUI, a situation of crisis of identification and further deepening 
dislocation became possible. The democratic institutions of the first period of 
EUI therefore failed to ensure affection, disregarding the diversity of political 
positions and interests, and therefore depriving any ground for identification 
within the political system. In a situation characterized by a lack of 
identification, dislocation emerges as the condition for social and political re-
articulation and change.939 The dislocation of the hegemonic formation in the 
post-war period was further reinforced by several political events in the 
discourse on EUI. Although discourses are generally able to integrate a diversity 
of events into their discursive system, every system has its disruptive limits, 
which it ultimately reaches. This is the moment, according to Mouffe and 
Laclau, when a discourse is unable to integrate a particular event and therefore 
weakens. As illustrated by Laclau, “a stable hegemonic discourse becomes 
dislocated when it is confronted by new events that it cannot explain, represent, 
or in other ways domesticate.”940 
In the case of the hegemonic formation in the post-war period, the discursive 
system confronted its limits with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the late-1980s. As illustrated above, the threat of the Cold 
War functioned as the constitutive outside and antagonistic other for the identity 
construction of the hegemonic discourse on EUI during its first period. With the 
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ideological and 
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social division in Europe – which had been present over decades – 
disappeared.941 The disappearance of the antagonistic other and the general 
division of the political space substantially dislocated and weakened the 
hegemonic formation. The assumed threat of the war was no longer present, and 
therefore the political identities were substantially dislocated during this 
time.942 Thus, without the antagonistic other, the original constitutive outside 
was obsolete. In this way, a destabilization of the prevalent identification and a 
substantial crisis of identification emerged.  
Moreover, the rapidly-changing political and economic conditions from the 
1970s brought about a further crumbling of the post-war hegemonic 
formation.943 Such events included the end of the Bretton Woods system of 
fixed exchange rates, which occurred when Richard Nixon – President of the 
United States at the beginning of the 1970s – declared to take the United States 
off the Gold Standard. Instead, the Nixon administration implemented a tax on 
imports and further established domestic wage and price controls. These 
modifications provoked an international monetary turbulence, which was 
further accompanied by the Arab-Israeli war and the international oil crisis in 
1973, followed by an international economic slowdown.944 
With the illustrated economic and political events in the late-1970s and 1980s, 
Europe faced new challenges. The emerged crisis of identification and the 
structural gap within the discourse on EUI allowed discursive change to 
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appear.945 In a situation of dislocation and structural crisis, the reactivation or 
re-politicization of a relatively stable, sedimented system becomes possible 
again.946 The existing discursive system becomes weekend a temporally fixed 
signifiers are floating or empty again. This allows for hegemonic activity and 
the re-articulation of the hegemonic formation.947 Therefore, the crisis of 
identification and dislocation was accompanied by a discursive change in the 
discourse on EUI toward an increasingly critical debate and more resistance. 
These developments therefore further affected the presumed permissive 
consensus among the public and the excess of consensus among the European 
political elites. 
The discursive change was most prominently shown in the debate around the 
organization and regulation of the internal market of the EC in the late-1980s. 
With the signature of the SEA in 1987, the first major step towards the single 
market was realized. The core element of the act was to complete all 
requirements for the single market within the EC by 1992. Especially Jacques 
Delors’ – president of the European Commission from 1985 till 1995 – three-
phase plan for the implementation of a single market and a monetary union. The 
plan aimed to eliminate existing trade barriers to create “an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is 
ensured.”948 Further, several national levels of taxation and different quality, 
health and technical standards were affected. In the context of the SEA and 
Delors’ ambitions for a stronger economic and political cooperation in Europe 
a intensified the debate over the institutional arrangement of the European 
system and a more controversial discourse could be recognized.949 
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The was particularly visible in in Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges Speech (1988), 
as one of the most significant speeches in the history of EUI. She was the first 
European political leader openly challenging the direction in which the EUI was 
progressing and putting forward a competing vision of the European project.950 
According to Thatcher, Europe’s attempt to develop from the originally-
indented “charter for economic liberty” as proclaimed in the Treaty of Rome951 
toward the implementation of a common market and single currency presents a 
fundamental change in direction. For her, it showed the attempt to develop a 
“social Europe,” implementing “collectivism and corporatism” by establishing 
“power at the center of a European conglomerate.”952 During a party 
conference, a few weeks after her speech in Bruges, Thatcher further argued 
that the idea of supranationalism in Europe would ultimately implement a 
socialist state. This claim was shared by other conservatives, arguing that a 
shared sovereignty was not acceptable, even regarding the creation of a common 
market.953 Thatcher further elaborates that “any further integration was no 
longer compatible with our sovereign statehood.”954 Her rejection of any 
deepening of a political union is particularly shown in her “first presented 
guiding principle,” as she formulates in the following: 
“[w]illing and active co-operation between independent sovereign states is the 
best way to build a successful European Community. To try to suppress 
nationhood and concentrate power at the center of a European conglomerate 
would be highly damaging and would jeopardies the objectives we seek to 
achieve.”955 
Here, Thatcher contradicts the previously-illustrated construction of the 
European identity and the constitutive myth of a united Europe. Instead, she 
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demands that individual states remain separated and maintain their national 
sovereignty rather than growing together to become the “United States of 
Europe”. However, Thatcher did not consider herself as an anti-European, but 
rather as an anti-federalist, as she formulates in the following statement: “[l]et 
Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating 
each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less 
than our common European endeavor.”956 
Thatcher’s speeches can therefore be determined a discursive turning point in 
the discourse on EUI. Her argument created a new articulatory position within 
the discourse leaving behind the principle of unity as an empty signifier and 
myth the notion of peace as a discursive center around which the hegemonic 
project of EUI matured. The discursive center of peace appears much less in the 
context of EUI. In fact, the term appears only once, however, explicitly 
questioning the ability of the European community to ensure peace. As Thatcher 
claims that “[i]t is to the NATO that we owe the peace that has been maintained 
over 40 years.”957 In regard to the identified myth of unity, which is in constant 
need to reproduce itself to procreate the foundation of society, political 
unification is of much less concern. Thatcher uses unity primarily in the context 
of security toward the Soviet Union, as she elaborates, “[a]bove all, at a time of 
change and uncertainly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we must 
preserve Europe’s unity and resolve so that whatever may happen, our defense 
is sure.”958 She therefore fills the empty signifier unity differently proclaiming 
the independence of the European states, which are linked only by cooperation 
security and economic matters, but not in a political sense. As Thatcher 
formulates in the following statement: 
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“Certainly, we want to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of 
common purpose. But it must be in a way which preserves the different 
traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one's own 
country. […] The European Community is one manifestation of that European 
identity, but it is not the only one.”959 
Thatcher further stresses this point in the following statement, underlining the 
support for a cooperation in economic and security matters, albeit not in a 
political sense going along with a united identification among its members. 
“[…] The European Community belongs to all its members. It must reflect the 
traditions and aspirations of all its members. […] The European Community is 
a practical means by which Europe can ensure the future prosperity and 
security of its people in a world in which there are many other powerful nations 
and groups of nations. […]”960 
Thatcher further emphasizes that despite her support cooperation in security and 
economic matters, she rejects any further political corporation, as she claims 
that it would not be necessary for “power to be centralized in Brussels or 
decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.”961 This is illustrated in one 
of the most significant sentences of the Bruges speech, as Thatcher says: “We 
have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see 
them re-imposed at European level, with a European super-state exercising a 
new dominance from Brussels.”962 She further proposes: “Our aim should not 
be more and more detailed regulation from the center: it should be to deregulate 
and to remove the constraints on trade.”963 
Thatcher’s contributions during this period were therefore seen as an attack to 
the European project and any attempt for further integration and an indication 
that Britain would not surrender national sovereignty and political power to the 
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European institutions. It further marked a change in discourse towards a more 
critical and controversial public engagement. Following Thatcher’s critical 
statements toward the project of EUI, more diverging views among the 
European political elites and public were increasingly recognized.964 As Collins 
– one of her closest political advisors – formulates: “I think it is still true, as a 
historical fact, that this begins the trend towards a more Eurosceptical outcome. 
[…] It was the beginning of that trend in Conservative thinking, it is a new turn 
in the road.”965 Politicians, such as James Goldsmith – a popular conservative 
British politician – who openly referred to Thatcher’s statements when 
formulating his concerns about the EC and presented himself as a vehement 
opponent of further integration and the proposed monetary union in the late-
1980s.966 
The analysis conducted in this section therefore suggests that the hegemonic 
discourse on the European project experienced change from post-war consensus 
to a substantial crisis of identification at the end of the first period of EUI. Given 
the consensus-approach of the post-war period, the emergence of deepening 
dislocation and a crisis of identification is not surprising. In a post-political 
situation characterized by the absence of real choice given to citizens, the 
political system lacks passion and therefore the possibility for people to identity 
with the project.967 As Mouffe suggests, no society is truly homogeneous, and 
thus necessarily needs the possibility for struggle and controversial debate. This 
allows the politicization and mobilization of passion within the political 
process.968 However, the possibility for an agonistics confrontation was missing 
during the first period of EUI. The system did not reach the “emotional 
participation of the populace in the affairs of government.”969 Instead, people 
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were excluded from the process of European governance. This lack of effective 
participation thus allowed for a crisis of identification to emerge. 
The crisis of identification was further reinforced by several political and 
economic events in the 1970s and 1980s. With the end of the Cold War, 
dissolving the constitutive antagonistic other and further the disarticulation the 
founding myth of the common project in the context of the debate around the 
organization of the EC in the late-1980s, the discursive system of the hegemonic 
formation further weakened. In the situation of dislocated identification, the re-
articulation of the discursive elements and empty signifiers such as unity and 
peace became possible, as presented in Thatcher’s articulations, as the most 
crucial example. This situation therefore credited as a turning point toward the 
dislocation of the post-war hegemonic formation and the emergence of a more 
controversial debate.970 This discursive change toward more resistance and 
hegemonic struggle following the crisis of identification within the discourse 
on EUI will be further analyzed in the following chapter. 
5.3 Hegemonic struggle 
This section analyzes the re-articulation of the existing hegemonic formation in 
the context of the crisis of identification and discursive dislocation. The 
discursive change has found expression in the emergence of various hegemonic 
movements striving to re-structuring the hegemonic formation and aiming for 
political leadership. 
With the identified crisis of identification and discursive dislocation a new era 
in the discourse of EUI emerged. According to Mouffe’s model, the dislocated 
discourse and lack of identification allow for a re-articulation of the existing 
hegemonic formation accompanied by a proliferation of antagonism, seeking to 
                                               




radically negate the established order.971 This symbolizes a structural crisis or 
“organic crisis” of the hegemonic formation during the post-war period.972 In 
this structural crisis, assumptions and discursive constructions of the previous 
post-war consensus established around a hegemonic project are challenged, and 
the possibility for the construction of different collective projects emerges. Such 
new projects therefore have the potential to reconfigure the social order and thus 
better meet a diversity of demands. They aimed to rearticulate empty signifier 
in the context structural crisis and capture a variety of unsatisfied demands in 
chains of equivalence. Previously-established identities therefore dissolved and 
new political identities emerged in the context of the hegemonic struggles.973 
The proliferation of new hegemonic movements competing to hegemonize and 
suture the dislocated social order can therefore be recognized. 
In the discourse on EUI, the proliferation of antagonism and the emergence of 
hegemonic projects becomes especially apparent since the early-1990s.974 In 
particular, the negotiation and ratification debates around the Maastricht Treaty 
from 1992 to 1993 constituted a decisive point in the discourse of EUI. The 
Maastricht treaty aimed to transform the community from an economic to a 
political union, which was accompanied by the rearrangement of national and 
supranational responsibilities and therefore the affection of the national 
sovereignty and citizenship.975 The treaty therefore marked a qualitative break 
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in the process of EUI. During the process of negotiation and ratification, the 
discourse on EUI became therefore more diversified and dissent with the 
European project more visible.976 
In this context, various counter-hegemonic projects around resistance 
attempting to disarticulate the hegemonic formation emerged in the beginning 
of the 1990s. The movements were of very different kind, ranging across the 
political spectrum from the extreme-left to the extreme-right from specific 
“anti-euro parties” in France, Germany and Denmark977 to diverse neo-fascist 
parties or nationalist and agrarian movements.978 The newly-emerged positions 
show similar demands regarding the process of integration, generally revealing 
a position of resistance towards EUI. The phenomenon of resistance in the 
discourse on EUI has further found expression in several referenda or 
amendments to the treaties of the EU.979 The ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty at the beginning of the 1990s, or the Danish and French referenda 
resulting in the rejection by the Danish population and a very marginal 
acceptance by the French population, are substantial events in this regard.980 
In this manner, resistance became increasingly routinized in the hegemonic 
struggle using articulatory practice generally challenging the European project. 
These articulatory practices presented the European project and the process of 
integration as either an “external power that forces economic measures on 
national governments” or an “incompetent instance that is thus unable to come 
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up with useful solutions to economic challenges.”981 Further, these practices 
emerged around the claim about “the non-democratic nature of the EU”.982 This 
was further based on the widespread understanding that the European project 
led by “elites that lack any democratic legitimacy and transparency”.983 
Moreover, it was argued that the project is “too expensive in terms of 
bureaucratic resources” and that it lacks the capacity to “serve its extensive 
areas of competences,” further assuming that “national sovereignty and the 
national state are undermined” by the progressing integration.984 
The growing resistance and share of votes for euro-critical movements within 
the discourse on EUI was further visible in the EP from 1994 onwards.985 
Previously, the political landscape in the EP was rather indifferent. However, 
from the 1990s, the Common Assembly started to be divided along the main 
dimensions of left- and right- wing, as well as on pro- and anti-integration and 
showed particular fertile ground for actors resisting EUI. Euro-critical positions 
were therefore increasingly strengthened further consolidating its ranks within 
the EP.986 The first anti-Europe group in the EP was the European of Nations 
(EN), which was founded in 1994, uniting a diverse set of demands of resistance 
toward EUI.987 
James Goldsmith, who represented and chaired the EN, was further one of the 
most popular and influential opponents of the European project during that time. 
He openly articulated his concerns with the EUI from the 1980s. With the 
entrance of the EP, he substantially expanded his political influence as a 
vehement opponent of any further process toward integration and the proposed 
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monetary union.988 Based on Thatcher’s ideas in the 1980s, Goldsmith 
articulated a new hegemonic anti-establishment project within the discourse on 
EUI. His project emerged around the “resistance towards European integration” 
among the people who felt excluded by European political elites and their 
different allies. In his speech titled Creating a Superstate is The Way to Destroy 
Europe (1993), which was famously published in The Times, he initially 
declared his political goal to empower “the people” in the matter of European 
membership.989 As he formulates in the following statement: “Our purpose is to 
fight to obtain that right to decide [whether Britain should remain] an 
independent nation or whether her future will better be served as part of […] 
the single European super-state.”990 His declared opposition to the European 
political elite, was further particularly apparent in his Bournemouth-Speech in 
1994, where he asserts that his followers are the “real people” of Europe, as 
opposed to the political elite: 
“[…] It should be obvious that we, who are opposed to Maastricht, are the true 
Europeans. We are the ones who want a family of nations, a Europe built on 
its constituent nations. But the others keep saying that they are the pro-
Europeans and that we are anti-European.”991 
The establishment of an opposition towards the European political elite was 
further emphasized in the following statement by Goldsmith, as he formulates 
that the European political elite’s behavior demonstrates their ignorance 
towards the public: “[…] it demonstrates the belief that citizens are no more 
than an encumbrance and that only a tiny elite should be entitled to know what 
is going on.”992  
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Goldsmith also questioned the motives of European member states, as he 
articulated suspicion that Germany was pursuing the goal of dominating 
Europe. According to him, this was particularly confirmed with the Maastricht 
Treaty and the change of the EC into the EU, which implied the centralization 
of governmental powers.993 He further emphasized his opposition to any kind 
of political union, as he saw these developments as a threat to national 
sovereignty. This was further shown in the following statement: 
“[…] we reject the idea that this country’s destiny as a proud and sovereign 
nation can be brought to an end through the backroom dealings of politicians. 
The sovereignty of this nation belongs to its people. The sovereignty of this 
nation belongs to its people and not to a group of career politicians.”994 
Goldsmith articulations throughout these statements thus illustrate the 
disarticulation and redefinition of key elements of the post-war hegemonic 
formation. He, for instance, reactivates internal antagonism not only between 
“the people” and the elite, but also between the members states, as he questions 
their real motives.995 The identification is therefore constituted in difference to 
the European elite as the constitutive outside, but also to the threat of the loss 
of national sovereignty through the dominance of other European states. 
Therefore, new political frontiers against the “forces of the establishment” 
emerged within the discourse of EUI. Goldsmith further established his anti-
establishment project around resistance toward the European project. In this 
way, he was able to include a diversity of demands political position toward the 
European integration among the people excluded by European political elites. 
The EN was further able to manifest itself in the EP and persisted in different 
shapes and under different labels over decades.996 The manifestation of the euro-
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critical sentiments in the EP was widely seen to be one of the most significant 
developments in the process of EUI, which was mostly labeled as 
“Euroscepticism” in the media and politicians.997 In particular from the 2009 
elections of the EP onwards, euro-critical anti-establishment parties across the 
political spectrum from the extreme-left to extreme-right were able to achieve 
historical success.998 The success was often declared as an “Eurosceptic storm 
in Brussels.”999 Euro-critical parties along the spectrum entered the parliament 
including neo-Nazi parties, extreme right groups and also extreme left 
groups.1000 In particular the 2014 elections in the EP marked a shift in the 
political influence toward euro-critical positions in the EP. As illustrated earlier, 
in 2014, around twenty five percent of seats in the EP were taken by parties 
resisting the process of integration, compared with around sixteen percent in 
2009.1001 In the 2019 EP elections, anti-euro parties – both left and right – were 
able to further confirm their success and thus manifest themselves in the 
political landscape.1002 Although the euro-critical parties do not represent a 
homogenous group, they were further able to form groups at the supranational 
level, thus putting Europe’s capacity to defend itself and act politically at 
risk.1003 In response to the historical success of euro-critical parties in the EP in 
2014, Francois Hollande - French President from 2012 till 2017 – further 
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interprets the results as “a vote of mistrust towards Europe.”1004 He requested 
for the “EU to change focus and reduce its role,” claiming that the EU had 
become “remote and incomprehensible for many of its citizens.”1005 
The analysis conducted in this section therefore suggests that the situation 
characterized by a crisis of identification and discursive dislocation at the end 
of the first period of EUI allowed for emergence of new hegemonic movements 
in the discourse on EUI and the re-articulation of the existing hegemonic 
formation.1006 In the context of the structural crisis or hegemonic struggle, the 
newly-approached movements were able to form their projects around the 
empty signifier of resistance and tie together a diverse set of demands through 
chains of equivalence towards the EUI. They further employed articulatory 
logics of difference by establishing new frontiers within the discourse of EUI 
against the European political elite. The aforementioned phenomena further 
show how the hegemonic struggle around resistance finds expression in a 
number of referenda and euro-critical parties across Europe and in the EP. They 
emerged across the political spectrum from extreme-left to the extreme-right, 
including neo-fascist parties, nationalist or agrarian movements, aiming to fill 
the void and therefore hegemonize the dislocated political arena. 
From the second period of EUI onwards, the discourse on EUI was therefore 
characterized by widespread and openly-articulated resistance towards the 
sedimented hegemonic discourse. The emergence of diverse hegemonic 
projects in the situation of a crisis of identification was further accompanied by 
the de-sedimentation of the post-war consensus and the re-articulation of the 
existing hegemonic formation.1007 The emergence of this moment of struggle 
therefore indicated the crisis of the post-war hegemonic formation gradually 
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implemented from the 1950s. In this way, a greater diversity and differentiation 
of positions and opinions became visible and the discourse on EUI was therefore 
increasingly characterized by political polarization, questioning the European 
project..1008 It eventually split the post-war consensus into those in favor of the 
previous consensus and those associated with the newly-proposed projects.1009 
The discourse on EUI thus changed from a relatively stable system around the 
permissive consensus to a much stronger critical engagement and increased 
resistance toward the EUI.1010 It followed that European political elites 
supportive of the project were no longer able to lean on the supportive climate 
and a general Europhile attitude, enabling them to make decisions without much 
public involvement.1011 This development thus marks a new era in process of 
EUI characterized by resistance as an increasingly powerful phenomenon and 
the mainstreaming of anti-EU rhetoric.1012 
The next section more closely explores the hegemonic struggles within the 
discourse on EUI, analyzing the ongoing political dynamics and structures 
allowing for apathy and disaffection within the discourse on EUI. 
5.4 Apathy and disaffection 
This section focuses on the analysis of the ongoing hegemonic struggle within 
the discourse EUI. In particular, it investigates the manifestation resistance 
evolving around more extreme forms of euro-critical movements, therefore, 
showing apathy and disaffection from the European project. 
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According to Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theoretical elaborations, in a situation of 
structural crisis and hegemonic struggle, the different hegemonic projects strive 
for political leadership by using articulatory practices. They aim to fill empty 
signifier with their particular content and tie together a diverse number of 
demands through chains of equivalence. They further constituted relational 
identification by determining a discursively-articulated antagonistic other.1013 
They differ in their articulation of new hegemonic projects and continue until a 
hegemonic formation has sedimented in the never-ending discursive 
processes.1014 The discursive struggle between different hegemonic projects 
competing to suture a dislocated social order is, according to Mouffe, the actual 
modus of politics under the condition of modern democracy.1015 In the context 
of a modern democracy, different political projects struggle to implement their 
interpretations of the shared ethic-political principles. The political system thus 
needs to provide legitimate channels for the expression of those political 
positions and for an ongoing agonistic confrontation to take place within the 
system. According to Mouffe’s theoretical model, the struggle between 
different hegemonic projects can result in the crystallization of passion outside 
of the particular discursive system when these agonistic dynamics are hindered 
in a political system. These forms of collective identification can further appear 
around non-negotiable moral values such as nationalist, ethic, or religious, 
which are non-manageable within the particular democratic political 
process.1016 The newly-emerging projects and movements can therefore take the 
form of extremist parties bringing about political polarization.1017 This way, 
they further show disaffection with the processes of political participation and 
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even apathy from the system, thus destabilizing and threating the existence of 
particular political system.1018 
Given the consensus-focused approach in the first period of EUI, the political 
system was unable to provide the political structures and processes for those 
agonistic dynamics of pluralism to unfold. It therefore failed to secure the 
diverse demands of the people and lacked legal political channels for 
confrontation of different political positions and disagreement with the existing 
system.1019 The possibility for legitimate dissent was thus eliminated and any 
resistance towards the hegemonic project of EUI was only possible outside the 
discursive system and thus declared in negative terms.1020 This laid the ground 
for political polarization and extreme political movements to emerge in the 
political landscape that take up the unoccupied political space and question the 
existence of the political institution.1021 Therefore, with the lack of the political 
system to allow identification with a diverse set of political positions and 
agonistic confrontation to take place, the ground was laid for extreme forms of 
antagonism to emerge.1022 
As illustrated in the previous section, the diverse demands in the structural crisis 
of the hegemonic formation emerged around resistance toward the ongoing 
integration of the European project. Under the umbrella of resistance towards 
EUI, the projects were able to subsume a wide range of diverse demands at the 
national or supranational level. However, the projects increasingly showed 
articulatory practices around empty signifier such as re-nationalization, 
demanding not only the reduction or stagnation of the competences of the EU, 
but even the dissolution of the community. 
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As part of the earlier movements, Goldsmith established his anti-establishment 
project around the empty signifier of re-nationalization of the European project. 
In this way, he was able to include a diversity of political position and demands 
opposed to any further vertical or horizontal deepening of the European project, 
affecting centralization of political power, sovereignty. He openly proclaimed 
his ambition to build an alternative anti-establishment movement aiming for re-
nationalization and the protecting of the national identity in the European 
project, as he states in the following statement: 
“How can one possibly expect that there will not be a reaction, a nationalist 
reaction, by people who want to protect the identity, and the culture, of their 
nations? […] a project which will be an alternative to that of the centre right / 
centre left establishment.”1023  
Goldsmith further articulates his efforts to strive for the strengthening of the 
national state and national sovereignty, as he further states in the following: 
“According to our plan Europe will be built on the strengths, cultures and 
heritage of its nations, based on true subsidiarity and that means that everything 
that can be done by the family, the locality, the region and the nation should be 
done accordingly, and only those things that cannot be decentralised, should 
be re-grouped at the European level.”1024 
These articulations therefore underline Goldsmith resistance towards any 
further decentralization of the European states and his rejection of the European 
project. Similar efforts, however, become further apparent examining 
articulatory practices from European politicians in the third period of EUI. Here, 
Nigel Farage – leader of the UKIP, which also supported Britain’s exit from the 
EU – proclaims in 2010 his resistance and re-nationalization efforts against the 
European project in The Guardian. He further asserts about van Rompuy – 
president of the European Council 2009-2014 – that: 
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“This man is an overpaid catastrophe who wants to abolish our nation. Nation 
states will not disappear because they are the expression of peoples’ will. The 
EU is swimming against the tide of history. The number of nation states in the 
world is increasing all the time, therefore establishing the project of resistance 
and re-nationalization.”1025 
Farage goes on to state his ambition to bring an end to the European project, as 
he further claims: “I will do anything to overthrow this empire. […] Rather than 
bring peace and harmony, the EU will cause insurgency and violence.”1026 Here, 
he also de-articulates the post-war hegemonic formation and the historical 
signifier of European unity. He instead proposes that the EU is in thrall to the 
myth of European unity, and thus speaks out against the vision of “inevitable” 
unification. As demonstrated above, for many years there has been a Europhile 
tenor and a concerted effort to justify the need for an “ever closer union.”1027 
The hegemonic project of unification prevailed in the historical debate and was 
used to explain the “inevitability” of the EU.1028 However, Farage de-articulates 
this post-war consensus and builds a new collective identification around re-
nationalization as the need of “the people,” as he continues to elaborate on van 
Rompuy: 
“You appear to have a loathing for the very concept of the existence of nation 
states - perhaps that’s because you come from Belgium, which of course is 
pretty much a non-country. […] Sir, you have no legitimacy in this job at all, 
and I can say with confidence that I speak on behalf of the majority of British 
people in saying: We don’t know you, we don’t want you, and the sooner 
you’re put out to grass, the better.”1029 
Farage therefore emphasizes his objections against the European institutions 
and its leaders, and also stresses his re-nationalization efforts, as he further 
elaborates: “[w]e seek an amicable divorce from the European Union and its 
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replacement with a genuine free-trade agreement.”1030 Farage’s articulations 
show therefore a more extreme form of the already elaborated hegemonic 
struggles during the second period of EUI. Van Rompuy, as a representative of 
the European political elite supportive of the European project responds to 
Farage’s elaborations and the strong euro-critical positions and growing re-
nationalization efforts in  in the EU in his speech in 2010, stating that: 
“Euroscepticism leads to war and a rising tide of nationalism is the European 
Union’s ‘biggest enemy.’ […] We have together to fight the danger of a new 
Euroscepticism. […] This is no longer the monopoly of a few countries. In 
every member state, there are people who believe their country can survive 
alone in the globalized world. It is more than an illusion: it is a lie.”1031 
Van Rompuy therefore confronts the euro-critical positions and further sees the 
re-nationalization efforts and the associated new nationalism in Europe based 
on fear: 
“The biggest enemy of Europe today is fear. Fear leads to egoism, egoism leads 
to nationalism, and nationalism leads to war. […] Today’s nationalism is often 
not a positive feeling of pride of one’s own identity, but a negative feeling of 
apprehension of the others. Our Union is born out of a will to co-operate, to 
reconcile and to act in solidarity”1032 
As illustrated in van Rompuy’s speech, it is argued that opposing the path of 
integration means being on the “wrong side” of history. However, following 
Farage, these “historical determinisms” needed to be challenged since they were 
used as a justification for bypassing the democratic wishes of “the people.”1033 
Following Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse-theoretical ideas, this shows that the 
previous hegemonic formation and historical determinism in relation to the 
process of EUI is substantially challenged by different projects such as the re-
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nationalization efforts formulated in Farage’s speeches. With these efforts, the 
political movement around Farage questions the existence of the particular 
democratic institution itself, which appears – following Mouffe – particularly 
often when there is a crisis of identification and a lack of agonistic pluralism in 
a modern democratic society. With the statements from van Rompuy it becomes 
further prevalent that movements opposing the dominant hegemonic project is 
constituted in negative terms. 
Resistance toward the European projects therefore showed increasingly extreme 
forms and questioning the very existence of the institutions. Even among 
European political leaders similar statements can be found, such as David 
Cameron –British Prime Minister from 2010 till 2016– who declared himself to 
be “Eurosceptic” after he fought to holt up an increase in the EU budget during 
a time of national austerity.1034 Also, Viktor Orbán – Hungarian Prime Minister 
– openly articulated his mistrust in the European Union, as he states in 2015 
talking about the “migration crisis” that “[w]e must acknowledge that the 
European Union’s misguided immigration policy is responsible for this 
situation.”1035 However, the increased disaffection and apathy from the 
European institution further peaked with the UK’s decision to leave the Union. 
After a long history of resistance towards its EU membership and re-
nationalization efforts, Prime Minister David Cameron declared to hold a 
referendum on the UK’s further remaining the EU in case his party won the 
majority in the general election in 2015. The referendum resulted 2016 in the 
decision to withdraw from the EU. It was the first referendum in the history of 
EUI on whether a member state wants to remain within the EU. The UK leaving 
the EU – often called “Brexit” – eventually took place in 2020.1036 
The analysis conducted in this section therefore suggests that the third period of 
EUI showed an increasing manifestation and more extreme forms of resistance 
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evolving around re-nationalization efforts. The emerged movements in the 
context of a structural crisis and a crisis of identification successfully divided 
the previously-existing consensus in the post-war period. They moved into a 
vacuum created by technocratic post-politics that were particularly prevalent 
during the early period of EUI. The created void was occupied by diverse 
projects on resistance, increasingly showing strong disaffection and apathy 
across Europe. The disaffection and apathy became commonplace with the 
UK’s decision to leave the Union in 2016,1037 ultimately threatening the 
existence of the European institution.1038 The process of EUI has therefore 
arrived in a new era determined by the manifestation of the resistance in euro-
critical and anti-establishment parties across Europe and the increased 
disaffection and apathy from the European institution.1039 Therefore, Mouffe’ 
theoretical elaborations allow to gain an enhanced understanding of the 
manifestation of resistance accompanied by strong apathy and disaffection with 
European project as such.1040 
5.5 Conclusion 
As illustrated in the previous analysis, for much of the earlier history of EUI, 
the project was understood as a hegemonic, elite-driven project in which 
political rivalries and ideological conflicts were mostly absent. The general 
modus operandi in the European institutions was in favor of compromise over 
conflict and the chosen decision-making process was consensus-focused.1041 
The immediate post-war period was thus characterized by an excess of 
consensus, the also called permissive consensus, allowing European elites to 
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design and implement the European institution without much public debate. In 
this manner, resistance against the EUI was only peripheral during this time and 
persisted at the margin of the political system. 
The elite focus and the consensus-focused strategy lacked, however, the 
possibility for political identification within the discourse on EUI. It did not 
offer different political positions with which people could identify. The period 
was thus characterized by the exclusion of the people from the process of 
European governance and the possibility of effective participation. The 
“emotional participation of the populace in the affairs of government”1042 was 
therefore not possible. This situation further created a void that allowed for a 
weakening of the hegemonic formation and a crisis of identification to emerge. 
The dislocated identification enabled for the proliferation of antagonism and a 
hegemonic struggle to prosper. This was followed by the de-articulation of the 
sedimented hegemonic formation and the weakening of the presumed consensus 
in the post-war period, fostering the discursive shift from the post-war 
consensus towards more resistance within the discourse on EUI.1043 The 
discourse of EUI therefore showed a greater differentiation of positions and 
opinions and a greater visibility of resistance.1044 In this way, European political 
elites supportive of the project were no longer able to lean on the supportive 
climate for EUI and a general Europhile attitude.1045 The manifestation of 
resistance in the discourse of EUI therefore marked the emergence of a new era 
for the process of EUI, as it showed increasing disaffection and apathy with the 
institution itself. 
In the next chapter the findings of this analysis are illustrated and discussed 
against the backdrop of Mouffe’s model of agonistic pluralism.  
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6. Theory and results 
In this chapter, the findings of the analysis at hand, seeking to elaborate on the 
research questions “How can resistance towards European integration be best 
understood from the perspective of Chantal Mouffe’s AMD?”, are illustrated 
and discussed against the theoretical backdrop of Mouffe’s model of agonistic 
pluralism. The general purpose of this analysis cannot be to find empirical 
evidence or seek verification and falsification of a thesis. This would be in stark 
contrast to the poststructuralist approach adopted in the study at hand. Instead, 
the analysis aimed to elaborate on and provide more answers to the research 
question, which will be further discussed in this section. The research question 
was analyzed in the previous chapter by deconstructing and reconstructing the 
discourse on EUI. Here, discourse-theoretical concepts such as hegemonic 
formation, antagonism, empty signifiers or hegemonic struggle were used. 
Hereby, the change from a presumed post-war permissive consensus in the first 
period of EUI towards resistance and disaffection with the European institutions 
was theoretically substantiated. The discourse on EUI was further analyzed 
along the four determined categories of the analytical framework based on 
Mouffe’s AMD, namely excess of consensus, crisis of identification, 
hegemonic struggle, and apathy and disaffection. These were further elaborated 
along the three time periods of the EUI, first from the early 1950s until the late-
1980s, second from the early-1990s until the late-2000s, and third from 2010s 
until the election of the EP in 2019. Therefore, in the following, the discussion 
will take place against the background of Mouffe’s theory based on the analysis 
conducted along the categories of “excess of consensus,” “crisis of 
identification,” “hegemonic struggle” as well as “apathy and disaffection.” The 
section concludes on the general relevance and substantiation of Mouffe’s 
democratic model of agonistic pluralism for the phenomenon of resistance. 
Excess of consensus and the agonistic model of democracy 
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As the analysis in the previous chapter illustrates, the major argument of section 
5.1 is that the first period of EUI from the 1950s onwards was characterized by 
the existence of an excess of consensus and a presumed post-war permissive 
consensus. The sedimented hegemonic formation under direct control of the 
European elites, allowed for a consensus-focused policy approach to emerge. 
During this time, the European elites were able to implement the hegemonic 
project and design political structures without much conflict and public debate. 
Following Mouffe’s theoretical elaborations, this situation of consensual 
politics during the first period of EUI demonstrates a post-political system.1046 
It blurs the political frontiers between different positions and eliminates the 
political and pluralist space. Mouffe further suggests that such consensual 
practices presuppose the very disappearance of what constitutes the viral core 
of democracy.1047 It thus manifests the evolution towards post-democracy, in 
which the agonistic dimension providing democratic politics with its inherent 
dynamics are erasure.1048 Politics instead become a mere issue of managing the 
order dominated by the ideas of European political elites and carried out by the 
policy-making of European and national technocrats. In this situation of 
consensus, the European citizens are deprived of the possibility to exercise 
popular sovereignty and their democratic rights. The system thus lacks a real 
agonistic confrontation and political alternatives to identify with. 
Crisis of identification and the agonistic model of democracy 
As shown in analysis conducted, the major argument of section 5.2 is that 
towards the end of the first period of EUI, the sedimented hegemonic formation 
of the post-war period was dislocated and a general crisis of identification 
appeared. The consensus-focused approach installed, and several political and 
economic events stressed the limits of the established discursive system. In the 
context of a deepening crisis of identification from the late-1980s, the discourse 
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on EUI shifted from a general consensus towards increasing resistance. 
Following Mouffe’s theoretical elaborations, the emerged situation of 
deepening discursive dislocation and crisis of identification is not surprising. 
Given the emphasis on consensus in a post-political system, it lacks real 
alternatives and real choice given to citizens. The possibility to channel passion 
in productive democratic ways towards the political system and for people to 
identify with the project is further absent. This in turn allows for the dislocation 
of identities in the discourse of EUI followed by a discursive shift away from 
the presumed consensus. As Mouffe’s theory suggests, no society is truly 
homogeneous, and people need the possibility to constantly struggle with 
internal deficiencies of real debate.1049 Thus, politics requires the availability of 
a conflictual representation of the world, and the possibility for passion to be 
mobilized politically to enable identification and affection with the particular 
system.1050 This is precisely what was missing during the first period of EUI. 
With the elite focus and the consensus-focused policy strategy in place, the 
European project was unable to reach the emotional participation of the citizens 
in the affairs of government. The exclusion of citizens from European 
governance and the lack of effective civic competence is thus at the expense of 
popular fragmentation and the end of the permissive consensus. 
Hegemonic struggle and the agonistic model of democracy 
As suggested in the analysis conducted, the major argument of section 5.3 a 
crisis of identification and a dislocation of the hegemonic formation emerged in 
the second period of EUI. In the context of the structural crisis, various 
hegemonic movements in the discourse of EUI strove to fill the emerged void 
and hegemonize the existing order. The hegemonic struggle was therefore 
accompanied by the de-sedimentation of the post-war consensus and the re-
articulation of the existing hegemonic formation.1051 The emergence of this 
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moment of struggle therefore indicated the crisis of the post-war hegemonic 
formation gradually implemented from the 1950s. In this way, a greater 
diversity and differentiation of positions and opinions became visible and the 
discourse on EUI was therefore increasingly characterized by political 
polarization, questioning of the European project and resistance.1052 The 
movements especially criticized the direction that EUI had taken in the context 
of the 1988 Single Act and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.1053 Further mobilized 
the logics of equivalence and difference to articulate their particular projects 
around resistance and re-nationalization an in difference to the European elite 
and its proceeding. The discourse on EUI was therefore characterized by 
widespread and openly-articulated resistance towards the sedimented 
hegemonic discourse. Following Mouffe’s theoretical elaborations, these 
movements were able to move into the void created by the consensus-focused 
approach over the first period of EUI. Here, the system failed to provide 
legitimate ways for political contestation and opposition to the existing order. 
In a situation of lack of agonistic debate, the emergence of a crisis of 
identification is therefore not surprising. The hegemonic struggle eventually 
split the post-war consensus in the discourse on EUI into those in favor of the 
previous consensus and those associated with the newly-proposed projects.1054 
The discourse therefore changed from a relatively stable discursive system 
around the permissive consensus towards increased resistance. It followed that 
European political elites were no longer able to lean on the supportive climate 
and a general Europhile attitude.1055 
Apathy and disaffection and the agonistic model of democracy 
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The analysis conducted in section 5.4 of the analysis further suggests that 
resistance, as an expression of disaffection and apathy towards the process of 
EUI, increasingly manifested itself in the third period of EUI. The emerged 
movements in the context of a structural crisis and a crisis of identification 
successfully divided the previously-existing consensus in the post-war period. 
Following Mouffe’s theoretical elaborations, these struggles moved into the 
vacuum created by technocratic post-politics. When political frontiers become 
blurred disaffection with the political system and the formation of collective 
passions outside the discursive system can appear.1056 These trends therefore 
opened the door to extremist and anti-establishment parties. The post-political 
situation in the earlier periods of EUI left a void that diverse hegemonic projects 
strove to fill, followed by the manifestation of resistance in the increasing 
success of euro-critical anti-establishment parties, aiming for the re-
nationalization of the EU. Disaffection from the institutions of the EU therefore 
became increasingly visible, climaxing with the ultimate decision by the UK to 
leave the Union in 2016,1057 which substantially endangered the existence of 
European institutions. The process of EUI has therefore arrived in a new era 
determined by the manifestation of the resistance in euro-critical and anti-
establishment parties across Europe and the increased disaffection and apathy 
from the European institution.1058 
Mouffe’ model therefore suggest that the described manifestation of resistance 
followed by a “crisis of Europe”1059 in the discourse on EUI indicates for a lack 
of agonistic struggle in the European institutions. The post-political system is 
not responsive to the normative challenges posed by the movement of 
resistance. Without the possibility for legitimate criticisms about the existing 
shape of the hegemonic project and the process of EUI, the strengthening of 
                                               
1056 Mouffe (2005a: 21, 30, 104). 
1057 Abbarno and Zapryanova (2013); Brack and Startin (2015); Brack (2018). 
1058 Vasilopoulou (2013); Verney (2015). 




resistance and general disaffection is not surprising.1060 The persistence of such 
a situation could eventually lead to the collapse of the European project. 
Therefore, it appears as an urgent matter to think about “how to create the 
conditions for democratic contestation within the EU.”1061 
Recommendations from the perspective of the agonistic model 
The research approach used in this study provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation and delivers more 
answers to the research question. Against this elaborated background and on the 
basis of Mouffe’s AMD, the demonstrated analysis further provides some 
recommendations on how to proceed in the identified post-political situation 
and in order to encounter the phenomenon of resistance in the discourse on EUI. 
The present study suggests that the liberal European institutions in place may 
undergo an agonistic reform. This agonistic reform would imply the application 
of the “conflictual consensus” to the institutional design. On the one hand, the 
democratic structures in the EU must be composed of a multiplicity of diverse 
demoi providing different spaces for the exercise of democratic sovereignty and 
clear and appealing identity positions.1062 This way, the system can foster 
affection with the democratic institution. The possibility of an agonistic 
confrontation over the direction of integration process within the European 
institution thus seems vital. On the other hand, it is necessary to link together 
the different demoi to provide a common bond between the citizens under the 
shared ethico-political principles and still allowing an agonistic conflict 
between adversaries to take place. This way, it becomes possible to take the 
eradicated antagonistic dimension of the political serious and established 
democratic institutions that are able to mobilize passion and affection towards 
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the democratic design, preventing the strengthening of disaffection and 
apathy.1063 Derived from this insight, the analysis therefore suggests for a 
politization of the European institutions and the decision-making process. It 
stresses the urgency to allow for a real debate about the process of integration 
and the contestation of different political project. 
The aspect of conflictual consensus has however also been criticized. Here, the 
central argument is that Mouffe’s model is inconsistent by privileging a 
necessary consensus over the ethical-political principles of freedom and 
equality as a prerequisite for agonistic pluralism. The premise of this necessary 
consensus within the democratic community is seen to be a strong contradiction 
to the plea for a comprehensive recognition of pluralism, dissent and 
antagonisms. Since Mouffe accuses the representatives of the liberal currents of 
adhering to the ideals of a consensus and thus giving insufficient room to 
pluralism, it is unclear how the conflictual consensus presuppose agreement on 
equality and freedom without even assuming a basic normative unity among 
citizens.1064 The primary importance of unity and consensus has prompted 
commentators to conclude that Mouffe’s critique of deliberative democracy is 
inconsistent. As Matthew Jones questions: “How is it that Mouffe believes that 
a rational consensus is impossible, yet argues that the same parties are able to 
pledge allegiance to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy, namely 
liberty and equality?”1065 
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The aspect of institutionalization of the agonistic approach has also encountered 
critical objections.1066 Here, critiques claim that the consequences of the 
agonistic model for the design of democratic politics remain unclear. It suggests 
that the institutions of current liberal democracies need to undergo an agonistic 
reform, making dissent more visible in the political process,1067 and enabling 
passionate identification with differing positions. However, the theoretical 
elaborations lack any precise guideline for the institutional reform process1068 
and therefore “the consequences of the deep dissent to the organization of 
political institutions and procedures.”1069 Therefore, the model leaves open the 
concrete implications for the design of political institutions.1070 As David 
Howarth articulates: “[T]here is still something of an ‘institutional deficit’ in 
their respective theories, both in terms of their critique of existing arrangements 
and in terms of their more positive alternatives.”1071 
The reformist approach of the agonistic model 
However, other academic scholars in the wider academic literature around the 
agonistic approaches have presented ideas to close this gap.1072 Among others, 
Manon Westphal presents an alternative concept for the institutionalization of 
the agonistic approach, claiming that it is possible to overcome the identified 
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institutional deficit without violating its claim of contingency.1073 Her 
“comparison and reform-oriented approach” generally suggests that the ideas of 
agonistic democracy should be used as a benchmark for a critical evaluation of 
existing formal democratic institutions.1074 The comparative element of her 
approach, on the one hand, examines whether the characteristics of the 
institutions prove to be conducive and useful for conflict promotion and 
regulation from an agonistic perspective.1075 The reform element of her 
approach, on the other hand, examines whether there may be forms of political 
institutions that are better suitable from an agonistic perspective. If this is the 
case, Westphal recommends outlining a program of institutional innovation, 
which shows precisely how the institution under investigation can be formed 
more agonistic.1076 
Following the analysis provided in this study, the agonistic model has the 
potential to stimulate new ways of thinking and provide political guidelines to 
simultaneously promote the contingency and controversy aspects in the 
European institutions and process of EUI.1077 In this way, the agonistic reform 
of the formal European institutions enables the effective handling of pluralism 
and opens new spaces for participation with its focus on hegemony and 
antagonism. It further allows the visibility of emerging disagreement and 
conflict and the direct shaping of the integration process. Instead of reconciling 
particular interests, the system therefore allows the incorporation of a wider 
range of particular interests and actors that may otherwise be left behind. 
Therefore, an agonistic reform can provide for a lively confrontation of political 
position and participation, making contestation and power possible in 
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democratic terms and erasing traces of exclusion.1078 In this way, identification 
and affection and identification with the European institutions can be fostered, 
therefore, entailing the potential to encounter the current challenges of 
resistance in the discourse on EUI. The model of agonistic democracy is thus 
able to provide practical implications and impulses in dealing with the 
challenges of pluralism in modern democracies. This study therefore presents 
the perspective of the agonistic theory of democracy on resistance in the 
discourse on EUI, suggesting for an agonistic reform of the European project 
since the possibility for an agonistic confrontation within the institutions of the 
European Union seems absolutely beneficial to its further existence.  
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8. Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache 
Der Prozess der europäischen Integration (EUI) wurde lange Zeit in der 
Öffentlichkeit nur in begrenztem Umfang diskutiert und galt als hauptsächlich 
von den europäischen politischen Eliten dominiert. Das Projekt EUI stellt sich 
im Allgemeinen als ein kontinental ausgerichtetes, postnationales politisches 
Projekt dar, welches darauf abzielt, bestimmte exekutive, legislative und 
judikative Zuständigkeiten auf supra- oder internationaler Ebene zu bündeln.1080 
Es verfolgt das Ziel, eine „immer engere Union der europäischen Völker“ zu 
schaffen, um vergangene nationale Rivalitäten zu beschränken und eine Sphäre 
des Friedens und der Stabilität, zu fördern.1081 Dieser Prozess kann grob in drei 
Hauptperioden unterteilt werden: die erste Periode, die die frühen Phasen des 
Integrationsprozesses in den 1950er Jahren bis in die späten 1980er Jahre 
umfasst, eine zweite Periode von der Gründung einer Union in den frühen 
1990er Jahren bis in die späten 2000er Jahre und die dritte Periode, die bis zur 
Wahl des Europäischen Parlaments (EP) im Jahr 2019 andauert.1082 
In der ersten Periode der EUI waren politische Rivalitäten und ideologische 
Konflikte in dem Prozess weitgehend abwesend. Die modi-operandi innerhalb 
der europäischen Institutionen bevorzugte den Kompromiss gegenüber dem 
Konflikt.1083 Der Prozess wurde von Integrationsbefürwortern, die das 
europäische Projekt unterstützten, und einer wohlwollenden Haltung in der 
Öffentlichkeit dominiert. Diese wohlwollende Haltung in der europäischen 
Öffentlichkeit wird allgemein als „Permissiver Konsens“ bezeichnet.1084 Der 
angenommene Konsens ermöglichte es den europäischen Eliten, den Prozess 
                                               
1080 Hix (2007); Europäische Union (2012a). 
1081 Präambel in “Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” (TFEU). Siehe: 
Europäische Union (2012a); Cantat (2015). 
1082 Vasilopoulou (2013), nimmt ähnliche Einteilung der Zeiträume des Prozesses der EUI 
an. 
1083 Siehe Cantat (2015). 




der Integration ohne große Einmischung der breiten Öffentlichkeit 
voranzutreiben und zu beschleunigen. So scheint es, dass der Schuman-Plan 
von 1950, als politisches Grundkonzept zur Zusammenlegung der deutschen 
und französischen Kohle- und Stahlproduktion nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, 
von einer kleinen, nahezu konspirativ arbeitenden politischen Elite lanciert 
wurde. Sie konnten schnell und effektiv manövrieren, auch weil die 
Öffentlichkeit nicht eingebunden war.1085  
In der zweiten Periode der EUI schien, dieser angenommene Permissive 
Konsens der Öffentlichkeit jedoch zu erodieren.1086 Dies wird insbesondere in 
Margaret Thatchers – Premierministerin des Vereinigten Königreichs von 1979 
bis 1990 – berühmten Brüssel-Rede im Jahr 1988 deutlich, in der sie das 
europäische Projekt und dessen eingeschlagenen Richtung grundlegend in 
Frage stellt und eine konkurrierende Vision aufzeigt.1087 Ihre Rede wurde oft 
als Wendepunkt in der öffentlichen Debatte um den Prozess der EUI gesehen, 
die divergierende Positionen gegenüber dem europäischen Projekt anregte.1088 
EUI war somit zunehmend Gegenstand bedeutender und kontroverser Debatten 
in den Medien und der Öffentlichkeit. Die kritischeren Beiträge zur EUI waren 
gekennzeichnet durch Widerstand gegen den Prozess und die zunehmende 
Unterstützung von Renationalisierungsbestrebungen, die eine Unzufriedenheit 
mit den europäischen Institutionen erkennen ließen.1089 
Während der dritten Periode der EUI wurden diese Bewegungen zunehmend in 
den europäischen Institutionen sichtbar, wobei eurokritische und Anti-
Establishment-Parteien die wachsende Unzufriedenheit mit den traditionellen 
                                               
1085 Inglehart (1970). Wissenschaftler gehen davon aus, dass diese Art von Konsens bis in 
die 1970er Jahre vorherrschte (Down und Wilson 2008: 46). 
1086 Hooghe und Marks (2009); Risse (2017). 
1087 Usherwood und Startin (2012: 2); Flood (2002). 
1088 Thatcher (1988). Siehe ebenfalls hierzu: Hooghe und Marks (1997); Flood und 
Usherwood (2007); Brack und Startin (2015). 
1089 Diese Bewegungen wurden oft mit dem Label “Euroskeptizismus” versehen 




Parteien und Eliten repräsentierten.1090 Die Manifestation des Widerstands 
gegenüber dem Prozess der EUI wurde bei den Wahlen zum EP 2014 und 2019 
besonders deutlich. So wurden 2014 über fünfundzwanzig Prozent der Sitze von 
eurokritischen Parteien eingenommen, verglichen mit etwa sechzehn Prozent 
im Jahr 2009.1091 Parteien wie der Front National (FN) in Frankreich, die United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), die Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) 
in Deutschland, das Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) in Italien und Synaspismos 
Rizospastikis Aristeras (SYRIZA) in Griechenland erzielten beispiellose 
Wahlerfolge und gewannen bedeutende Anteile.1092 Forderungen nach größeren 
Reformen oder gar einer Renationalisierung der Europäischen Union (EU) 
wurden zur Selbstverständlichkeit, quer durch das Parteienspektrum und selbst 
bei den Mainstream-Parteien.1093 Einen weiteren Höhepunkt erlebte diese 
Entwicklung mit dem „Brexit“-Referendum im Juni 2016, das schließlich zum 
Austritt des Vereinigten Königreichs (UK) aus der EU führte. 
Der Diskurs zur EUI durchlebt somit eine deutliche Veränderung. Er wandelt 
sich von der Existenz eines angenommenen Permissiven Konsens hin zu einer 
wachsenden Unzufriedenheit und einem Widerstand in der Öffentlichkeit, der 
schließlich die Existenz der europäischen Institution in Frage stellt.1094 
                                               
1090 Albertazzi und McDonnell (2008); Mair (2011). 
1091 Siehe hier die Wahlergebnisse des Europäischen Parlaments in 2014/19: Europäische 
Union (2014, 2019). Siehe auch: Brack und Startin (2015). 
1092 Brack und Startin (2015); Hobolt (2015), Hobolt und de Vries (2016). 
1093 Abbarno und Zapryanova (2013); Brack (2018). Siehe auch: Dahl (1961, 1982); Held 
(1995); Offe (2006: 34-35). Für „agonistische Ansätze“ in Internationalen Beziehungen 
(IB), siehe auch: Mouffe (2013: xv, Kap. 2); Norval (2007: 4-5). 
1094 Wissenschaftler haben Herausforderungen innerhalb der EU identifiziert. Dies gilt 
insbesondere für die Entscheidungsfindung und die Legitimation der EU unter ihren 
Mitgliedern (Hix 2007). Diese Herausforderungen wurden auch als Zeichen dafür gewertet, 
dass die Präferenzen der Eliten und der Öffentlichkeit in Bezug auf die EUI nicht synchron 
sind. Selbst der Europäische Rat hat Bedenken geäußert, dass die Bürger die EU als eine 
Bedrohung ihrer Identität sehen und das Gefühl haben, dass Beschlüsse ihre Bedürfnisse 
nicht berücksichtigen (Europäischer Rat 2002; siehe auch: Hobolt 2012). Vor diesem 
Hintergrund ist es wichtig, den Prozess der EUI zu analysieren und zu verstehen, wie der 





Infolgedessen sieht sich die EU mit einer erheblichen Krise konfrontiert, wie 
Emmanuel Macron – französischer Präsident seit 2017 – 2019 formuliert:  
“[Europe is a] historic success: the reconciliation of a devastated 
continent in an unprecedented project of peace, prosperity and 
(democratic) freedom (and pluralism). […] Never, since World War II, 
has Europe been as essential. Yet never has Europe been in so much 
danger. Brexit stands as the symbol of that. It symbolizes the crisis of 
Europe.”1095 
Diese Entwicklungen werden von der Entstehung einer umfangreichen und 
wachsenden akademischen Literatur begleitet.1096 Frühere Studien, 
insbesondere während der ersten Periode der EUI, zeigen meist einen 
europhilen Tenor und konzentrieren sich hauptsächlich auf die Unterstützung 
und Legitimation der Prozesse der EUI.1097 Im Gegensatz dazu hat sich die 
wissenschaftliche Aufmerksamkeit in den letzten Jahrzehnten mehr auf die 
Untersuchung des Widerstands sowie der eurokritischen Parteien verlagert. Das 
Phänomen des Widerstands und der zunehmenden Infragestellung des 
Prozesses der EUI wird sowohl in den Medien als auch in der akademischen 
Debatte weithin als Euroskeptizismus (EUS) etikettiert. Der allgemeine 
akademische Diskurs geht davon aus, dass sich EUS von einem politischen 
Randphänomen zu einer weit verbreiteten Position entwickelt hat, die sogar von 
Mainstream-Parteien und Parteien in der Regierung vertreten wird. Das 
Phänomen des EUS hat somit das Potenzial, dem Streben der EU nach 
Legitimität und Stabilität langfristig zu schaden.1098 Infolge dieser Ereignisse 
                                               
1095 Macron (2019). 
1096 Für eine Übersicht, siehe Flood (2002); de Vries und Hobolt (2016). 
1097 Siehe hier Inglehart (1970); Gabel (1998). 
1098 Siehe hier: Kopecký und Mudde (2002); Szczerbiak und Taggart (2002, 2017: 11); 
Harmsen und Spiering (2004a); Marks und Steenbergen (2004a, 2002, 2004b); Hix (2005); 
Hooghe (2007); Hooghe und Marks (2007); Krouwel und Abts (2007); Usherwood und 
Startin (2012); Serricchio, Tsakatika, und Quaglia (2013); Leconte (2015); Rohrschneider 




entwickelten sich die Untersuchungen zum EUS zu einem gut etablierten 
Teilbereich der europäischen Integrationsstudien (kurz: European Studies, 
manchmal auch EU-Studien).1099 Die meisten Forschungen, die innerhalb des 
Feldes der EUS durchgeführt werden, konzentrieren sich auf rationale 
Ansätze.1100 Anfang der 2000er Jahre erlebte das Forschungsfeld jedoch eine 
sogenannte „kritische Wende“. Seitdem haben ebenfalls kritische Theoretiker 
das akademische Feld eingenommen und stellen die wichtigste theoretische 
Alternative zu rationalen Ansätzen innerhalb der Disziplin dar.1101 Die kritische 
Theorie als Wissenschaftsdisziplin stellt den Mainstream des theoretischen 
Denkens und der Wissensproduktion grundsätzlich in Frage. Sie basiert auf den 
Ideen von Theoretikern, die zum Beispiel der Frankfurter Schule, des 
Poststrukturalismus und des Feminismus zugeordnet werden. In Bezug auf den 
Poststrukturalismus wird sie oft als „eine kritische Haltung“1102 oder „ein Ethos 
der Kritik“1103 beschrieben, die allgemeinen Behauptungen und grundlegende 
Mainstream-Annahmen innerhalb des Fachgebiets problematisiert. Beeinflusst 
von Theoretikern wie Michel Foucault und Jacques Derrida, wird darüber 
                                               
1099 Siehe hier Schmitt und Thomassen (1999); Flood (2002); Kopecký und Mudde (2002); 
Leconte (2010); Mair und Thomassen (2010); Capuzzi (2016). 
1100 Diese Studien konzentrieren sich hauptsächlich auf die Analyse der „Natur“ des 
Begriffs sowie der ihm zugrunde liegenden „Ursachen“. Siehe hier zum Beispiel: Brack 
und Startin (2015); Leruth, Startin, und Usherwood (2017b); Brack (2018). Für die zweite 
Debatte werden mehrere Erklärungen angeboten (Leruth, Startin, und Usherwood 2017a: 
3). Diese konzentrieren sich entweder auf die Parteipolitik oder die öffentliche Meinung 
(Marks und Wilson 2000; Hooghe, Marks und Wilson 2002; Marks, Wilson und Ray 2002; 
Szczerbiak und Taggart 2008; Usherwood und Startin 2012). Die vorliegende Studie nimmt 
jedoch eine poststrukturalistische Perspektive ein und lehnt daher diese theoretischen 
Annahmen explizit ab. Aus einer poststrukturalistischen Perspektive gibt es keine 
allgemeine Natur oder Ursachen für ein bestimmtes Phänomen, stattdessen ist das Soziale 
generell diskursiv konstruiert. 
1101 Siehe hier Rengger und Thirkell-White (2007). Robert Cox ist zudem einer der frühen 
Theoretiker in der kritischen Tradition der IB (Cox 1983, 1981). 
1102 Campbell und Shapiro (2007); Campbell (2013). 




hinaus die Möglichkeiten erforscht, die soziale und politische Sphäre jenseits 
rationaler, auf Essentialismus basierender Ansätze zu verstehen.1104 
Die vorliegende Studie wählt einen kritischen Ansatz, um das Phänomen der 
wachsenden Unzufriedenheit und des Widerstands in Bezug auf den Prozess der 
EUI zu untersuchen und ein besseres Verständnis der bestehenden Debatte zu 
gewinnen. Mouffes „Agonistisches Modell der Demokratie“ (AMD) bietet eine 
gut erforschte, diskursbasierte und poststrukturalistische Theorie der 
Demokratie. Mouffes AMD schlägt vor, dass die Abwesenheit einer 
agonistischen Konfrontation zwischen unterschiedlichen Parteien und 
Meinungen eine wachsende Apathie und Unzufriedenheit in demokratischen 
Systemen erlaubt.1105 In Abgrenzung zum populären deliberativ-
demokratischen Ansatz, der auf der Möglichkeit eines rationalen Konsenses 
beruht, argumentiert Mouffe, dass die Art und Weise, wie demokratische 
Identifikation entsteht, weder von ausgefeilten rationalen Argumenten noch von 
kontexttranszendenten Wahrheitsansprüchen abhängt. Stattdessen findet die 
Identifikation innerhalb demokratischer Systeme durch komplexe 
artikulatorische Praktiken und Diskurse statt.1106 Die Identifikation mit 
demokratischen Prinzipien erfordert ein demokratisches Ethos, das durch die 
Mobilisierung von Leidenschaft innerhalb des demokratischen Designs 
geschaffen wird, da die demokratischen Subjekte die Möglichkeit haben, sich 
mit verschiedenen politischen Positionen zu identifizieren.1107 Demokratische 
Politik impliziert also immer Konflikt und die Dimension des Antagonismus 
und das Ziel der Politik ist die „Herstellung von Einheit in einem Kontext von 
Konflikt und Vielfalt.“1108 Nach Mouffe neigen demokratische Systeme, die 
einen übermäßigen Schwerpunkt auf den politischen Konsens legen, dazu, 
                                               
1104 Edkins (2007: 89); Çalkıvik (2017). Zur Kritik am Poststrukturalismus siehe ferner: 
Khan und Wenman (2017); Rengger und Thirkell-White (2007). 
1105 Mouffe (2000: 85, 105). 
1106 Mouffe (1995: 5). 
1107 Mouffe (1995: 6). 




Gelegenheiten zur lebhaften Auseinandersetzung mit legitimen und 
unterschiedlichen Positionen auszuschließen, und schaffen somit Raum für 
Apathie und Entfremdung vom demokratischen System.1109 
Chantal Mouffes agonistischer Pluralismus kombiniert die Elemente Konflikt, 
Konsens, Demokratie und Politik somit in einer Weise, die eine substanzielle 
Kritik an der gegenwärtigen Form der europäischen Institutionen und den 
Prozessen der Entscheidungsfindung erlaubt. Aus der Perspektive der AMD 
lässt sich vermuten, dass die Entwicklung der EUI – insbesondere in der 
früheren Periode – auf einen Mangel kontroverser Debatte über die Richtung 
des Integrationsprozesses innerhalb der Institutionen hinweist. 
Dementsprechend spiegelte dies eine Situation dislozierter Identifikation wider, 
die Apathie und letztlich Renationalisierungsbestrebungen erlauben.1110 Auf 
diese Weise bietet Mouffe’s Modell einen potenziell fruchtbaren Weg, um neue 
Einsichten und ein tieferes Verständnis des Prozesses der EUI und des 
Phänomens des Widerstands zu gewinnen. Es bietet zudem die Möglichkeiten, 
die Verfassung und Praxis der Europäischen Institutionen neu zu überdenken 
und zeigt schließlich Reformmöglichkeiten auf, um eine stärkere Bindung an 
die Institution zu ermöglichen und marginalisierte Gruppen und Minderheiten 
stärker in den demokratischen Prozess einzubeziehen.1111 In der vorliegenden 
Arbeit wird daher das Argument vorgebracht, dass Mouffes AMD – 
insbesondere ihre Betonung des Konflikts – sinnvoll auf den Diskurs zur EUI 
angewendet werden kann und die Möglichkeit bietet, ein besseres Verständnis 
des untersuchten Phänomens zu erlangen und die Strukturen des politischen 
Systems der EU zu überdenken.1112 
Das zu untersuchende Phänomen wurde allerdings bisher noch nicht aus der 
Perspektive der AMD untersucht und erfährt kaum wissenschaftliche 
Aufmerksamkeit auf diesem Gebiet. Dementsprechend zielt die vorliegende 
                                               
1109 Mouffe (2000: 105). 
1110 Mouffe (2013). 
1111 Jones (2014: 250). 
1112 Down und Wilson (2008: 46); Jones (2014: 253). 
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Arbeit darauf ab, diese Forschungslücke zu schließen, indem sie den 
aufkommenden Widerstand und die Renationalisierungsbemühungen, die von 
eurokritischen Parteien vorangetrieben werden, aus der Perspektive der AMD 
betrachtet. Die Forschungsfrage, die im Mittelpunkt dieser Arbeit steht, lautet 
daher: „Wie kann der Widerstand gegen den Prozess der europäischen 
Integration aus der Perspektive von Chantal Mouffes AMD verstanden 
werden?“ 
In dem Bestreben, dieser Frage nachzugehen und Mouffes theoretische 
Überlegungen, wie in ihrem Modell des „agonistischen Pluralismus“ 
vorgeschlagen, anzuwenden, entwickelt die vorliegende Studie ein analytisches 
Framework mit vier Kategorien („excess of consensus,“ „crisis of 
identification,“ „hegemonic struggle,“ and „apathy and disaffection“). Zur 
Anwendung dieses Modells bedient die Arbeit sich der poststrukturalistischen 
Diskursanalyse, basierend auf Mouffes und Laclaus theoretischer Arbeit. 
Mouffe und Laclau formulieren ihre diskurstheoretischen Überlegungen 
ursprünglich in ihrem gemeinsamen Werk Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
(HSS). Laclau führt diese in New Reflections on Revolution of our Time (1990), 
Emancipation(s) (1996) und The Rhetorical Foundations of Society (2014) 
weiter aus und Mouffe ebenso in Die Rückkehr des Politischen (1993) und Das 
Demokratische Paradox (2000) und anderen Werken.1113 Mouffes und Laclaus 
allgemeiner Ansatz beruht auf der ontologischen Annahme, dass alle Bedeutung 
diskursiv konstruiert ist und von kontingenten Artikulationsbeziehungen 
abhängt.1114 Das Diskursive konstituiert in diesem Sinne die soziale und 
politische Welt.1115 Sie lehnt damit die auf dem Empirismus aufbauende 
positivistische Tradition ab und bestreitet die Möglichkeit, objektiv Wissen für 
den wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt zu produzieren.1116 Erkenntnistheoretisch 
                                               
1113 Siehe hier Glynos und Howarth (2007); Howarth, Norval, und Stavrakakis (2000).  
1114 Siehe hier Glynos und Howarth (2007); Howarth (2000: 8-9, 2005a: 336); Howarth 
und Stavrakakis (2000: 2-3); Laclau und Mouffe (2014: 107); Torfing (2005: 3-4). 
1115 Howarth (2000: 9). 




folgt sie somit dem sozialkonstruktivistischen Paradigma1117 und verwirft die 
Idee, nach kausalen Erklärungen zu suchen und so die Welt mit objektiven 
universellen Begriffen zu erklären.1118 Da die soziale und politische Ordnung 
diskursiv konstruiert ist, zielt die poststrukturalistische Diskursanalyse 
vielmehr darauf ab, gesellschaftlich produzierte Bedeutungen zu verstehen.1119 
Diesem Verständnis folgend bildet die Analyse des Diskurses der EUI den 
zentralen Gegenstand der vorliegenden Studie. Die Arbeit analysiert, inwiefern 
die hegemoniale Formation um den Prozess der EUI von den 
Widerstandsbewegungen angefochten und neu artikuliert wird. Um diesen 
diskursiven Wandel zu analysieren, wird der etablierte Diskurs um 
„Euroskeptizismus“ mit dem Begriff des Widerstands als gegenhegemoniale 
Bewegung ersetzt. Der Fokus der Analyse kann somit auf der Produktion und 
dem Wandel von Identifikationen innerhalb des Diskurses liegen.1120 Der 
poststrukturalistischen Tradition folgend, basiert die Analyse auf der 
qualitativen Auswertung verfügbarer Textdaten wie Reden von Politikern, 
Medienberichterstattung oder Debatten rund um den untersuchten Diskurs. Bei 
der vorliegenden Studie handelt es sich damit um eine theoretische Studie 
komplementiert durch Bezug zu empirischen Daten, die den diskursiven 
Wandel vom vermeintlich Permissiven Konsens zum Widerstand analysiert. 
Auf der Grundlage des ausgewählten Textkorpus werden darüber hinaus die 
theoretischen Logiken erforscht und die theoretischen Annahmen von Mouffe 
kritisch diskutiert. 
Die durchgeführte Analyse zeigt, dass die Anwendung des entwickelten 
Frameworks basierend auf Mouffe‘s AMD auf das Phänomens des Widerstands 
mit Hilfe der poststrukturalistischen Diskursanalyse in der Lage ist, nützliche 
Einsichten und ein besseres Verständnis der gestellten Forschungsfrage zu 
gewinnen. Die Analyse legt nahe, dass der Prozess der EUI in den früheren 
                                               
1117 Howarth, Norval, und Stavrakakis (2000: 3). 
1118 Howarth (2000: 126). 
1119 Howarth (2000: 113); Howarth (1995: 115); Paul (2009: 242); Carta (2019). 
1120 Crespy und Verschueren (2009). 
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Perioden seines Bestehens einen erheblichen Mangel an kontroverser Debatte 
und damit an Identifikation erfahren hat. Auf diese Weise wurden der 
Widerstand und die zunehmende Unterstützung von eurokritischen Anti-
Establishment-Parteien, die die Renationalisierung vorantreiben, gestärkt. 
Diese Prozesse zeigten zudem eine wachsende Unzufriedenheit mit der 
Institution, die in der Entscheidung Großbritanniens, die EU zu verlassen, 
gipfelte. Die Analyse stellt darüber hinaus Alternativen bereit, die 
Funktionsweise der demokratischen Institution zu verstehen und so dem 
wachsenden Widerstand gegenüber der EUI zu begegnen. Sie empfiehlt, dass 
in der gegenwärtigen Konstellation der europäischen Institutionen die 
Möglichkeit einer agonistischen Konfrontation hilfreich scheint, um eine 
stärkere Identifikation innerhalb der Institution der EU zu ermöglichen. Da 
Mouffe’s Model kein präzises agonistisches Reformprogramm vorschlägt, 
bezieht sich die vorliegende Arbeit auf den vielversprechenden Vorschlag eines 
umfassenden Reform- und Vergleichsansatz zur Implementierung des 
agonistischen Pluralismus von Manon Westphal.1121 Auf diese Weise wären die 
demokratischen Institutionen der EU in der Lage, Leidenschaft auf produktive 
Weise zu mobilisieren und gleichzeitig Kontingenz und Kontroversen zu 
stimulieren. Die durchgeführte Analyse besitzt daher starke Relevanz für die 
politischen Institutionen der EU indem es neue Räume für partizipative Politik 
eröffnet und somit die Einbeziehung von Akteuren ermöglicht, die sonst 
möglicherweise ausgeschlossen wären.1122 
Die vorliegende Studie ist somit wie folgt aufgebaut. Nach der Einleitung wird 
im zweiten Kapitel der Stand des Untersuchungsgegenstandes dargelegt. 
Zunächst wird anhand der Geschichte und der Entwicklung des Diskurses zur 
EUI die Entwicklung vom Permissiven Konsens zu zunehmendem Widerstand 
und dem Aufkommen eurokritischer Parteien dargestellt. Dann wird das 
                                               
1121 Westphal (2019: 6). Manon Westphal stellt einen vergleichenden und 
reformorientierten Ansatz für die Implementierung des AMD vor. Ihr Ansatz wird später 
in dieser Studie weiter illustriert. 
1122 Jones (2014: 14-15, 20). 
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bestehende Forschungsfeld zum Widerstand oder „Euroskeptizismus“ 
vorgestellt. Hier werden die beiden Hauptfelder zur „Natur“ des Phänomens 
und das Verständnis seiner „Ursachen“ illustriert. Daraufhin wird die 
Forschungslücke der vorliegenden Analyse vorgestellt, um die Relevanz der 
Arbeit darzulegen und den Mehrwert für das Forschungsfeld zu verdeutlichen. 
Das dritte Kapitel führt den theoretischen Hintergrund des Mouffe'schen 
Modells des agonistischen Pluralismus ein. Zum besseren Verständnis ihrer 
agonistischen Schriften wird zunächst Mouffes theoretische Entwicklung vom 
Marxismus zum Poststrukturalismus dargestellt. Dann werden die 
diskurstheoretischen Grundlagen, die sie gemeinsam mit Ernesto Laclau 
entwickelt, dargestellt, bevor das AMD von Mouffe vorgestellt wird. 
Schließlich wird ein analytischer Rahmen für die vorliegende Analyse 
entwickelt. Das vierte Kapitel geht auf die Forschungsstrategie der Analyse ein. 
Zunächst werden in diesem Kapitel die ontologischen und 
erkenntnistheoretischen Annahmen erläutert, die für die Auswahl der Daten und 
der Analysewerkzeuge maßgeblich sind. Dann wird eine deskriptive 
Darstellung der gesammelten Daten und des Materials für die Analyse 
eingeführt, bevor das Kapitel ausführt, wie die ausgewählten Daten und das 
Material mit Hilfe der poststrukturalistischen Diskursanalyse analysiert werden. 
Das fünfte Kapitel veranschaulicht die für die vorliegende Studie durchgeführte 
Analyse. Hier wird der entwickelte analytische Rahmen mit Hilfe der 
poststrukturalistischen Diskursanalyse auf die vorgestellten empirischen Daten 
angewendet. Das sechste Kapitel der Studie unternimmt eine Diskussion der 
Analyse und zieht Schlussfolgerungen sowohl für den theoretischen als auch 
für den praktischen Bereich der EUI. Darüber hinaus werden eine kritische 
Diskussion und Substantiierung des Mouffe-Modells geliefert. 
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